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ABSTRACT
The thesis argues that as technology and the economy are closely 
related, one factor undermining Mexico's economic performance may be 
the lack of a coordinated technology and innovation policy. It examines 
the relationships between three main participants in the national system 
of innovation: government, firms and financial institutions. Indigenous 
technology development in Mexico has become a more relevant debate 
since the country evolved from a protected to an open economy. 
Therefore, the period of study starts with the background of the 1970s, 
while the core of the thesis covers the mid-1980s onwards. It is argued 
that the economic crises of this period justify the need for, and hence the 
assessment of, government participation.
Among the different government policy tools, this work focuses on the 
financing of private firms' technology projects. Small and medium-size 
enterprises (SMEs) are the subgroup of firms analysed through both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Empirical evidence was gathered 
mainly from primary sources, including documents, in-depth interviews 
and a national survey of SMEs that have sought support from 
government agencies for undertaking technology projects.
Even if Mexico has the main elements that, by international standards, 
any national system of innovation should have, this research shows that 
the short-termism of the government policies to promote the 
development of technology clashes with the long-term nature of 
technology projects. The lack of effective coordination between 
participants within the system undermines the creation of national 
technology capabilities. Designers and users of technology promotion 
programmes are isolated from each other, and bridging institutions, like 
business chambers, are not bringing them closer overcoming divide. 
Small firms do not have internal resources for research and development 
(R&D) activities, and banks have been reluctant to fund technology 
projects. Therefore, this thesis makes the case for government 
intervention, while suggesting more suitable actions for change.
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'A company which wants to 
survive must innovate... The innovative 
performance of a company is affected 
by the conditions of the economy in 
which it operates. These in return are 
largely affected by the actions of the 
government/
David Budworth, 1996
1.1 - THE ARGUMENT
Current economic debate on growth theories emphasises the 
importance of technology as a determinant of growth. Moreover, the 
dispute with main-stream opposing theories lies precisely there, on 
whether technology should be treated as an exogenous or endogenous 
factor.1 Furthermore, the most recent studies of economic performance 
of nations are giving an increased weight to the role played by 
technology and innovation as an explanation of the different levels of 
competitiveness among countries (World Economic Forum and Harvard- 
CID 2000). Even though both the theorists and the empirical studies 
centre their attention on technology, the complex interactions of the 
processes and players involved in innovation systems have not been 
given the required attention as determinants of the innovative 
behaviour of a country.
The driving force behind this research is the underperformance of the 
Mexican economy over the last thirty years and the apparent
1 For a review of the evolution of the theoretical discussion see Chapter 2.
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relationship this has to a prolonged period of under-investment in 
technology and innovation. Within this context, the aim of this thesis is 
to understand why, despite many advantageous reforms in the 
economic climate of Mexico since the mid-1980s, there is little evidence 
of an improved position in innovation and technology. As Budworth 
argues, innovation is critical to companies' survival, but furthermore, 
the application of new technologies at the micro-level is the critical link 
between innovation as an isolated process and the performance of the 
national economy (Budworth 1996).
This research is timely, therefore, since after almost two decades of 
liberal reform, recent evidence suggests that during the period 1990- 
99, Mexico lagged far behind comparable countries such as Chile and 
Argentina, and even less-developed economies such as Bolivia, in terms 
of real growth in GDP per capita (World Economic Forum and Harvard- 
CID 2000). Indeed, over the comparable period during which this 
research has been formulated, Mexico has been outstripped in terms of 
growth by previously less-developed nations, thus the lack of 
investment in technology and innovation has come under increasing 
scrutiny as one critical factor.2
Given this underperformance by Mexico, it is necessary to reassess 
what appeared to be a promising climate for fostering innovation, and 
to ask what factors in the case of Mexico's economic and governmental 
reforms have inhibited, rather than stimulated, the development of the 
country's innovative capability. The economic factors are addressed 
first, before turning to the influence of government policy.
2 For instance, the most recent Global Competitiveness Report has introduced 
new measures of technical innovation and diffusion as key indicators of 
national competitiveness, after their tests based on the growth experience of 
the 1990s suggested that sustained high rates of economic growth depend on 
the ability of a national economy to upgrade technology, either through 
innovation at home or through the rapid and extensive adoption of 
technologies developed abroad (Sachs and Warner 2000).
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The Mexican economic context for innovative performance
Since the mid-1980s there have been many changes to the 
macroeconomic environment of Mexico which ostensibly should have 
favoured such capability. The preceding period was characterised by an 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) model, implemented following 
the Second World War, which, while encouraging industrial 
development, also led to favoured protection, regulation over open 
markets and to foreign investment inflows unaccompanied by 
technology transfer (Alcorta and Peres 1998; OECD 1994). The 
deficiencies of this model were highlighted by the first external crisis in 
1976. As a result of protection and over-regulation in all sectors of the 
economy, companies had been sheltered from the need to upgrade 
their technological resources. Furthermore, links between industry and 
science and technology (S&T) centres were virtually non-existent, and 
industry grew in sectors not necessarily tied to Mexico's comparative 
advantages (Alcorta and Peres 1998; OECD 1994; OECD 1997).
By the mid-1980s, Mexican government policy had changed 
dramatically, reorientating towards liberalisation. The change was 
extremely rapid, Mexico evolving from a highly protected environment 
into an open economy in a period of less than a decade. In 1986 it 
became a member of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) and by a 1995 had reduced significantly the average of trade 
barriers, had become part of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and a member of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). This sudden exposure to competition 
revealed the level of Mexico's technological deficit. Indeed, the situation 
mirrors the definition of 'technological backwardness', understood as 
the insufficient development of the set of social practices through which 
information is expected to become knowledge applied to production 
(Wionczek and Marquez 1993).
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Paradoxically, it was hoped that this liberalisation would also provide 
the favourable context for this deficit to be ameliorated. Larger markets 
supposedly bring about more incentives for innovation, since the fixed 
costs of research and development for a particular product are 
recompensed by more extensive sales in foreign markets. Thus, free 
trade reforms are expected naturally to expand world markets and 
provide a major boost to growth (Sachs and Warner 2000). Furthermore, 
if open trade and economic deregulation increase exposure to 
competition, in a competitive market environment, business 
opportunities are gained primarily by efficiency, technology 
development and innovation. This is as important for the defence of 
domestic markets as for capturing external market share. Therefore, 
managers need to promote technological modernisation as a core 
component of their business strategy.
This heightened awareness of the importance of technology coincided 
with the widespread reform of the financial system, principally the 
privatisation of the banking sector in 1991 following a period of state 
ownership in the 1980s. This would be expected to open up sources of 
funding to facilitate the necessary technological investment.
However, the Mexican experience indicates that this favourable 
environment was not capitalised upon. The 1999 figures show that just 
0.33 percent of GDP was spent on research and development (R&D), 
unchanged since 1991. In such terms, Mexico ranks 45th of the 59 
countries detailed by the World Economic Forum despite ranking 12th in 
terms of GNP. Moreover, the total R&D personnel per thousand in the 
labour force remains around 0.9 percent for the same period. A 
benchmark measure such as technological sophistication shows Mexico 
to rank below comparable countries such as Brazil and Chile (44th, 41st 
and 26th respectively), and far behind key competitors: the US ranked 
1st and Canada 13th (Conacyt 1996b; World Economic Forum and 
Harvard-CID 2000).
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This contributes to Mexico's continued low levels of economic growth. 
Even as this introduction is being written, press comment surrounding 
the World Economic Forum 2001 Davos Summit points to Mexico's poor 
growth over the preceding decade, averaging 1.2 percent per annum, 
and the critical role played by technological retardation (World 
Economic Forum and Harvard-CID 2000). Referring to such a context, 
La Jornada, a major national newspaper in Mexico, likened Mexico to a 
failing student who, despite having every opportunity, nonetheless 
never seems to improve his grade (Zuniga 2001).
The reasons for this failure lie firstly in the particular economic situation 
of Mexico. For while the opportunities outlined above represent an 
idealised model for growth, they do not reflect adequately the Mexican 
situation. A suitable economic environment, identified by Budworth 
(1996) as a determinant of innovative performance of companies (and 
by extension, nations) is not alone enough to guarantee a positive 
outcome. In the case of Mexico there are three main economic factors 
which have negated the potential released by the reforms of the recent 
years.
Firstly, there has been continued macroeconomic instability for a period 
of almost 30 years. The rapid restructuring during the 1980s, which 
allowed companies little time to adjust, was itself overlaid by a series of 
crises and consequent remedial policy initiatives. These repeated and 
ongoing fluctuations make even medium-term strategic planning futile. 
Furthermore, these crises compounded difficulties in the financial 
sector, already straining to readjust to private ownership.
Secondly, such volatility impacts most heavily upon small and medium­
sized enterprises (SMEs) which have few resources to allocate to R&D, 
which is perceived to be too risky, costly and slow to return investment. 
Without a historical legacy of innovation accumulated in a context of 
competition and stability, SMEs exposed to an aggressive and volatile
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environment are unable to engage in long-term technological 
development. The profile of the Mexican private sector is weighted 
heavily towards such SMEs, which make up 90 percent of private 
Mexican businesses.
Finally, alternative sources of funding usually available to SMEs are 
absent in the Mexican scenario, where there is a very poorly developed 
venture capital market. This reflects in Mexico's ranking 50th of 593 in 
respect of the availability of venture capital to entrepreneurs with 
innovative but risky projects (World Economic Forum and Harvard-CID 
2000).
In such an environment it is imperative that the government 
participates directly in fostering the innovative process. It is 
appropriate, therefore, to assess the policies of the Mexican 
government relating directly to technology in the light of the failures 
identified above.
Government policy and problems
To counteract this economic instability and successfully stimulate 
indigenous innovation growth, the Mexican government needs to 
provide a coherent policy framework. Two elements are essential; the 
approach must be holistic, integrating education and legal, financial and 
industrial policy; and this coherent framework must remain stable over 
a sufficient period of time to allow firms to formulate effective strategy.
Both these elements can be shown to be missing in the Mexican case. 
There has been a lack of coordination both within and between
3 Countries ranking higher include Argentina 43, Brazil 45, Canada 17, Chile 
34, Greece 25, India 30, Japan 26, Korea 11, Singapore 14, Thailand 42, 
Turkey 40, the UK 4 and the US 1. Bolivia and Ecuador ranked 58 and 59 
respectively (World Economic Forum and Harvard-CID 2000). This basket of 
countries will form the basis of more detailed comparisons later in the thesis.
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government departments and external agencies which has undermined 
the effectiveness of individual policy initiatives. Also, these initiatives 
have been predominantly responsive, determined by the volatile 
macroeconomic context. For reasons of political convenience, policies 
have targeted short-term goals, and without a credible system of 
accountability there has been little pressure to address long-term aims. 
This causes problems not only for companies, but also for the 
government itself, as the implementation of shifting programmes leads 
to bureaucratic confusion and inefficiency.
There is, therefore, an inherent conflict between the short-term political 
cycle and the R&D, innovation and technology cycle which by its nature 
takes a longer period of time to reach maturity and to realise 
commercial return. Even if the economic environment in Mexico had 
been stable, there is a case for government participation to overcome 
the long-term and risky nature of the innovation process, particularly 
for SMEs and at the early R&D stages. However, in Mexico's volatile 
situation, rapid changes in government policy have often proven at best 
ineffective and at worst counterproductive.
For example, during the period of liberal reforms, as we shall see later 
in this work, the government favoured a similar privatisation strategy in 
technology policy. The private sector was encouraged to take over 
responsibility for R&D and there was a simultaneous change in funding 
approach from direct state support through a system of grants to the 
use of the newly privatised banking sector as a credit intermediary. 
However, this policy failed because it was based on a naive 
understanding of the Mexican situation. As was outlined above, there 
was no history of private sector investment in R&D, and without any 
experience in evaluating innovative investment proposals, the banking 
sector was reluctant to release government funds. Furthermore, as this 
policy change was followed by a severe financial crisis, the seed-funding 
from the government was not matched by the banks' own investment.
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This transition from a grant-based to a credit-based system brings 
together all the elements introduced above, which cumulatively can 
explain the underperformance of the Mexican economy and the 
relationship that this has to technology and innovation, which formed 
the starting point of this introduction. It captures the inherent 
weaknesses of SMEs, the insufficiency of funding, and the impact of 
inappropriate policy design within the overall context of a rapid 
adjustment from a protectionist to a liberal economy. However, this 
context is not, in itself, the root of the problem. Neither regime has 
allowed a robust national system of innovation to develop, and so 
research must focus instead upon the nature of the central actors in the 
system and the dynamic relationships between them. A more detailed 
understanding of this complex interaction, thus far unresolved by 
existing research, may provide the key to breaking the vicious cycle of 
underinvestment in technology innovation and poor economic 
performance which has characterised the Mexican economy in the past 
30 years.
1.2 - THE RESEARCH APPROACH AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
THESIS
The description advanced above can be condensed into a clear research 
hypothesis: that the poor performance of the innovative system in 
Mexico can be explained not by headline policy shifts, such as 
stabilisation and liberalisation, but rather by political economy deficits - 
notably conflicting interests - within the national innovation system.
This core idea can also be represented graphically. Figure l.A  illustrates 
how the elements presented in the argument interrelate and thereby 
provides a natural structure for the thesis. The umbrella relationship 
between economic growth, technology and innovation will form the 
subject of the next chapter, while the evolution of the national system 
of innovation and the key processes of policy, indigenous innovation
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and financing, are the focus of subsequent chapters. These themes are 
shown to overlap the transition between economic systems, and will be 
unified through a case study presented in the penultimate chapter.
Figure l.A . Interrelations among the processes affecting the 
performance of Mexico's System of Innovation.
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Running through this structure is the central question of why, if 
technology is acknowledged as vital for economic development in any 
country, has Mexico not formulated an adequate long-term policy? This 
will be addressed in relation to the main actors in each one of the 
processes that make up the national system of innovation. The analysis 
of government policy will examine the role of policy makers and 
implementers within public sector institutions such as the National 
Council for Science and Technology (Conacyt); the National 
Development Bank (Nafin), the Ministry of Finance (SHCP), the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (Secofi), the Mexican Institute of Industrial 
Property (IMPI), and successive Presidents.
Governments can use a wide range of policy tools to promote and 
support innovation and technology-related activities including, amongst 
others, fiscal incentives, education, support for basic science, funding 
for universities and their link with the private sector, funding for the 
creation of R&D centres, and direct project financing. The importance, 
implementation and consequences of each could be the subject of a 
thesis in itself. For the purpose of this study, the government's financial 
instruments are the core policy under review.
The analysis of the private sector will focus upon the uptake of 
technology by small and medium-sized firms. This restricted focus can 
be justified for two reasons. Firstly, as detailed above, 90 percent of 
Mexican businesses fall into this category. Secondly, large firms 
generally have access to credit and capital (both domestic and foreign), 
and have traditionally allocated part of their budget to technology- 
related activites. The classification of firms for this study is related to 
their size and not to specific industrial sectors.
The leading national business associations like the Confederation of 
Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN) and the Chamber of the
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Transformation Industry (CANACINTRA) are also subjects of analysis 
because they form a bridge between private enterprise and the state.
Finally, the financing process will be investigated through an analysis of 
the role of privatised banks in the credit system as whole, and 
particularly the responsibility they were given for channeling the credits 
funded by public development banks and agencies (like Nafin and 
Conacyt) to the firms who required them.
Methodology framework
Given the different natures of the processes and actors to be examined 
in the research project, a cross-examination of several sources of data 
(primary and secondary/qualitative and quantitative) was needed, 
which in turn necesitated a multi-method approach.4 The analysis of the 
government institutions was based upon archive documents, including 
statistics, publications, policy outlines, internal documents, programme 
operation guides, and both official and internal material. This was 
supported by semi-structured and in-depth interviews of officials of 
different levels at the agencies involved in the policy network.5 This 
latter method was also used for the private sector, where it was applied 
to leaders of business associations and entrepreneurs of specific 
importance, and also to the banking sector, where credit executives 
were interviewed.6 The core of the empirical work was based on an 
analytical survey,7 conducted at a national level, which questioned8 
executives from a group of SMEs that had expressed an interest in
4 For a detailed account of the sources, tools and methodology used, see 
Appendix 1.
5 For the reference numbers of interviews and the detailed list of interviewees 
see Appendix 3. For the summary of topics used in the guides for interviews 
see Appendix 4.
6 Ibid.
7 For a detailed description of the methodology used for the design, testing, 
sampling application, processing and analysis of the survey's data, see 
Appendix 1.
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technological development over the period 1980-98. This group was 
identified as being those firms that had approached government 
agencies for assistance since the first assistance programme was 
established in 1980, at the earliest stages of liberal reform.9
From this national-scale analysis of SMEs, three particularly interesting 
cases emerged and became the subject for deeper study. This involved 
a mixture of qualitative methods including visits to the firm for 
observation and open discussion with different people within the 
organisation. A reconstruction of the firms' experiences was possible 
and this helped to shed light on the problems that they faced when 
developing a technology project within the wider context described 
above.10
This marks a distinct change in approach from previous work, conceived 
within the context of protectionism, which focused on the analysis of 
the formal scientific and R&D communities and their relationship with 
government and business interests. However, in the new market- 
oriented economy, the centre of gravity in the system has shifted, 
revolving around the takeup of innovation by businesses. In 
consequence, this thesis will consider the scientific and academic 
sectors as providers of technology services to private businesses and 
will not, therefore, be concerned with the direct funding of R&D perse.
Structure of the thesis
Following the structure of Figure l.A , the argument proceeds as 
follows:
8 For the survey questions and reference numbers see Appendixes 6 (Spanish) 
or Appendix 7 (English).
9 The list including the name and location of the firms whose owner or director- 
general responded to the survey's questionnaire is detailed in Appendix 5.
10 A summary of the case studies is presented in Appendix 2.
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Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature concerning technology and 
its links to economic growth and government intervention. The main 
concepts of technology and innovation are defined and the key 
relationships between technology and economic growth under different 
theoretical approaches discussed. Then the arguments are presented 
for and against state intervention as a crucial promoter of the building 
of national technological capability. The experiences of some East Asian 
and Latin American countries are described to show how important the 
interaction of states and markets can be in the technological 
development of a country. While more specifc theoretical discussions 
are introduced for each individual chapter, this chapter defines the 
overall theoretical approach towards political economy that is to be kept 
in mind throughout the thesis.
Chapter 3 sets out the theory behind a national system of innovation 
(NSI) as a context for the analysis of the Mexican case. The evolution of 
the Mexican system is described, from the era of the protected 
economy to the recent economic liberalisation. The participants of the 
system and their roles are presented, and special emphasis is placed on 
the aspects of legal industrial protection. In order to evaluate the status 
and performance of the system in relation to a sample of other 
countries, some comparative measurements -such as patents and 
expenditure -  are introduced, leading to the question of why Mexico 
does not have a support package similar to those that exist in the 
countries against which it is competing.
The next three chapters take a closer look at the three specific players 
that influence the performance of the system: government, private 
firms and financial institutions:
Chapter 4 shows how technology policy is created in Mexico, focusing 
on the political forces and bureaucratic system that affect the manner in 
which decisions concerning innovation and technology policies are
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adopted and implemented. A brief description of the Mexican political 
system introduces the basic notions of the theory of the State, and 
provides the background to a historical account of the evolution of 
technology policy and the government institutions involved. Key 
questions addressed in this chapter include why the government is now 
in favour of using the free market to dictate the national technology 
system, and whether this results in the efficient performance of the 
resulting basket of policy instruments. Furthermore, the importance 
placed upon technology policy by politicians will be questioned, as will 
their inability to avoid mistakes of previous administrations. These 
questions emerge through the experiences of firms that have interacted 
with those agencies and the obstacles and limitations they have 
encountered.
Chapter 5 follows this by looking at the other side of technology policy: 
the private firms, or in other words, the 'clients' of the policy. The role 
of firms and businessmen is central in any analysis of innovation and 
technology development, as companies are the ultimate users of 
technological advances. This chapter analyses the capability of small 
firms that operate under free trade in a developing country like Mexico 
to both engage in innovation activities and develop indigenous 
technology, rather than acquiring it from abroad. In the context of the 
evolution of Mexico's private sector, together with its relationship with 
the government, the role of business associations in helping their 
members to engage in such activities is evaluated. This provokes the 
questions as to why these private sector representatives have not 
appealed more strongly for support in technology-related matters, and 
why there has been such a limited uptake of such government support 
as is available.
Chapter 6 brings a third actor into the dynamics of technology 
development: financial institutions. Any innovation or technology 
project has costs associated with it, thus financing is a crucial input for
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its development. This chapter assesses the role of national systems for 
financing innovation and the dramatic shifts experienced by banks in 
Mexico in the past 20 years. The attitude of commercial banks towards 
investment in technology underpins the viability of firms to develop 
their projects. We must question, therefore, why the financial sector in 
Mexico does not recognise the importance and potential profitability of 
participating in technology development projects. When banks and 
firms do not understand each other's needs, and in consequence the 
technology efforts of the country are hampered, the question arises: 
should the government participate in the financing of private firms' 
technology projects? That is the subject of the final chapter.
Chapter 7 has two main objectives: first, to understand and define the 
government's place as an important player in the financing of 
innovation; and second, using the analysis of programmes for direct 
project financing, to present a technology policy case study that 
reconstructs the interactions between the system of innovation and the 
technology policy network. This case study illustrates, within the 
theoretical framework of the thesis, how Mexico's historical background 
and economic, political and social culture have important effects on the 
development and strengthening of the technology capabilities of small 
firms. The programmes of Banco de Mexico, Nafin and Conacyt, with an 
emphasis on FIDETEC, are the centre of analysis, examined from the 
perspective of their users, designers, operators and intermediaries. 
Important conclusions are drawn and can be extrapolated as supportive 
of the thesis' general conclusions.
The final chapter will review the evidence presented in support of the 
central hypothesis, and suggest that this innovative approach towards 
the issue of technology may open future opportunities for overcoming 
the obstacles to technological investment, not only in Mexico, but also 




A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY, ITS 
LINK TO THE ECONOMY AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
'Technical change is one of the 
most important sources of long-term 
economic growth...Classical, neo­
classical, Keynesian and Schumpeterian 
economists alike would accept this
assertion of the key role which 
technical change plays in fostering
economic growth/
Daniele Archibugi and Jonathan Michie, 
1998
INTRODUCTION
Technology is a word that has become part of our everyday vocabulary. 
We find the concept of technology as part of our lifestyles from dawn 
until dusk. Moreover, technology is embedded in the economy of 
nations and of the world as a whole (Turner and Hodges 1992), and the 
full range of players and events that surround technological innovation 
is vast. But this thesis is not about technologies as ends in themselves, 
rather the fact that they are widely considered central to economic
growth. As governments of nations are concerned with the promotion of
growth, they cannot afford to ignore the processes of innovation and 
technology development. It is, then, technology as a tool for the 
promotion o f economic growth which is the main interest of this work. 
The topic is by nature complex and can be dealt with in many different 
ways. The approach of this discussion is political and economic, in the 
sense that it explores the dynamics of the interaction between the
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public and the private sector in the field of innovation and technology 
generation, and the impacts on the economy.
In Section 1 of this chapter the sometimes confusing or overlapping 
main concepts surrounding technology and innovation are 
differentiated. The meaning of technology and systems of innovation as 
well as the introduction of the suppliers, users and intermediaries in the 
process of technology development are presented. Section 2 reviews 
the theories regarding the relationship between technology and 
economic growth. It describes various approaches, including classical, 
Schumpeterian, neo-classical, new growth, and evolutionary.
The interaction of the government and markets in the study of 
technology capability building is discussed in Section 3. The approach is 
a political and economic one: arguments for and against state 
intervention are discussed. Section 4 proceeds to present some 
important aspects of technology and the economic performance of 
developing countries in East Asia and Latin America, to set the context 
for the core chapters of the thesis which centre around the case of 
Mexico.
2.1 -  CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
Technology, R&D and innovation
Perhaps the simplest way to describe the elements that revolve around 
this field of study is to start with definitions of concepts. The 
relationships between these concepts and their impact on economic 
performance will be assessed in the following section.
The dividing line between the meaning of technology and the meaning 
of innovation is virtually impossible to draw. Both concepts are directly 
linked with production of goods, and one cannot be understood without
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the other. A conventional definition of technology considers it 'the 
branch of knowledge dealing with scientific and industrial methods and 
their practical use in industry1 (Longman Group Ltd. 1978). To put it 
more succinctly, it is the practical use of science. On the other hand, a 
series of authors define innovation as the initial introduction of a new 
product and/or the first use of a new product process. An innovation 
always rests upon an invention, that is, on new knowledge which is 
transformed by the innovator into economic activity. Research and 
development (R&D) is generally defined as investigative and 
experimental work carried out to acquire new scientific and technical 
knowledge, to devise and develop new products and processes or to 
apply newly-acquired knowledge in making technically significant 
improvements to existing products or processes (Christy and Ironside 
1987).
A more elaborate set of definitions has been compiled by Lundvall 
(1992b) and he starts with the fact that in the models of standard 
economics, innovations appear as extraordinary events, coming from 
the outside, which temporarily disturb the general equilibrium. After a 
process of adjustment, reflecting the work of the price mechanism, a 
new state of equilibrium is established. This approach might have been 
adequate in pre-industrial societies where innovations seemed to occur 
as rare and exogenous events. Nowadays, however, innovation is a 
fundamental and inherent phenomenon; the long-term competitiveness 
of firms, and of national economies, reflect their innovative capability 
and firms must engage in activities which aim at innovation merely in 
order to hold their ground. An innovation may be regarded as a new 
use of pre-existing possibilities and components. Almost all innovations 
reflect knowledge already in existence, but combined in new ways. 
Sometimes, the process of innovation results in radical breaks with the 
past, making a substantial part of accumulated knowledge obsolete. 
Schumpeter's concept of creative destruction points to this discontinuity 
and might be applied not only to the structure of production, but also to
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the structure of knowledge. Innovation appears not primarily as a single 
event, but rather as a process (Schumpeter 1934; Schumpeter 1943).
The following threefold taxonomy distinguishes between incremental 
and basic (or radical) innovations while also looking at clusters of 
related innovations (Freeman 1987a):
• Incremental Innovation. This is a relatively smooth continuous 
process leading to steady improvement in the array of existing 
products and services and the ways in which they are produced. The 
rate of incremental change varies greatly between different 
industries.
• Radical Innovations. These are discontinuous events. They may lead 
to serious dislocations, economic perturbations and adjustments for 
the firms in a particular sector. Examples would be the introduction 
of the television or of an entirely new material in the textile industry.
• Technological Revolutions. These are the gales of creative 
destruction which are at the heart of Schumpeter's long wave 
theory. The introduction of railways or electric power are examples.
To justify the description of a technological revolution, a change 
must not only lead to the emergence of new leading branches of the 
economy and a whole range of new product groups, it must also 
have fundamental effects on many other branches of the economy 
by transforming their methods of production and their input cost 
structure.
Moreover, innovations take two forms: product innovations and process 
innovations. The innovation process involves both, creating new 
knowledge and drawing on the knowledge pool to generate new 
products and processes. Further, it extends beyond the initial 
introduction of a new product to its diffusion among potential 
consumers and/or users, and includes the responses of producers to 
market feedback from buyers of new and existing products (Hall 1986).
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Whether product or process innovation, the innovation line itself has 
three parts: invention-innovation-diffusion.
The great diversity which characterises innovative activity implies that 
no one channel or institutional form could be expected to provide an 
ideal framework for innovation; there is a variety of sources 
distinguishing between the roles of external and internal learning in the 
innovation process (Freeman 1995; Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman 
1969; Metcalfe and Diliso 1996). Different inventories can be found 
throughout the related literature defining the crucial factors that 
encourage innovation. A comprehensive account would include 
(Dodgson and Bessant 1996):
• A thriving science base
• An educated and highly skilled workforce
• A range of intermediary organisations interlinking science base and 
industry
• Effective government policies and programmes designed to promote 
university/industry linkages
• Effective government policies towards technology-based joint 
ventures and offsets
• Legal protection of intellectual property rights
• A regulatory regime that encourages objective rather than de facto 
standards
• Strong managerial competence within firms
• Receptivity towards external know-how within firms
• Intermediaries between users and suppliers, providing a set of 
bridging institutions
• Availability of seed, venture and risk investment capital
• Firms experienced in linkages with other firms: customers, suppliers, 
competitors in long-term, trust-based relationships
• A number of progressive, leading firms in key sectors prepared to 
act as demonstrators to the rest of the industry
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• Employee mobility between and within firms, and between firms and 
the science base
• Supportive local and regional environments
• Good information and communications technology infrastructure.
Given the increasingly scientific character of technology it is difficult to 
separate many of the elements of science policy from those of 
technology or innovation policy (Gonsen 1998). This work refers to 
'science and technology (S&T) policy' but the emphasis is on the 
aspects most closely related to technology development and innovation.
Innovation systems
Perhaps the most popular contribution concerning innovation systems1 
is that of Lundvall. He talks about the fact that in the real world the 
state and the public sector are rooted in national states and their 
geographical sphere of influence is defined by national borders. The 
focus upon national systems of Innovation reflects the fact that national 
economies differ regarding the structure of the production system and 
the general institutional setup. It is assumed that basic differences in 
historical experience, language and culture will be reflected in national 
idiosyncrasies in internal organisation of firms, inter-firm relationships, 
the role of the public sector, institutional setup of the financial sector, 
R&D intensity and R&D organisation, all of which together constitute the 
elements of the system (Lundvall 1992b). The relationships between 
the elements are just as important. In this respect, Nelson focuses the 
analysis upon the combined public and private character of technology 
and the role of, respectively, private firms, government and universities 
in the production of new technology (Nelson 1987; Nelson 1988). 
Furthermore, Freeman focuses upon the interaction between the
1 For a detailed review of the concept of National Systems of Innovation see 
Chapter 3.
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production system and the process of innovation and applies a 
combination of organisation and innovation theory (Freeman 1987b).
Bo Carlsson (1994) makes a further distinction about technological 
systems, which are not the same as national systems of innovations. 
They have been defined as networks of agents interacting in each 
specific technology area under a particular institutional infrastructure 
for the purpose of generating, diffusing, and utilizing technology. 
Technological systems differ from national systems of innovation in 
several important dimensions (Carlsson and Eliasson 1991, 111):
1. Technological systems are defined by technology rather than 
national boundaries. They are not necessarily bounded by national 
borders, although they are certainly influenced by cultural, linguistic 
and other circumstances which facilitate or impede contacts among 
units within the system. An important dimension in which 
technological systems may differ from one another is the degree to 
which they are international in character.
2. Technology systems vary in character and extent from one 
technology area to another within any given country. A country may 
be strong in one technology and weak in another.
3. A further difference concerns the degree of emphasis on diffusion 
and utilisation as distinct from creation of new technology. As a 
result, technological systems tend to place more emphasis on the 
microeconomic (as distinct from macro-oriented public policy) 
aspects of technology diffusion and utilisation. The creation of new 
technology pushes out the production possibility frontier or 
opportunity set. But it cannot be simply assumed that just because a 
technology exists, it is also known and used effectively. Unless the 
expanded opportunity set is converted into economic-
entrepreneurial activity, it has no economic impact.
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Private businesses can make their contribution to strengthening the 
technological system of which they are a part, while at the same time 
enhancing the chances of their own success, by increasing their 
economic competence in all areas, by increasing their R&D efforts, by 
initiating and building new bridging institutions while strengthening 
existing ones, by articulating the requirements to which the academic 
sector can respond, and by broadening their technological base 
(Carlsson and Eliasson 1991). Apart from private firms, other 
participants include financial institutions, the legal institutions that offer 
protection to intellectual property, science and technology institutions 
and educational institutions.
Suppliers and users in the innovation process and their 
limitations
The suppliers and users of the innovation process are presented in the 
tables below, showing the limitations that each of them present 
(Dodgson and Bessant, 1996). Table 2.1 first displays the list of the 
main providers of innovation together with their unique limiting factors. 
Table 2.2 refers to the users or demanders of innovation. The following 
section deals with the bridging institutions that act as the intermediaries 
between the two.
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Table 2.1. Suppliers in the innovation process.
Supplier Limitations
Lone inventor Lacking in networks and contacts within user 
firms, marketing skills and experience, 
understanding of user needs, and project 
management experience.
University laboratory Lacking in industrial perspective, project 
management experience, marketing skills and 
experience. Has a long-term focus, advances 
in knowledge rather than in application. 
Technology-push emphasis.
New technology-based firms Limited in size and resources to manage the 
innovation process. Limited understanding of 
user needs. Lack of networks. Technology- 
push emphasis.
Commercial R&D laboratory Lacking in long-term experience and 
resources to pursue advanced experimental 
work. Bias towards larger clients.
Government R&D laboratory Over-reliant on the technology-push model. 
Insulated from awareness of commercial 
needs and real cost pressures. Different time 
horizons from users.
Technology institute Technology-push orientation. Lack of 
marketing awareness or skills. Designed on 
university model but lack of long-term 
technology strength
Large industrial firm Danger of resources being concentrated on 
the short-term. Lack of breadth coverage.
Consultancy Very short-term emphasis. Limited capacity.
Regional technology centre May lack technological depth, depends on the 
strength of its supply-side network.
Overseas supplier Problems of arm's length transactions.
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Table 2.2. Users in the innovation process.
User Limitations
Small firm Lack of awareness. Limited search 
behaviour. Lack of understanding of 
needs or ability to articulate them. 
Lack of network/access to suppliers.
New technology-based small firm Lack of marketing awareness. Strong 
technology push, problems of risk 
finance.
Medium-sized firm Deploys limited innovation resources 
to best ends. Lack of strategic 
perspective on technology/market.
Large organisation Over-dependence on internal 
technical resources. Insular networks 
and relationships. Limited search 
behaviour.
Intermediaries in the innovation process
It  is the overall system and the quality of interconnections within it that 
affect successful innovation. In particular, intermediaries in the process 
are important. Examples of such intermediaries include technology 
brokers, advisory and consultancy firms, university departments, 
regional technology centres, research and technology organisations, 
innovation agencies, and cross-national networks. Effective innovation 
policy requires a whole range of contributing factors: particularly 
important targets are the development of innovative capabilities within 
firms and the sensitive construction of 'bridges' via intermediaries to 
reach the suppliers (Dodgson and Bessant 1996).
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Finance in the national systems of innovation2
Schumpeter was one of the first to discuss the importance of credit in 
the process of innovation. According to him, the entrepreneur is the 
driving force in the process of innovation, but he must be able to 
convince the banks to provide him with credit to finance the innovation 
(Schumpeter 1934, 69). He considers the lender's judgment of the 
borrower to set the limit of credit expansion, and his contribution is still 
enlightening. The key characteristic of innovation in this context is its 
requirement for finance, since it involves a number of different 
categories of investment -  broadly defined as a sacrifice of cash flow in 
the present or near future with a view to improved cash flow later.
Although the government is not, strictly speaking, a financial institution, 
it does allocate resources for both private and public R&D and 
innovation.3 The financial burden of research is often the most 
important obstacle to innovation, particularly in the case of smaller 
firms, and also for projects which require a good deal of development 
work. Thus, direct financing from governments of R&D activities in 
these cases can be one of the major, and most effective, policy tools 
used by governments.
2.2 -  VIEWS ON TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION AND THE
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF NATIONS
Overview of the traditional approaches to technology and 
growth
As stated at the start of the chapter, the importance of the study of 
technological innovation in this case is related to its impact on economic
2 For a detailed discussion of the role of finance in national systems of 
innovation see Chapter 6.
3 See Chapter 7.
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growth and development. Whether growth derives predominantly from 
quantity changes in inputs or from technological change has always 
been a matter of great controversy, although the causal link between 
technical change on the one hand and growth on the other is 
undisputed -  even though its calculation depends to a large extent 
upon definitions and measurement methods used. However, classical, 
neo-classical, Keynesian, Schumpeterian and institutionalist economists 
alike, from Adam Smith to Robert Solow via Ricardo and Marx, would 
accept the assertion of the key role which R&D and technical change 
play in fostering long-term economic growth. Such growth cannot occur 
to any significant extent in the absence of such technical change (OECD 
1992; Usher 1980). New processes allow an increase in output per unit 
of input while new products create new markets and provide scope for 
output growth. Nevertheless, this proposition that investment in R&D 
and technological progress are essential for future growth has not yet 
been conclusively empirically demonstrated (Archibugi and Michie 1998; 
OECD 1992).
Marx in the 19th century and Schumpeter in the 20th placed innovation 
at the very centre of their growth theories. Paradoxically, Marx, 
although a powerful critic of capitalist society, admired it as far as 
innovation was concerned, as capitalism depends for its very existence 
on a constant drive to introduce new products and processes. In Marx's 
approach, when an individual capitalist doubles the productivity of 
labour whilst the value of the means of production remains the same, 
the articles produced have cost less labour time than the rest of the 
same article produced under average conditions. However, as the real 
value of a commodity is its social value, the capitalist who applies the 
new method sells his commodity at its social value and realises an extra 
surplus value as he has lower production costs. On the other hand, this 
surplus value vanishes as soon as the new method becomes generally 
used, and dissipates the difference between the individual value and the 
social value (Marx 1858, 312-317).
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The microeconomic processes involved in the adoption of innovations, 
which today are commonly described as Schumpeterian, were clearly 
recognised by Classical economists (Cooper 1992). For instance, David 
Ricardo wrote: '...He...who made the discovery of the machine, or who 
first usefully applied it, would enjoy an additional advantage, by making 
great profits for a time../ (Ricardo 1830, 378-379). In both Ricardo's 
and Marx's view, the conclusion is that innovations in general leave the 
'rate of surplus value' unaffected because of the re-assertion of 
equilibrium; but innovations in the wage goods sector reduce the costs 
of labour time in all other sectors.
In Schumpeter's theory, the ability and initiative of entrepreneurs, 
drawing upon the discoveries of scientists and inventors, create entirely 
new opportunities for investment, growth and employment. 
Schumpeter's analysis in its early form places considerable emphasis on 
the tendency of the industry to return to equilibrium. He suggests the 
idea that a re-organisation of the industry takes place in the re­
establishment of equilibrium. Subsequently, Schumpeter's thinking 
moved toward the notion of continual change as a result of a succession 
of innovations, leading to a continual reorganisation of the economic 
system in which the re-establishment of equilibrium is pre-empted by 
further rounds of innovation (Schumpeter 1934, 156). Later he wrote 
that the capitalist economy is incessantly being revolutionised from 
within and that existing structures and all the conditions of doing 
business are constantly in the process of change (Schumpeter 1943).
Recent theoretical approaches to innovation have been based primarily 
on empirical observation of firms' behaviour and have been informed by 
the Schumpeterian concept of how competition takes place in the 
industrial sector.
In the late 1950s, Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) attempted to 
account for economic growth in the United States, finding it to be not
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fully explained by the increase in productive inputs such as labour and 
capital alone. The largest part of growth was thus attributed to a 
residual, which was labelled 'technical change' (Abramovitz 1956; Solow 
1957). In subsequent international comparative research studies it was 
shown that growth theories varied considerably across nations and that 
differences in technological competences played a significant role. 
Technology was treated as a public good, meaning that it was viewed 
as freely available to all economic agents, costly to generate but able to 
be assimilated with nil or negligible costs.
The basic prediction of the neo-classical theory, based on the notion 
that the main engine of growth -  technology -  was a freely available 
good, was that in the long run all countries should converge towards a 
similar income level (providing that they were experiencing the same 
rates of capital accumulation). This assumption has been challenged as 
unrealistic (Nelson and Wright 1992; Rosenberg 1972). This is due in 
large measure to the fact that in conventional neo-classical 
(comparative static) analysis, technological change is treated as an 
exogenous factor.
Neo-classical growth models since the pioneering work of Solow have 
also pointed to the crucial importance of technical and institutional 
change as expressed in the relatively large residual factor. Classical 
economic analysis envisaged that per capita output would be stationary 
as the rate of profit declined with diminishing improvements in 
productivity. The neo-classical tradition also incorporated the idea of 
falling marginal product of inputs, so that sustained growth was 
possible only through exogenous technological change (Solow 1957). I f  
countries have access to the same technology, therefore, growth rates 
would be expected to converge across countries. Records of industrial 
countries offer support for convergence (World Bank 1991).
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The growth rates of developing countries, however, have diverged. At 
first glance, this seems to be at odds with the expectation of 
convergence. But in practice, technological change has neither been 
equal nor has it been exogenously transmitted in most developing 
countries, because of import and other restrictions. Furthermore, even 
if all economies have access to the same technology, national growth 
rates can differ if human capital and the incentives to adopt new 
technology differ across countries. The new growth theories note that 
technological change is endogenous, and that education and knowledge 
produce positive externalities or increasing returns (Lucas 1988; Romer 
1986).
In order to understand the relationship between technological change 
and economic growth more fully, we need to take an approach in which 
technological change is at least to some extent endogenised. In a 
theory in which technological change is endogenous, the existence of a 
variety of products, processes, economic agents, and institutions that 
exist in the economy must be recognised. The interdependence among 
these various entities, must similarly be recognised: it must deal with 
systems rather than with individual units. And it must be dynamic, 
recognising economic growth as a continuous process in which 
technologies and institutions co-evolve over time rather than as an end 
result at a moment in time (Carlsson 1994). New growth theory 
attempts to incorporate some measures of technological learning 
(Aghion and Howitt 1989; Aghion and Howitt 1992; Grossman and 
Helpman 1989; Lucas 1988; Romer 1986).
Despite its limitations, the 'new growth theory' highlights the interaction 
between growth and technology-related tangible and intangible 
investment. I f  the increasing returns associated with the features of 
technological change can be successfully introduced into macro- 
economic growth analysis and modelling, the results may show more 
satisfactorily (OECD 1992).
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Even if emerging countries may benefit from technology developed by 
more advanced nations, the institutional theory suggested that the 
attainment of equal income is neither automatic nor easy to accomplish. 
Institutional factors such as social rigidity, class structure, or an 
unwillingness to provide incentives for the innovators can seriously 
hamper the attainment (or 'catch-up') potential of a nation 
(Gerschenkron 1962; Olson 1982; Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986).
These arguments were supported by a large body of evidence, more of 
a historical than an econometric nature. The history of economic growth 
shows that growth patterns tend to be related to specific economic, 
institutional, social and cultural differences across countries (Archibugi 
and Michie 1998). Economists and economic historians within both the 
neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary school and the more traditional 
approaches to the international political economy have shown 
considerable interest in the 'catch-up' process in economic 
development. They have stressed the role of technological and 
institutional change, and have pointed to the dynamic interaction 
between trade performance and growth performance (Freeman 1996). 
Partly as a result of historical accidents and partly as a result of
deliberate policies and institutional changes, some countries have
proved more adept in exploiting the potential of these new
technologies, both in world trade and in domestic growth.4
Generalising from these discussions it would seem that to close a gap in 
income, backward or developing nations need to catch up with
technologically-advanced nations in terms of technological competence. 
A successful strategy for economic development will therefore be 
associated with the ability of the country in question to create their own 
endogenous know-how (Archibugi and Michie 1998). Thus, investment 
policies that encourage externality-generating activities (improvements
4 A qualitative analysis can attempt to capture some of those aspects of 
institutional change (Fagerberg 1988).
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in education) or introduce increasing returns (improvements in physicai 
infrastructure) can be good for growth. Also important are 
complementary policies that facilitate the spread of knowledge and that 
permit free entry and exit of firms and free mobility of people, capital 
and technology (World Bank 1991).
Technology and growth in developing countries: the
evolutionary approach
It  is possible to say that much of the traditional literature presented up 
to now has neglected the need for, and production of, technological 
activity in developing countries. Neo-classical theory simply assumes 
the problem will go away. Firms in a given industry are all on the same 
production function and select their technologies with reference to the 
relative factor price ratio, shifting costlessly along the function as this 
ratio changes. Moreover, in the highly simplified models used in trade 
theory, technology is taken to be freely available to all countries, and 
within countries to all firms. Developing countries are presumed to 
receive all relevant improvements from developed country innovators. 
There is no problem in assimilating the transferred technology in the 
developing country, and no adaptations are required, since alternatives 
are available for all factor prices. In the traditional approaches, 
developing countries select and, at no cost, apply those innovations 
that are useful or appropriate. The role of technological activity in 
developing countries is minimised, as well as the need for policies to 
support, protect and induce such activity (Lall 1992a).
Neo-classical approaches to development thus tend to confine 
themselves to cutting back government intervention in firms' 
technological activity, and also public S&T technology infrastructure. 
Where they admit the need for interventions in industry, they favour 
neutral rather than selective interventions (Lall 1991).
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In contrast to the analyses just mentioned, new approaches to the 
issues of technology in developing countries have recently appeared. 
These have assigned a central role to indigenous technological effort in 
mastering new production processes, adapting them to local conditions, 
improving upon them within the economy and exploiting them overseas 
by manufactured export growth and diversification, and by exporting 
the technologies themselves (Lall 1992a). These factors can be 
considered separately at the firm and the national levels.5
Firm-level technological capabilities
The micro-level analysis of technology in developing countries has 
drawn a great deal of inspiration from the 'evolutionary theories' 
developed by Nelson and Winter (1982), and explained in Nelson 
(1981) and Dosi (1988). The starting point of these theories is that 
firms differ in terms of the production function. Technological 
knowledge is not shared equally among firms, nor is it easily imitated 
by or transferred across firms. Transfer necessarily requires learning 
because technologies are tacit, and their underlying principles may not 
always be clearly understood (Dosi 1988; Nelson 1981; Nelson and 
Winter 1982). As a description of reality, in both developed or less- 
developed countries, the evolutionary approach is more believable than 
the production function theories. As Dosi puts it, evolutionary theories 
can explain the 'permanent existence of asymmetries among firms, in 
terms of their process technologies and quality of output' (Dosi 1988, 
1155). Once firm-level technological change is understood as a 
continuous process involving the absorption or creation of technical 
knowledge, determined partly by external inputs and partly by past 
accumulation of skills and knowledge, it is evident that 'innovation' can 
be defined much more broadly to cover all types of search and 
improvement efforts.
5 For a more detailed discussion see Chapter 5 .
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National technological capabilities
Countries differ in their ability to exploit technologies or bring forth 
technological innovation. The technological competence of a country's 
industrial sector may be manifested in a number of variables such as its 
dynamism, competitiveness, diversification, productivity growth or 
export performance (Lall 1990; Lall 1991; Lall 1992a). There is no 
theory that brings together all the factors that may influence these 
variables, as different studies analyse different influences. Moreover, 
national capabilities are not simply the sum of thousands of individual 
firm-level capabilities developed in isolation. Aggregated firm-level 
capabilities are affected by a series of policy variables and institutions 
which produce the technological competitiveness of a country's 
economy as a whole (Lall 1992b). Therefore, over the long-term, 
economic growth arises from the interactions of capabilities and 
incentives operating in an institutional framework: institutions set the 
rules of the game and act to alter capabilities and change incentives 
(OECD 1987). Moreover, it can be argued that the emergence of 
advantage depends on a complex evolution of competitive and 
cooperative ties among local firms, on government policies and on a 
host of other social and political institutions (Porter 1990).
In developing countries, just as for developed ones, given the skills and 
incentives to engage in technology activities, performance would still 
differ depending on the ability of institutions and government policies to 
overcome market failures and protect innovative activities. Therefore, 
the next section discusses how government intervention affects all 
aspects of technology development.
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2.3 -  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INNOVATION: THE
INTERACTION OF STATES AND MARKETS
Important efforts are made by companies and governments to create, 
enhance and diffuse technology. In this interaction, states and markets 
show a clear case of political economy (Dodgson and Bessant 1996). 
Technology-based products account for the highest and fastest growing 
proportion of world trade, which explains much of the corporate and 
public policy interest in technological innovation. Firms use technology 
as a fundamental driver of competitiveness, and in a wide variety of 
ways governments support corporate technological activities as the 
primary agents of technical advance within an economy.
Although it is essential for firms to stay in business, technological 
innovation is a lengthy and frequently uncertain process. Firms' 
preparedness to invest valuable resources in something so costly, 
disruptive and unpredictable derives from confidence in the potential 
comparative competitive advantage it can offer. There are ways in 
which public policies can assist firms to improve awareness of why and 
how to invest in technology, and to overcome the complexities and 
uncertainties of innovation so as to enhance their own and their nations1 
competitiveness and ability to pay their way in the world (Dodgson and 
Bessant 1996).
Governments face information and incentive problems no less than the 
private market. Therefore, good policy requires the identification of 
market failures and the differentiation between those causes of failure 
that can be directly attacked by making markets work more effectively 
and those that cannot. It is important to identify which market failures 
can be ameliorated through non-market institutions. It is important to 
recognise both the limits and strengths of the markets, as well as the 
limits and strengths of government intervention aimed at correcting 
market failures (Stiglitz 1989).
56
When there is a call, in some countries at least, for less government 
involvement (interference) in industry, it is becoming increasingly 
evident that consideration of the threats and opportunities posed by 
radical innovations need to be an important component of government 
policy (Rothwell and Zegveld 1981). Since it implies greater 
government involvement with industry, this could pose a dilemma. 
Involvement of industry in policy formulation and implementation 
processes might go some way towards resolving this dilemma; it should 
also result in policies of greater relevance to the needs of industry. 
Moreover, world economic crisis can be structural, and bound to a 
significant extent with the mode of evolution of industries and of 
technologies, implying that the changes necessary to overcome them 
are difficult and rather long-term in perspective (Rothwell and Zegveld 
1981).
On a more general level, some economists, businessmen and politicians 
are seriously worried by the proliferation of government controls and 
regulation of all kinds, which take up a great deal of management time 
and effort. Others, on the other hand, argue that the costs, 
complexities and risk-taking of technical innovation in many branches of 
industry are now becoming so great that an even higher degree of 
government involvement at all levels is quite inevitable. Moreover, it is 
argued that government-backed international competition is becoming 
so universal that economic survival dictates state involvement here too. 
Government participation in new product development, new plant 
investment, procurement, overseas marketing, and other aspects of 
innovation would lead logically to a strategy of total state involvement 
(Evans 1995).
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Arguments against state intervention
Simply stating that R&D is risky or that industry's R&D cycle times are 
too long does not automatically lead to the need for an R&D policy. I f  a 
market failure is identified, its severity must be assessed to determine 
industry's capacity for removing it through collective action or some 
other private sector strategy (Tassey 1997).
If  the firm is the social agency that specialises in innovation, the firm 
should be left to manage the precise form of the technology-market 
match and the uncertainty of success in innovation. The same simple 
point leads to a natural policy concern with both the firm's ability and 
incentive to innovate. Nor is this policy a version of 'laissez innover' 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979), of leaving innovation to the market, 
since this usually implies not only non-interference in the technology- 
market match but also non-interference in the producers' abilities and 
incentives. A less radical position is that there should be room for 
institutional policies, like those related to providing the framework 
rather than directly interfering in the process of resource allocation: 
policies on competition, financial6 and legal institutions7, for these more 
obviously shape the firm's incentive to innovate, as well as its ability 
(Howells 1997).
Industry's investments in the various elements of the typical industrial 
technology suffer from a number of partial market failures, and 
government's role is therefore more difficult to define and implement. 
These barriers to adequate investment in technology R&D affect both 
the aggregate amount of R&D spending by industry and the 
composition of this R&D (Tassey 1997).
6 See Chapter 6.
7 See Chapter 3.
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The main anti-interventionist arguments can be summarised and 
classified as follows:
1. The evolutionary argument. There is a scepticism towards prediction 
and manageability of processes of change inherent in evolutionary 
thinking. Evolution is fundamentally an open process ruled partly by 
contingency, and partly by unforeseeable and accidental generation 
of new knowledge. The importance of unexpected novelty and 
survival of the luckiest tends to make forecasting and planning for 
the future rather uncertain and seems to leave little room for 
effective innovation policies (Dalum, Johnson, and Lundvall 1992).
2. The Austrian argument. The market mechanism is a very effective 
discovery process. Its results cannot be improved by policy-makers 
through selective intervention in resource allocation (Hayek 1975).
3. The political failure/rent-seeking argument. Much depends, however, 
on the competence, honesty and political strength of the policy­
makers.8 Where governments are so weak or corruptible that 
selective intervention leads to the hijacking of policy by entrenched 
interests, it may be better to suffer market failure than pervasive 
government failure (Biggs and Levy 1990).
4. The knowledge/information argument. Governments do not 
necessarily have the requisite information of present and future 
market trends in order to effectively intervene selectively. The 
market turns out to be a more efficient mechanism for digesting 
dispersed information than any man can design (Hayek 1975).
5. The general equilibrium argument. The selective allocation of 
resources via selective intervention may affect the rest of the 
economy operating under market forces.
Some other economists, however, use a more targeted approach and 
have questions about usefulness and the need for subsidy, especially of
8 See Chapter 4.
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full-scale commercial development. Eads and Nelson (1971) have 
argued that, while governments should continue to finance the 
development of basic skills and knowledge (including engineering skills 
and knowledge), industrial firms still do have the capacity to finance 
even very large-scale development projects. The latter provided that 
both the technology and the market conditions are right (Eads and 
Nelson 1971). Government-financed projects of full-scale commercial 
development will be one result of pressures from government and 
industrial lobbies committed to a particular technology, without 
sufficiently cool appreciation of its commercial prospects. In other 
words, governments are running the risk of commercially financing 
second-best projects, which, once given governmental financial and 
political involvement, will also be more difficult to stop than regular 
commercial projects.
The experience of developing countries is overburdened with instances 
of misguided intervention. Yet the existence of relatively few cases of 
very successful selective intervention suggests that, in the presence of 
market failures, improved forms of intervention may well be worth 
striving for.
The justification of state intervention
The arguments against state intervention presented above mainly 
centred around the capacity of markets in successfully leading the 
process of innovation, and a scepticism of government's ability to 
intervene effectively in markets when going beyond framework policies. 
Nevertheless, those who do not trust the market blindly would neglect 
three important and interrelated problems (Eads and Nelson 1971):
• Market imperfections. These exist particularly in the high technology 
sectors, where there is considerable monopoly power and barriers to
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entry/ and where lead times for the development of new 
technologies are long.
• Infant industries. There is a problem regarding how to sustain infant 
industries in an internationally free trade world where mature 
industries have stronger technological positions.
• Adjustment. In an open world with rapid technical, competitive and 
political change, it is the government's responsibility to tackle the 
social costs of transition.
Taking into account these three problems, the notion of government 
responsibility cannot simply be banished. In such a context the 
institutional setup can also be very important. To a greater or lesser 
extent, all authors involved with the study of innovation give important 
attention to the role of governments. Even those who oppose state 
intervention have to defend their 'no participation' position in order to 
support the natural flow of technological innovation under perfect 
markets. Perhaps a better division would be between those in favour of 
an active selective intervention on the one hand, and on the other 
those who find that intervention limited to providing the appropriate 
framework or public goods policy is more effective. Therefore, the 
debate of government participation becomes relevant under any 
approach.
If governments are interested at all in growth, they have to be 
interested in the nature of the path it takes as well as its pace. So, what 
effort, if any, should government make to promote growth through 
encouraging the workings of innovation? One answer to this question 
would be to leave it to the market, but there are good reasons in this 
area to expect the market to generate welfare sub-optimal solutions. 
Why intervene? A first answer could then be that the market is 
unreliable (Hall 1986). An equally important matter is whether 
governments can do better than the (imperfect) market, and here is an 
aspect that is more difficult to resolve.
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I t  could be said that appropriate intervention calls for an understanding 
of how the innovation process works and what its effects will be. So 
another answer to 'why intervene?' would include these aspects:
• To devise some way of rewarding inventive activity to overcome the 
inappropriability problem
• R&D uncertainty
• Size of investment or the length of project gestation discourages all 
but the most risk-loving inventors to buy or retain an interest in the 
company.
Given that the creation of new knowledge has 'public good' 
characteristics, governments intervene in the creation and 
reinforcement of S&T infrastructure. This includes the system of 
education and training of a country, its public and private research 
laboratories and its network of S&T associations (Ergas 1986).
The imperfections (fragmentation, gaps and externalities) that 
characterise the markets for finance for technology development, for 
the creation of new skills and for the generation and diffusion of 
technical information are considered to be larger in less developed 
countries (LDCs) than in developed countries, and may therefore create 
a case for government intervention (Lall 1991; Lall 1992b).
In practice, governments may lack the skills, knowledge, objectivity 
and/or autonomy to intervene efficiently, leading to the higher costs of 
government failures than the costs of market failure itself (OED 1992). 
However, alongside the ill-advised and inefficient government actions in 
the past in import-substituting economies, successful interventionist 
industrialisation strategies have also been recorded in export-oriented 
countries. In this respect, Moreira (1995) contrasts the cases of Brazil 
and Korea in terms of government intervention. Intervention in Brazil 
was not properly designed to overcome market failures, and lacked the
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guidance and discipline of an open economy. The Korean government's 
intervention was both decisive and selective, and reduced the risk of 
failure by subjecting actions to the objective of achieving export 
growth. Apart from the increasingly accepted advantage of outward- 
orientation, Moreira's analysis shows that government intervention may 
be a powerful instrument of industrialisation when it is used within the 
discipline of an outward-oriented economy, and with selective and clear 
objectives of remedying specific market failures. In short, well-designed 
policies can increase the quality and pace of industrialisation (Moreira 
1995).
A government or nation can become involved in economic 
transformation in two different ways: becoming implicated in the 
process of capital accumulation and involvement in conflicts over 
distribution and welfare. Wealth creation is no longer considered just a 
function of nature and markets: effective state-craft is needed.
What kind of intervention?
Under the reindustrialisation9 approach, public policy must 
simultaneously tackle three main factors determining overall national 
innovative performance: technological opportunity; structure of the 
industrial sector; and the size and structure of market demand. An 
important factor influencing national technological opportunity is the 
size and orientation of the scientific and technological infrastructure 
(universities, government laboratories and collective industrial research 
institutes). Moreover, governments must provide a suitable regulatory 
framework in which all three elements can develop effectively, and the 
three remaining main government policy instruments -  finance, 
procurement and technical infrastructure (including technical education)
9 When there is structural transformation of industry into higher value-added, 
more knowledge-intensive sectors and product groups, and the creation of
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-  should be directed at these elements in a balanced way (Rothwell and 
Zegveld 1985).
Regarding the structure and dynamics of the industrial sector, public 
policies generally have swung from supporting industrial agglomeration 
to a bias in favour of small firms and have largely ignored the dynamic 
complementarities that exist between the two. While the balance 
between the large and the small might vary over the industry cycle, it 
should be a prime aim of public policy to redress any major imbalances 
that occur. With respect to the size and structure of market demand, it 
is possible to say that they are key elements in determining innovative 
performance. For a large variety of products, governments can provide 
substantial markets and are hence in a position to exercise their market 
power in influencing the direction of supply towards higher value-added, 
technologically more innovative products. Thus, public procurement 
policy can be considered, potentially at least, to be an effective 
instrument in influencing both the rate and direction of supplier 
innovations. Other forms of state intervention include state control 
exercised over foreign technology agreements, restrictions on the 
import of technology, and technology decisions through the state 
ownership and control of technology-using and -generating firms and 
institutions (Fransman 1986).
For Evans, the main argument is that state involvement is a given, so 
the appropriate question is not 'how much' but 'what kind'. First of all 
he starts by constructing two historically-grounded ideal types of 
states: predatory and developmental (Evans 1995). Predatory states 
extract at the expense of society, undercutting development. 
Developmental states have not only presided over industrial 
transformation but, it can be argued, played a role in making it happen. 
They are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state
major new technology-based sectors and products serving new markets, it is 
called ^industrialisation’ (Rothwell 1986; Rothwell and Zegveld 1985).
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to society and provides institutional channels for the continual 
negotiation of goals and policies. They have the structural basis for 
successful state involvement in industrial transformation. Structures 
confer potential for involvement, but potential has to be translated into 
action to have an effect, so there are patterns or roles of the states, 
and Evans uses a new terminology -  to go back to the question of'what 
kind' -  to define state involvement:
• The 'custodian' role (a variation of the more conventional 'regulator') 
identifies regulatory efforts that privilege policing over promotion, 
restricting the initiatives of private actors.
• 'Demiurge' is a specific way of playing the more generic role of 
'producer'. This role is based on a strong assumption about the 
limitations of private capital, which is considered incapable of 
successfully sustaining development of commodity production. The 
state establishes enterprises that compete in markets for normal 
private goods.
• The role of 'midwife' occurs where, instead of substituting itself for 
private producers, the state tries to assist in the emergence of new 
entrepreneurial groups or to induce existing groups to venture into 
more challenging kinds of production: promotion over policing (i.e. 
infant sector protection, subsidies, incentives, etc.).
• 'Husbandry' consists of assisting private groups in meeting global 
challenges that continually affect local firms. The techniques of 
husbandry overlap with those of midwifery.
His prediction is that combining midwifery and husbandry should work 
better than combinations that rely more heavily on custodian or 
demiurge (Evans 1995).
The empirical evidence for the effectiveness of state intervention 
through technology policy does not allow clear generalisations, either 
for developed or for less developed countries. However, the Korean
65
case shows that imports of technology should complement rather than 
substitute for indigenous technological development (World Bank 
1993). The effects of technology policy on the building up of technology 
capacities are widely different from country to country. Ergas states 
that the effect of technology policies depends on the environment in 
which they operate (Ergas 1986). I f  the environment promotes the 
broad diffusion of new ideas and the rapid adoption of new 
technologies, then policies aimed at encouraging innovation can yield 
spin-offs across a broad range of economic activities. Conversely, in an 
environment characterised by low mobility of human and capital 
resources, the results of government-sponsored innovation will remain 
trapped in their originating sector or firm.
The impact of S&T policies is also modified by a number of other 
factors, such as sociocultural and historical backgrounds, the forms of 
state intervention, the ways in which the state makes its decisions 
about the matter, the timing of such decisions, the interests involved in 
the decision-making process, and the degree of consistency among 
different S&T policy instruments (Gonsen 1998).
Even in 1963, the OECD was already reporting the fact that a science 
policy aimed at promoting economic growth is by no means limited to 
the direct or indirect aid which the government can provide for 
financing research and development by business enterprises. The 
Organisation was pointing at other factors which affect more or less 
directly and profoundly the R&D activities designed to promote 
economic growth; and these must also be integrated into a 
comprehensive science policy aimed at economic growth (Freeman, 
Poignant, and Svennilson 1963).
In a world where economic, social and political institutions -  the state 
among them -  shape international specialisation, state involvement
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must be taken as one of the sociopolitical determinants of which niche a 
country ends up occupying in the international division of labour.
2.4 -  TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN
'CATCHING UP' COUNTRIES: THE CONTEXT FOR THE CASE OF 
MEXICO
Many historical accounts point to the importance of institutional 
innovations in both Germany and the United States which facilitated 
their 'catching up' with and 'forging ahead' of Britain in economic terms. 
Particularly important were specialised institutions for vocational 
education and later for the education of graduate engineers. In the 
early stages of 'catching up', the import of technology from Britain 
through migration of skilled workers and reverse engineering was of 
crucial importance. But in the later stage of 'forging ahead' the social 
innovation of in-house industrial R&D departments in the chemical and 
electrical industries from the 1870s onwards was also of major 
importance in the introduction, exploitation and diffusion of the new 
technologies (Ashby 1969; Fox and Guagnini 1993; Freeman 1989; 
Maddison 1982; Maddison 1991).
Carlota Perez and Luc Soete have suggested that times of change in 
techno-economic paradigm could create especially favourable windows 
of opportunity for catching-up countries (Perez and Soete 1988). But 
these opportunities could be seized only if they had made the necessary 
infrastructural investments and institutional changes over a long period, 
so that an intensive and fruitful learning process could take place in the 
new and in older technologies. The import of the technologies is very 
far from the costless diffusion of perfect information assumed in pure 
versions of neo-classical theory. It involves very active involvement in 
learning activities at enterprise level (Bell 1991). Technologies cannot 
simply be taken off the shelf and put into use anywhere. Moreover, 
without infrastructural investment in education, training, R&D and other
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scientific and technical activities, very little can be accomplished by way 
of acquisition of imported technologies.
Starting as low-income economies in the 1960s, a few economies in 
East Asia managed, in a few decades, to bridge all or nearly all of the 
income gap that separated them from the high-income economies of 
the OECD. Meanwhile many other developing countries stagnated 
(World Bank 1999).
Amsden and Wade argue that active policies were needed to import and 
learn to use new technologies, as well as intensive learning at the 
enterprise level (Amsden 1991; Amsden 1992; Wade 1990). At this 
level, there are many channels of technological learning and all have 
been important in the experience of the East Asian countries over the 
past 40 to 50 years, but three channels have been exceptionally 
important:
• Education of large numbers of qualified engineers and especially of 
electronic engineers
• Promotion of a wide range of technical and scientific activities within 
an individual industry and within commerce itself
• Investment in physical equipment, in new and second-hand plant 
and machinery.
It is important to mention that these channels could not have been 
effective had there not been an export-oriented strategy, together with 
tight fiscal and monetary policies.
Among the economies that are most successfully closing the knowledge 
gap with the global technological leaders, several featured active 
government participation, including Japan, Korea and Taiwan, China. 
Korea followed a strongly interventionist and nationalist route, keeping 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to a minimum and relying on other
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modes of technology transfer and a concerted domestic technological 
effort (World Bank 1999). Although the government of Taiwan, China, 
was also actively involved in promoting industry, its policies differed in 
many ways from those of Korea. The Taiwanese based their growth 
strategy on small and medium-sized enterprises, rather than supporting 
a few large enterprises that were particularly successful at developing 
exports. Although Taiwan did not erect the barriers to FDI that Korea 
did, neither did they it base its development on the massive recruitment 
of FDI as some other economies have done (World Bank 1999).
It is often forgotten today that in the 1950s the prospects for growth in 
Latin America seemed far more favourable than those in Asia. US 
investment was substantial and the levels of industrialisation were well 
above those in Asia. Argentina was regarded as already being almost 
developed or industrialised and per capita incomes generally were much 
higher in Latin America than in Asia (Freeman 1996).
However, by the 1970s, despite this lower starting point in terms of 
industrialisation, the four 'Tigers' of East Asia were generally being 
bracketed with Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela as NICs (newly 
industrialised countries). They all enjoyed growth rates well above 
those of the US and Europe for quite a long period, so that catching up 
seemed a feasible prospect for them, if not yet for the great majority of 
less developed countries (Freeman 1996).
But in the 1980s there was a sharp process of differentiation between 
Latin American NICs and the East Asian NICs. Whereas the East Asian 
countries continued their rapid growth and even accelerated it, the Latin 
American countries slowed down or declined. The high growth rates 
achieved by the East Asian countries were associated with an even 
more impressive achievement in export performance. All four 'tigers'
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surpassed the leading Latin American countries (Brazil and Mexico10) in 
their share of world merchandise exports and far surpassed them in 
world manufacturing exports; the combined exports of the four 'tigers' 
in 1989 were greater than those of the USA in the commodities group 
and nearly as large as those of Japan, although in 1980 they still had 
been producing only about half the export levels of either of those 
countries (Amsden 1989; Amsden 1991; Freeman 1996; World Bank 
1999).
In a recent review of science and technology policy indicators in Latin 
America, it is concluded that overall science and technology budgets are 
modest and even declining, there is a low patent activity, and a 
shortage of scientific and engineering personnel engaged in R&D 
(Correa 1995).11
Within the alternative tradition of evolutionary, neo-Schumpeterian 
economics, Fagerberg (1988) was the first to offer a reasonably 
plausible and consistent model of the 'catching up' and 'forging ahead' 
processes. He was also the first systematically to compare national 
innovative performance for Asian and Latin American as well as OECD 
countries (27 countries altogether). His work demonstrated a much 
better performance in all respects by Asian NICs than by Latin American 
for the period of 1973 to 1983. Nevertheless, it has little or nothing to 
say on how to achieve higher growth in innovative activity or other 
efforts related to the exploitation of innovation and diffusion, and the 
relation between these changes and similar changes in the institutional 
system are ignored.
Summing up the discussion on 'catching up' in new technology, the 
basis of the East Asian success and the relative failure of Latin America
10 Between 1977-1989, Mexico was the country in the region with the most
registered patents, but was continuously overtaken by the Asian Tigers 
towards the end of the 1980s (World Bank 1999).
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in the 1980s lies in a combination of institutional and social changes 
promoted by active policies (Amsden, 1989, 1991; Wade, 1990), as in 
the earlier case of Japan (Freeman 1987b). It still remains to be seen 
whether the major policy changes and new industrial initiatives which 
are taking place in some Latin American countries, like Mexico, will 
enable them to evolve into the new international political economy.
Thus, as will be discussed further in the following chapter, the national 
system of innovation is a crucial factor in facilitating the acquisition and 
exploitation of new technologies. But in its broadest sense this national 
system also involves and interacts with other features of the social and 
political system that are covered in the rest of the thesis for the case of 
Mexico.
So for the specific case of Mexico, some of the aspects reported by the 
OECD link the latter discussion of the region with the single 
performance of the country: Mexico's main challenge regarding 
economic and social development requires an extraordinary effort of 
educational, structural, institutional, technological and managerial 
upgrading. Science and technology policy must become a central agent 
of Mexico's structural change: the country needs many more 
professional engineers, scientists and technicians; it needs a much 
larger technological infrastructure to support the modernisation of 
industry, services, and public administration; and it needs a much wider 
base of enterprises with high technical standards able to compete on 
the international markets on the basis of product quality rather than low 
labour costs, which at the moment is still fundamental to Mexico's 
comparative advantage (OECD 1994).
11 Mexico's indicators are presented in Chapter 3.
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SUMMARY
To summarize, we could say that most current streams of thought 
commonly accept that technological change is one of the primary forces 
generating economic growth. Nevertheless, the causal linkages between 
innovation and economic growth are not too well understood.
A starting point is the understanding of the concepts, players and roles 
of innovative or technological activity. A system of innovation is 
constituted by elements and relationships which interact in the 
production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, 
knowledge, and a national system encompasses elements and 
relationships either located within or rooted inside the borders of a 
nation state.
Countries differ both in their degree of cultural homogeneity and in their 
degree of political centralisation. Both globalisation and regionalisation 
could be interpreted as processes that weaken the coherence and 
importance of national systems. National systems play an important 
role in supporting and directing processes of innovation and learning. 
The concept of national systems of innovation may also be useful when 
it comes to inspiring public policies at the national and international 
level. Public policies must derive first from the assumption that there is 
an important role for the state to play in the fostering and promotion of 
technology-related activities in its productive sector; in the correction of 
given market failures; and in the pursuit of economic growth.
As far as the generators and users in the innovation process are 
concerned, there is clearly no such thing as a standard or typical 
supplier or user in any industry, and thus any policy designed to close 
gaps in resources or capabilities on the way to developing technological 
competence must first find ways of dealing with the diversity of the 
client population. No single policy measure is capable of meeting the
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wide range of needs; instead some combination is required (Dodgson 
and Bessant 1996). The issue of what kind of government participation 
rather than how much of it is central to the understanding of the 
relationships between technology, economic environment and economic 
performance.
Chapter 3
EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF 
MEXICO'S NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INNOVATION
'Science and technology
institutions are not fully performing an 
enabling role: links and interactions 
between support organisations, 
business and academia are tenuous; 
investment in intangibles and human 
capital is low; and public policy is only 
partially effective/
Ludovico Alcorta and Wilson Peres,
1998
INTRODUCTION
For anything that reflects some kind of technology it can be argued that 
it started sometime in the past with an idea, which led to an invention, 
then to an innovation, which in the end created a new product, process 
of production or service. Whose idea was it? Who believed in it? How
and by whom was it developed? Who paid for the first prototypes? How
was the intellectual property protected from imitators? Who was it 
intended for and who benefited from it?
The introduction of new advanced products and processes, both locally 
and internationally, is generally seen as the result of the functioning
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and interactions of the institutions, organisations, investments and 
policies of a national system of innovation (Alcorta and Peres 1998). 
This chapter discusses Mexico's national system of innovation and the 
way in which it functions to provide the country with the capacities to 
develop technologically.
Section 1 presents the main concepts and elements of a national 
system of innovation, from its definition to its performance 
measurements. Section 2 covers the origins and historical background 
of the Mexican system of innovation, assessing its evolution under the 
protected economy. This includes the origins of the country's science 
and technology institutions, as well as the main aspects of technology 
policy planning, design and implementation at the time. An hypothesis 
that prevails throughout this analysis is that, in Mexico, the lack of 
concern for technology development issues can be attributed to the 
inward development policy in place during that period (1950s-mid 
1980s). This policy not only reduced vital incentives, but also hid the 
real dimension of the changes needed (Nacional Financiera and 
Comision Economica para America Latina 1974). The first results of the 
system are presented. Section 3 continues the analysis of the system in 
Mexico but now looks at more recent times, when the country began 
operating under the framework of an open economy. The stages of 
opening up the economy are described, and the institutional 
configuration analysed. The participants of the Mexican system of 
innovation are presented, together with their roles and infrastructure. 
Section 4 introduces the framework of technology policy within the 
context of an open economy and its impacts on the Mexican system of 
innovation. Policy issues include taxation and legal aspects. The final 
section presents some performance measurements, such as patents 
and expenditure, used within the Mexican system of innovation since 
the opening up of the economy, and compares them with other 
countries.
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3.1 -  NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK
Before the Mexican system of innovation can be analysed, it is 
important to be acquainted with the main concepts related to all 
national systems of innovation. The following brief review introduces 
the definitions, components, interactions and performance measures of 
national systems of innovation.
Definition
The concept of national systems of innovation (NSI) was first posited by 
Freeman (1987), who defined the NSI as the 'network of institutions of 
private and public sectors, whose activities and interactions initiate, 
import, modify and diffuse new technologies' (Freeman 1987b, 1). It 
has since been widely disseminated by several authors and 
organisations (Edquist 1997; Lundvall 1992a; Niosi et al. 1993; OECD
1992). Lundvall, for example, defined the NSI in terms of the 'elements 
and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of 
new, and economically useful, knowledge...either located within or 
rooted inside the borders of a nation state' (Lundvall 1992a, 2).
Elements
National systems of innovation involve both institutions and 
organisations (Edquist and Johnson 1997; Galli and Teubal 1997; Smith
1997).
Institutions are the rules and laws, established practices, common 
habits and routines that govern the behaviour of organisations and the 
individuals that comprise them. Their main functions are to reduce 
uncertainty, regulate interaction and provide incentives. Thus the
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importance of the intellectual property protection regime (Watanabe 
1985).
Organisations are the formalised structures or bodies that operate the 
NSI. They are the players with predetermined roles within the 
innovation process, including basic and applied research; knowledge 
dissemination; invention; product and process research, design, 
experimentation and development; and new product commercialisation. 
Such organisations include: schools and universities; industrial and 
government research laboratories; information-providing and regulatory 
agencies or knowledge infrastructure agencies; and private and public 
firms. Within organisations, however, as firms are responsible for 
innovating, they play a central role in the NSI (Alcorta and Peres 1998).
Each organisation provides the NSI with different kinds of knowledge 
necessary for successful innovative performance. For instance: 
universities provide scientific theory and engineering principles; 
laboratories bring in specifications on products, components and 
materials; firms supply knowledge on how components interact; and 
user firms provide information on emerging technological opportunities 
and the performance of products (Carlsson 1994). These interactions 
involve not only markets but important personal and professional 
acquaintances and institutional relations (Alcorta and Peres 1998).
It is generally accepted that governments must support basic research 
that is socially useful yet would not have been undertaken by the 
market because it is considered too high-risk. Public policy, therefore, 
provides direction and coordination to the NSI (Dalum, Johnson, and 
Lundvall 1992; Freeman and Soete 1997; Galli and Teubal 1997; 
Nelson 1993). But public policy's role goes well beyond that.1 Because 
of the number and variety of institutions and organisations and of
1 Chapter 4 discusses the role of the public sector in the design, 
implementation and evaluation of technology policy in Mexico.
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possible interactions, both market and non-market, it is necessary to 
introduce mechanisms that will coordinate them. Moreover, apart from 
their role in establishing and enforcing institutions, governments can set 
priorities and provide incentives. Two of the main mechanisms for 
public policy are related to funding -  either of university or government 
research -  or programmes for directly supporting different aspects of 
the innovation process.2
Industrial and intellectual property protection systems
An extensive discussion of the nature of intellectual property systems -  
institutional aspects, regulations, behaviour and policies -  is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but some issues need to be recalled here as they 
affect firms' innovative activities within a national system of innovation.
Intellectual property is a term used to describe the wide range of rights 
that are conferred by the legal system in relation to discrete items of 
information that have resulted from intellectual activity e.g. inventions, 
scientific discoveries, literary and artistic works, trade marks and 
industrial designs (Lamberton 1994; Rickeston 1992). National 
intellectual property systems have the following basic requirements 
(Archibugi and Pianta 1996):
• a balance between providing adequate incentives to generate
invention and innovation and ensuring rapid diffusion of new
technologies.
• a balance between the private interest of the inventor and society's
interest in creating a stable system conducive to both invention and
diffusion, with due attention to welfare considerations.
2 The thesis concentrates on the aspects of public financing for firms' 
technology projects, see Chapter 7.
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• a balance between the temporary monopoly power granted to 
inventors by patent protection and the norms for the protection of 
competition (such as anti-trust laws, industry regulations, etc.).
NSI's performance measurements
The output of the NSI can be measured in terms of indicators such as 
numbers of new products or patents, share of sales derived from new 
products, or a combination of these. However, it should be assessed not 
simply through the use of quantitative changes but also through the 
analysis of the distribution of technological activities or specialisation 
across different sectors (Archibugi and Pianta 1992).
The most relevant performance indicators of NSI should reflect the 
efficiency and effectiveness in producing, diffusing and exploiting 
economically-useful knowledge. Such indicators are not well developed 
today. One of the classical measures for comparing different NSI is R&D 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP. This is considered an input 
measure. The output measures used include patents, the proportion of 
new products in sales, and the proportion of high-technology products 
in foreign trade (Lundvall 1992a). Each input or output measure has its 
own specific weaknesses and it is wise to combine them in order to get 
a more satisfactory picture of the performance of a NSI.
The patent system in the broader sense is probably the most 
conventional and also one of the most powerful policy instruments that 
have been used for the development and diffusion of new technologies. 
History indicates that the patent system can work as an effective tool to 
stimulate people's interest in inventive activity. Third world nations' 
frustration about the system appears to accrue partly from their patent 
offices' failure to provide adequate information services and the 
absence of complementary policy instruments (Watanabe 1985). 
Furthermore, patent indicators are only partial indicators of innovative
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performance, as not all inventions or innovations are patented, nor are 
all patents innovations. There is a propensity to patenting variations 
across sectors and firm size classes. Moreover, many patents are never 
transferred into commercially viable products and the economic impact 
of individual patents may differ considerably (Kleinknecht 1996).
Other measures can be used in combination with other indicators, 
including (Patel and Pavitt 1995):
• the technological balance of payments (data for patent and know­
how licenses)
• exports of high- and medium-technology products
• direct measurement of innovations and their diffusion (total costs of 
innovation)
• surveys of technical experts
• technometrics (measurement and comparison of various dimensions 
of technical performance of a product or production process)
• statistics on citations contained in patents
• scientific papers and citations.
The rest of this chapter discusses the way in which the Mexican 
National System of Innovation has evolved. With the above-mentioned 
concepts in mind, it analyses the system's institutions, organisations, 
interactions and results, firstly in the context of protectionism and 
secondly in the context of an open economy.
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3.2 -  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MEXICAN SYSTEM OF 
INNOVATION
Origins and background (1950s-1970s)
In Mexico, scientific and technological organisations have been 
established since the 19th century, although it was not until 1950 that a 
coordinating organisation, the National Institute for Scientific Research, 
INIC (Instituto Nacional para la Investigacion Cientffica), was created. 
INIC did not cover applied research or technology, and did not have 
technical personnel (INIC 1970). It  was the precursor of the National 
Council for Science and Technology, Conacyt (Consejo Nacional de 
Ciencia y Tecnologfa), which is today in charge of defining Mexico's 
national policy for science and technology (Alcorta and Peres 1998; 
Nadal Egea 1995).
Historically, both science and technology have followed the overall 
course of external dependence which characterises the Mexican 
economy and society (Wionczek and Marquez 1993). The impetus given 
to economic development via import substitution in the 1930s coincided 
with the emergence of incipient scientific and technological activities. 
However, they did not receive support either from the state of from the 
productive sectors. While measures to promote industrialisation were 
accompanied by increased spending on higher education, which 
contributed to the advancement of certain areas of scientific research, 
no similar effort took place in the field of technology. This general lack 
of interest in technological development could have been related to the 
fact that technology could be acquired from outside, mostly from the 
United States, at costs easily transferable to the final consumer in a 
heavily protected economy. Moreover, little technical know-how was 
needed in the initial import substitution stages (Alcorta and Peres
1998). Consequently, foreign capital goods, know-how and technical
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assistance were imported massively, and technological dependence 
increased progressively as a result.
Such dependence was considered inevitable by the country's economic 
policy-makers and highly profitable by both the foreign technology 
sellers and the local buyers and users. The issue of choosing 
technologies appropriate to the local endowment of other production 
factors was not yet perceived, while at the enterprise level no risks of 
importing proven technology seemed to exist. The result was that as 
late as in the early 1970s no Mexican technology policies existed, little if 
any technology was created nationally, and the meaningful absorption 
of imported technology -  including management capacity -  into the 
economy and society was hampered by the absence of local 
technological capability (Alcorta and Peres 1998; Vergara Reyes 1993; 
Wionczek 1973). The efforts favouring technological development 
consisted of regulating the transfer of technology processes. Thus their 
impact was limited and reduced to some areas and enterprises, mostly 
those publicly-owned.
Not until the early 1970s did the state start considering the need for 
R&D policies. Some ambitious efforts were made, including: the 
establishment of policy guidelines for science and technology; provision 
of additional financing for R&D at university and technical education 
levels; and the linking of local scientific and technological output with 
the productive sectors, through supporting legislation, in respect to 
technology transfer from abroad and the country’s access to the 
international patent system. But given the overall technological 
dependence and the heavy presence of transnationals in Mexico, not 
much was achieved in these fields. At the highest political level, what 
was absent was the understanding that no economic and social 
development was possible in the face of the persistent weakness of 
scientific and technological efforts which were largely divorced from the
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productive sector (Ramirez and Unger 1998; Wionczek and Marquez
1993).
In retrospect, Mexico has lagged scientifically and technologically 
behind other countries which entered into the industrialisation cum 
modernisation process post World War II, and the country condemned 
itself to dependent development patterns. It could not be otherwise 
while overall policies were largely improvised and industrial, fiscal and 
monetary policies continued unconnected with science and technology 
support policy proposals (Alcorta and Peres 1998; Metcalfe 1997) .
The Mexican System of Innovation during the protected era 
(1970s-m id 1980s)
Context
Under the protected environment that prevailed in the country until the 
mid-1980s, the chances of reducing Mexico's high technological 
dependence were very slim because most domestic and foreign 
enterprises lacked incentives to innovate (Bazdresch and Marquez 
1999; Elizondo Mayer-Serra 1999; Vergara Reyes 1993). The large 
presence of transnational enterprises in Mexico was significant, 
especially as they use mostly foreign technologies in their productive 
activities. Historically, only a minority of technological problems have 
been resolved locally (Wionczek and Marquez 1993).
The evaluation of the role played by foreign technology in Mexico's 
industrialisation is difficult because of the limited availability of data. It 
is particularly true for the period prior to the early 1970s, in which, on 
one hand, the government regarded the contribution of technological 
progress to the development process as relatively unimportant, and, on 
the other, most enterprises, whether public or private, domestic or 
foreign, refused to collect and make public information related to
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technological aspects of their operations (Wionczek 1973; Wionczek and 
Marquez 1993).
The situation improved in the 1970s, thanks to new laws implemented 
in the first half of the decade. An official policy regarding technology 
transfer was defined in November 1972, when a law providing for the 
approval of technology transfer contracts and another on patents and 
trademarks were drafted at the then Ministry of Trade and Industry 
with the full support of the Presidency. Previously, technology transfer 
had been taken care of by various measures included in industrial 
development legislation (Wionczek, Bueno, and Navarrete 1974). 
Therefore, it can be argued that until late 1972, the Mexican 
government confined its participation to monitoring the costs of 
acquiring technology abroad using foreign currency. I t  did not seem to 
be concerned with what these technologies really were and how they 
would function within Mexico's particular development characteristics. 
Nor did it offer to help the manufacture and capital goods production of 
the private sector to adapt imported technology to local conditions 
(Wionczek and Marquez 1993).
In the period 1950-80, under a protected scheme, manufacturing 
production grew fast and generated a constant demand for technology 
(available mainly from industrialised countries). However, small 
adaptations were carried out within firms. The existence of such 
demand stimulated the formation of technical human resources for both 
the adjustment of imported technologies to local conditions, and the 
production of some equipment and machinery (Mercado Garcia 1980). 
It seems as if demand for technology had stimulated the initial growth 
and evolution of an internal offer of scientific and technological 
knowledge. Nevertheless, the persistent weakness of close and 
permanent links between the education system, R&D and its users was 
made obvious during the Mexican oil boom that started in the mid- 
1970s. At that time, urgently needed equipment, technology, and high-
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level technicians had to be brought from abroad because the local 
productive apparatus failed to respond to growing demand (Alcorta and 
Peres 1998; Ramirez and Unger 1998).
Origins o f technology policy institutions
Mexico's continued lack of awareness and understanding of the role of 
scientific research can be traced back to the beginning of the first 
formal attempts to design policy for science and technology. By the end 
of the 1960s, it was still not accepted openly that an explicit science 
and technology policy was needed in Mexico (Urquidi and Lajous V. 
1967).
Agencies established during the first half of the 20th century had already 
been replaced by INIC, founded in 1950 under the Ministry of 
Education's budget. Most of INIC's resources had been channeled to 
support basic scientific research in universities (INIC 1970). 
Nevertheless, the scientific community in Mexico has been 
characterised by the weakness of its institutions and by being 
dependent on a small group of people.
It was not until the mid-1960s that public opinion in Mexico indicated 
some concern about the country's scientific and technological 
underdevelopment, and the high dependence on knowledge generated 
abroad. I t  was also realised that practically all technological processes 
and design for industrial plant came from abroad, at prices that were 
seen as over-inflated. In 1966-67 groups started to argue in favour of a 
restructuring of INIC, specifically to include the technology-related 
aspects of R&D (Urquidi and Lajous V. 1967; Wionczek, Bueno, and 
Navarrete 1974). It is commonly mentioned that the recommendations 
of UNESCO during the 1960s to create bodies for the formulation and 
implementation of science and technology policy was the direct 
precedent for the establishment of science councils in Latin America, 
and of Conacyt in Mexico (Nadal Egea 1995).
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During the first quarter of 1969, the Ministry of the Presidency 
convened a series of meetings with the directors and top staff of the 
main research institutions in Mexico. The outcome of this process was 
an executive order to INIC, charging it with the task of carrying out the 
necessary steps to establish an institutional base for the development 
and implementation of S&T policy in Mexico. Towards the end of 1970, 
INIC produced a final report with a series of recommendations. On 23rd 
December 1970, the Federal Congress approved a law creating 
Conacyt. Since 1971, Conacyt has been the focus of dialogue and 
communication between government and the scientific community 
(Marquez 1982). However, its creation did not offer clear signs of 
improving the problems mentioned before, as it had the characteristics 
of a typical heavy bureaucratic machine (Nadal Egea 1977; Wionczek 
1973). Moreover, according to Alzati, former Director of Conacyt, due to 
the political reasons surrounding the creation of Conacyt, the institution 
was more a presidential tool to control the country's academic 
community than a true concern for science and technology.3
Conacyt was formally set up as a decentralised body responsible for the 
design and implementation of S&T policy in Mexico. Nevertheless, it has 
had difficulty in influencing the substance of S&T decisions in Mexico. 
One of the main reasons for this difficulty is precisely that it is a 
decentralised body and not a ministry. In Mexico's public sector, where 
decision-making is heavily centralised, the relative weight of a 
decentralised body is almost negligible when confronted with monster 
state-owned firms or state-controlled entities such as the Mexican 
petroleum company, Pemex (Petroleos Mexicanos), the Federal 
Electricity Commission, CFE (Comision Federal de Electricidad) or the 
Institute of Social Security, IMSS (Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad 
Social). And vis-a-vis giant ministries, Conacyt was, and still is, dwarfed 
and thus could not influence science and technology decisions as it
3 Interview #10.
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should (Nadal Egea 1995). Conacyt is an agency employing currently 
approximately 1,500 people and exercising an annual budget of 300 
million US dollars.4
Technology policy
As became clear in the last sub-section, the need for an integrated 
science and technology policy consistent with the country's economic, 
social and cultural requirements started being perceived in Mexico only 
in the late 1960s. In spite of some progress made in this respect by the 
state and scientific community during the 1970s, one can hardly talk 
about the emergence of a long-term policy in that field even though 
some components of such a policy did exist.
When talking about the various planning exercises in respect of science 
and technology policy, Wionczek and Marquez consider that the most 
serious was the first one, Plan Nacional Indicativo de Ciencia y 
Tecnologia (Wionczek and Marquez 1993, 44-49). This plan, elaborated 
by Conacyt and made public in 1976, was based on a thorough 
evaluation of the existing scientific and technological systems. Some 
300 scientists and technologists participated in its elaboration (Aboites
1994). It  was based on two premises. First, recognising the increasing 
importance of science and technology in economic and social 
development, it considered it imperative to systematically organise and 
institutionalise R&D activities. Second, in view of underdevelopment, 
the relative shortage of financial resources and the magnitude of the 
needs of vast sectors of the population, it embraced the idea of long­
term science and technology planning and of establishing R&D 
priorities. The plan's basic goals were scientific development, cultural 
autonomy and technological self-determination (Conacyt 1976).
4 Interview #15.
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In addition to establishing overall goals and policy guidelines, the plan 
addressed itself in detail to all aspects of the science and technology 
infrastructure problems, from manpower training, producing and 
maintaining R&D equipment and scientific instruments, to the advisable 
patterns of international cooperation. Goals and guidelines for action in 
this respect were set for the incoming six-year presidential term (1977- 
82).5 Furthermore, the plan quantified the expenditure needed to meet 
the outlined targets, indicating that by 1982 it should rise to slightly 
over one percent of GDP. The state's participation in funding R&D would 
be reduced and the private sector's share would increase (Conacyt 
1976). The plan proposed institutional changes in the management of 
science and technology activities. The National Science and Technology 
Planning Commission was to be established with high-level participants 
from the government, major public enterprises, higher education 
institutions, and users of science and technology in the productive 
sector.6 It  had the responsibility of the permanent planning process.
The plan further proposed that the state designed fiscal, financial and 
other incentives for private enterprises that would help them to develop 
their own R&D capability, increasing the use of domestic R&D. Scientific 
and technological policy was to be incorporated into the overall 
development strategy. However, the results of the planning exercises 
were not necessarily spectacular, due to the sharp changes which 
characterise the six-year political cycle in Mexico.7 Moreover, the 
complex interplay of power groups seeking their own short-term 
political and economic interests prevented the initial efforts of 
technology policy to render the expected achievements (Marquez 1982; 
Wionczek and Marquez 1993).
5 A similar attempt was made at the end of 1994 in respect to proposed 
adjustments to Fidetec to better meet the needs of users of the programme. 
The change of administration and the economic crisis of 1995 prevented any 
effort at continuity. See Chapter 7.
6 If  the financial sector had been included, this Commission could be a 
predecessor of 1992's CONCERTEC. See Section 3 (page 27) of this chapter.
7 The political aspects are discussed in a more detailed way in Chapter 4.
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The subsequent presidential administration (1977-82) saw the 
appearance of the new National Science and Technology Programme for 
1978-82. It was not only unrelated to the earlier Conacyt planning work 
but took the form of a disorganised directory of thousands of isolated 
research projects submitted by the scientific and technological 
community members (Conacyt 1978; Wionczek and Marquez 1993).
Legal aspects
Regarding the legal aspects that prevailed in this first era of technology 
policy in Mexico, it should be noted that in 1972 the Mexican 
government enacted a law requiring all contracts on transfer of 
technology to be registered with a special office in the Ministry of 
Industry. The law covered agreements on patents, trade marks, 
unpatented know-how, technical assistance, engineering services (basic 
and detailed), training of technical personnel and management services. 
The parties to these agreements had 60 days to register their contracts 
in the Registry of Transfer of Technology, ROTT (Registro Oficial para la 
Transferencia Tecnologica). The purpose of this requirement was to 
make licensing agreements available for scrutiny by government 
experts, in order to verify that restrictive clauses harmful for the 
economy would not be included as part of these agreements. Mexican 
firms perceived this instrument as an obstacle to their access to foreign 
sources of technology, and it was seen as one step within a sequence of 
highly regulatory policies. With ROTT, between 1973-84, the private 
sector had to endure what it considered an invasion of its prerogatives 
(Nadal Egea 1995).
In 1976 a new law for patents and trade marks was enacted by the 
federal Congress. Patents were restricted in a number of sectors, terms 
were shorter than those available internationally and lapsed if not used 
locally early on, or faced compulsory licensing. Penalties for 
infringement of property protection laws were small (Sherwood 1990).
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Results and performance
Faced with a general lack of understanding, and in the absence of 
criteria for scientific and technological policy, the academic and 
research institutions1 budgets are usually determined by treasury 
authorities on the basis of the amount approved for the previous year. 
These disadvantages increase, particularly when the budget is subject 
to restrictive policies, since the amount allocated for science and 
technology is usually the first to be reduced due to a lack of awareness 
of its importance on the part of both treasury administrators and the 
rest of the state bureaucracy, not to mention a large segment of the 
university bureaucracy.
According to the 1976 Plan, it was necessary that total national 
spending on science and technology continued to grow during the next 
administration at a real annual average rate of about 20 percent. Only 
in this way would the proportion of national spending of science and 
technology increase from 0.52 percent of GDP in 1976 to something 
more than 1 percent in 1982, the minimum considered necessary for 
developing countries (Conacyt 1976). Nevertheless, due to the cyclical 
political process of forgetting earlier attempts to establish the bases for 
a long-term national policy on science and technology,8 the goals of the 
1976 Plan vanished (Wionczek 1981).
According to the data presented by Conacyt's reports, domestic 
spending on science and technology did increase considerably, even if 
not to the expected levels: from 772 million pesos in 1970 to 4,729 
million pesos in 1985 (at constant prices). Its share of total federal 
expenditure budget rose from 0.15 percent in 1970 to 0.51 percent in 
1985. Private expenditure on these activities continued to be very 
small. Funds assigned to Conacyt grew slowly but steadily from 41
8 See Chapter 4 .
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million pesos in 1971 to 505 million in 1985. In 1985 these resources 
represented a 0.006 percent share in GDP, a 10.68 percent share in 
total domestic spending and an 11.21 percent share in total 
government expenditure for science and technology. Until 1985 almost 
95 percent of all spending in the scientific and technological areas was 
made by the state (Conacyt 1976; Conacyt 1978; Marquez 1982; 
Wionczek and Marquez 1993).
3.3 -  THE MEXICAN SYSTEM OF INNOVATION SINCE THE 
OPENING OF THE ECONOMY
From protectionism to economic opening
A common criticism of the protectionist framework that dominated the 
Mexican economy since the 1940s is that possibilities for deepening the 
import-substitution strategy became exhausted by the late 1970s and 
that this was not recognised by the relevant government officials. Thus, 
Mexico was slow to change gear, open its economy and move to an 
export-promotion strategy (Casalet 2000; Lustig 1992; Nadal Egea 
1995).9
Following the debt crisis of the early and mid-1980s, the 1990s featured 
a considerable reduction of state involvement in technological 
development. Sectoral priorities were no longer established by the state 
and are now left instead to the market, comparative advantage and 
profitability. S&T institutions have been streamlined or eliminated, 
previous attempts to develop indigenous technologies through public 
enterprises have ceased and most state firms have been privatised. 
Intellectual property protection laws have been strengthened by 
expanding the scope of patents to previously excluded products and 
increasing their duration, and by introducing tougher penalties (Braga
9 It could be argued though, that by Latin American standards it was not 
slower than other countries like Brazil.
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1993). Controls and regulations on technology transfer have been 
eliminated, including provisions that discriminate in favour of local 
firms, set domestic content requirements or limit the acquisition of 
foreign capital goods (Nadal Egea 1995; Vaistos 1990). More emphasis 
has been given to the technology side of research and development, 
correcting the historical higher importance of science over technology.10
Facing the 1982 crisis, Mexico had to defend against the negative 
impact of the crisis on its emerging scientific and technological 
development in three ways: the effort to regain levels of federal budget 
allocations for science and technology; the more rational resources 
allocation in this field; and the design of a set of incentives to 
encourage investment in technological innovation by private enterprises 
(Aboites 1994).
In December 1984, the Science and Technology Development Act was 
enacted to establish administrative and legal procedures for promoting 
and developing a national science and technology system. Its main 
objectives were:
• to coordinate, promote, develop, disseminate and apply the scientific 
and technical knowledge required for national development;
• to establish guidelines for the federal public administration in the 
planning of scientific and technological activities;
• to establish a framework for the President of the Republic to 
coordinate efforts with state and local governments, according to 
their level of scientific and technical development;
• to promote the participation of the public and private sectors in the 
development, use and dissemination of scientific and technological 
knowledge.
10 Interviews #10, 11 and 20.
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To a large extent, these provisions were ineffective. The Planning 
Committee created by this Law did not succeed in implementing the 
criteria and guidelines needed to coordinate the efforts of the 
institutions involved in R&D. The content of the National Science and 
Technology Development Programme for 1984-88 confirmed the 
persistence of serious problems in Mexico, arising from the lack of a 
long-term approach to science and technology policy and making 
impossible self-reliant technological advancement. The programme 
stated at its outset that it was based on a long-term outlook but would 
take effect at least explicitly and on a compulsory basis during that 
administration only (Wionczek and Marquez 1993). I t  was hard to 
believe that, if no progress had been made in respect of science and 
technology policy in Mexico when the economy was growing rapidly, 
progress could be expected at the time of the serious crisis of 1982, 
and when the country was set to start a radical shift in economic policy 
to open up to international competition.
By 1983-84, the private sector was pressing hard for economic reform 
in Mexico. From 1983-88 the regulatory environment started to change 
gradually. In 1983-1984, import permits for 35 percent of the 
categories of the Import Tariff Schedule were eliminated. In 1986, 
Mexico became a member of GATT (now the World Trade Organisation, 
WTO). In 1986, it implemented an accelerated programme to reduce 
the level of remaining tariffs and eliminate official prices on commercial 
goods (OECD 1994).
In the first months of 1990, Mexico began negotiations with the United 
States on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Formal 
negotiations amongst Canada, the US and Mexico began in June 1991, 
and the Agreement was signed on 17 December 1992. Following 
ratification by the US Congress in November 1993, NAFTA became 
effective in January 1994. Mexico also engaged in several other regional 
free trade initiatives that include Chile, Costa Rica, and the Group of
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Three (Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia). On 18 May 1994 Mexico 
became a member of the OECD (OECD 1994). Furthermore, an 
Agreement has been signed with the European Union to promote trade 
and investment.
The participants of the Mexican System of Innovation
The Mexican System of Innovation is composed of the following 
elements (Casalet 2000; Casas 2000; Marquez 1982; Phillips Greene 
1995):
• almost all of the federal government's ministries;
• a national organisation in charge of the coordination (Conacyt);
• private and public universities, higher education institutions, and 
technical education institutions;
• R&D centres that provide service to industry;
• laboratories of certification, quality control and metrology;
• technical information centres;
• financial institutions with funding programmes;
• technology consultancy firms;
• R&D units within private and public enterprises;
• the legal framework regarding science and technology;
• skilled R&D human resources; and
• foundations, academies and associations related to R&D activities
Historically the private sector plays a limited role in Mexico's R&D 
system (Ramirez and Unger 1998). Therefore, this section concentrates 
on the public sector institutions/organisations that provide the 
infrastructure of the Mexican System of Innovation (MSI).
According to Cimoli, the governmental institutional players in Mexico's 
system of innovation can be classified in four types (Cimoli 2000):
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1. Fostering institutions that provide incentives to technological and 
innovation activities (i.e. Conacyt, Nafin, FIDETEC, Secofi)
2. Bridging institutions that provide information and reduce uncertainty 
(i.e. the Mexican Institue of Industrial Property, IMPI)
3. Highly specialised R&D institutions that develop specific sectors' 
projects (i.e. the Mexican Petroleum Institute, IMP)
4. R&D institutions that develop technology and innovation projects in 
different sectors and regions of the country (i.e. SEP-Conacyt 
Centres).
Nevertheless, a broader spectrum of institutions and organisations 
participate in different ways in the MSI, and may fall outside Cimoli's 
classification. For instance, the Mexican Constitution gives the 
legislative branch the power to issue laws regarding the promotion of 
scientific and technological development,11 and the President has the 
power to send legislative initiatives to the Congress.12 According to the 
most recent amendments to the Federal Public Administration Law, 
LOAPF (Ley Organica de la Administracion Publica Federal) since 1992, 
the Ministry of Education, SEP (Secretarfa de Educacion Publica), is now 
in charge of science and technology policy and the coordination and 
promotion of scientific and technological development. These duties 
were formerly carried out by the Ministry of Budget and Programming, 
SPP (Secretarfa de Programacion y Presupuesto), whose other 
responsibilities have been largely taken over by the Ministry of Finance, 
SHCP (Secretarfa de Hacienda y Credito Publico).
While SEP is responsible for scientific and technological policy, Conacyt 
must be consulted concerning all activities and programmes in this 
area. Its General Director is a member of the extended cabinet. SEP 
oversees the operation and evaluation of Conacyt, as well as its 
programming and budget decisions.
11 Article 73 of the Mexican Constitution.
12 Article 89 of the Mexican Constitution.
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SEP and Conacyt are not the only federal agencies involved in scientific 
and technological development: LOAPF also confers responsibilities of 
this nature on other ministries and public agencies. Some of the most 
important bodies of the Mexican government working in the S&T field 
are:
• The Science and Technology Committee within Congress (Chamber 
of Deputies), which specialises in the formulation and the analysis of 
legislative initiatives.
• The Presidential Science Advisory Council, CCC (Consejo Consultivo 
de Ciencias) which keeps the President informed and advised 
regarding science matters.
• The Ministry of Education (SEP) is the highest authority for science 
and technology policy and the coordination and promotion of 
scientific and technological development.
• The National Council for Science and Technology (Conacyt) is the 
primary agency responsible for defining and implementing science 
and technology policy.
• Other ministries which work in S&T areas related to their fields. The 
most active are the Ministry of Energy, SE (Secretarfa de Energfa), 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Secofi (Secretarfa de Comercio y 
Fomento Industrial), the Ministry of Agriculture, SARH (Secretarfa de 
Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos), the Ministry of Communications, 
SCT (Secretarfa de Comunicaciones y Transportes), and the Ministry 
of Social Development, SEDESOL (Secretarfa de Desarrollo Social).
• The National R&D centres concentrated within public universities, 
higher education institutes, the system of SEP-Conacyt centres, and 
research centres dependent on other ministries.
The infrastructure of the MSI
Within the spectrum of private and public institutions and organisations 
that comprise the MSI, some are specifically devoted to R&D activities
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and these are the ones commonly known as the infrastructure of a 
national system of innovation. In the case of Mexico, the main 
participants are (Alzati and Teubal 1992; Bazdresch and Marquez 1999; 
Casalet 2000; Casas 2000; Concheiro 1987):
• Government R&D centres: in this category are the SEP-Conacyt 
Centres, Sectoral R&D Centres and activities of other ministries. The 
SEP-Conacyt Centres System is a group of 28 research centres 
specialising in a range of fields including natural sciences, social 
sciences, humanities, and technology development (Phillips Greene
1995). The entire system has over 4500 active personnel, of which 
almost 2500 are directly involved in research. Traditionally, these 
centres have developed in isolation from industry, with little 
attention to market demands for technology diffusion or innovation 
(Casalet 2000).
• The National System of Investigators, SNI (Sistema Nacional de 
Investigadores): system based on peer review by distinguished 
Mexican scientists, offering tax-free income to its members.
• Higher education centres: public universities generate a large share 
of national R&D output, and almost 95 percent of papers published 
are produced by researchers working at public universities. The 
leading university in R&D is Mexico's National Autonomous 
University, UNAM (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico), 
which has about 2960 researchers. In its R&D system UNAM has 25 
institutes, 16 centres and 6 programmes. The second institution is 
the National Polytechnic Institute, IPN (Instituto Politecnico 
Nacional) which has 536 researchers. Apart from Monterrey's 
Institute of Technology, ITESM (Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios 
Superiores de Monterrey) which is strongly committed to R&D, 
maintaining important links with local and national industry, private 
universities are little involved in R&D. According to the surveyed 
firms, educational institutions play a very important role in the
96
promotion and support of the country's technology development. 
91.7 percent of the respondents consider them most responsible.13
The following Sectoral Centres and activities of other ministries play an 
important role due to their size and quality of their research (although 
there are others):
• the Institute for Electrical Research, HE (Instituto de Investigaciones 
Electricas)
• the Mexican Petroleum Institute, IMP (Instituto Mexicano del 
Petroleo)
• the National Institute for Agricultural and Forestry Research, INIFAR 
(Instituto Nacional de Investigacion Forestal y Agrfcola)
• the Biomedical Centres of the Mexican Institute for Social Security 
(IMSS)
• the National Oceanography Institute, INO (Instituto Nacional de 
Oceaongrafi'a)
• the former National Laboratories for Industrial Development, LANFI 
(Laboratories Nacionales de Fomento Industrial)
• the National Institute of Cardiology, INC (Instituto Nacional de 
Cardiologla)
• the National Institute for Nutrition, INN (Instituto Nacional de 
Nutricion)
When asked about their perception of the centres, the former 
Technology Director of one of the largest business associations said that 
in his experience, 'the centres have skilled personnel, but they are not 
focused to their region's needs'.14 Moreover, Conacyt's former Director 
General talked about the centres' potential to serve either their region 
or a specific industrial sector, otherwise, according to him, if they
13 Author's Survey: Question #12.
14 Interview #3.
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cannot find a clientele, they should be closed or transferred to a 
university to concentrate on basic research.15
In recent years, industrial support organisations like the SEP-Conacyt 
centres, which offer R&D services, have been facing severe financial 
restrictions as a result of fiscal retrenchment. In those organisations 
that have successfully moved towards self-financing, this has been 
done at the expense of eliminating what little independent long-term 
research projects they had. Less successful ones are struggling to make 
ends meet and are being forced to reduce personnel and to sell 
equipment. The reduction of personnel involved in R&D worsens the 
problem of the non-availability of technologically-skilled human 
resources (Alcorta and Peres 1998).
According to the surveyed firms, R&D centres play a very important role 
in the promotion and support of the country's technology development.
94.4 percent of the respondents consider them most responsible.16
3.4 - THE TECHNOLOGY POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR A NATIONAL 
SYSTEM OF INNOVATION UNDER AN OPEN ECONOMY
Chapter 4 analyses the way in which technology policy is created in the 
context of the Mexican political system. In contrast, this section 
examines the way technology policy evolved to set the new framework 
for the operation of the MSI under the opened economy.
Under President Salinas' administration, the National Development Plan 
1989-94, PND (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo) placed great emphasis on 
the promotion of scientific and technological activity. The Plan 
established the general criteria for national S&T policy through the 
National Programme for Scientific and Technological Modernisation
15 Interview #10.
16 Author's Survey: Question #13.
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(PRONCYMT). PRONCYMT, based on PND, was elaborated by SEP under 
the guidance of Conacyt, the Planning Committee, and the rest of the 
institutions involved in this field (Conacyt 1990).
One of the main challenges stated in the programme was to increase 
private sector participation in financing scientific and technological 
training and in clearly defining the objectives of science and technology 
policy. In the field of technology its objectives were to encourage 
private participation in R&D; to support human resource development in 
areas related to industrial activities; and to support, through the 
acquisition and development of up-to-date technologies, the increased 
efficiency of health, education and housing services, as well as the 
protection and improvement of the environment (Conacyt 1990).
In the light of the new economic environment that has prevailed in 
Mexico during recent years, the main technology policies can be 
classified as follows:
Fiscal policies for R&D
As in most OECD countries, an active fiscal policy constitutes an 
important complement to the government's effort to promote 
technological innovation. Common benefits are deductions for current 
expenditures in R&D, accelerated depreciation, tax credits, and 
exemptions.
In Mexico, the Income Tax Law provides for deductions of up to 1 
percent of total sales for investments in R&D and an additional 0.5 
percent if projects meet certain criteria set by Conacyt. To obtain this 
benefit, the firm must deposit these resources in special trust funds 
designated for this specific purpose. The law also permits accelerated 
depreciation of equipment, at a rate of up to 35 percent, when it is 
linked to domestic product and process R&D. On the other hand, the 2
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percent Assets Tax directly affects those sectors absorbing technology 
embodied in capital goods (OECD 1994, 129).
According to the examination of science and technology in Mexico 
carried out by the OECD in 1994, existing tax schemes in favour of 
industrial R&D appear to be insufficient given the challenges faced by 
Mexico. The examiners considered it necessary to introduce temporarily 
-  for a period of three to five years -  tax measures that can act as 
catalysts for technological investment. They also suggested the 
elimination of the 2 percent tax on assets.
It  is worth mentioning that countries with which Mexico's firms compete 
can offer up to 100 percent immediate tax deductions for current and 
capital expenditure on R&D (Canada, USA, Japan, France, Italy), not to 
mention the rest of the incentives that are by far broader and stronger 
than in Mexico (Mercado 1996). The 1997 amendment to the income 
tax law provides for fiscal credit of up to 20 percent for expenditure on 
technology research and development.17 This is an improvement on the 
incentives but still does not match international standards.
Linkages between universities, R&D centres and firms
The evidence regarding the way that parts of the system of innovation 
interact with each other is limited and fragmented. Historically, many 
research centres and technology institutions determined their 
programmes on the basis of what the government or individual 
researchers wanted and not as a result of a study of what industry 
needed. Their emphasis has been more towards basic science than to 
applied and productive technology development.18 There was little 
consultation with the private sector and they operated largely in
17 Article 27-A of the Income Tax Law, as appears on the federal government's 
official diary of the 29th of December 1997 (Diario Oficial 1997, 34).
18 Interviews #3, 4, 11,15 and 20.
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isolation from real demand conditions, resulting in a poor system of 
technological linkages within the country (Alcorta and Peres 1998; 
Casas 2000; Ramirez and Unger 1998). Research centres have the 
'optimum human resources to provide the services to industry; what is 
lacking is the link between them'.19
The problem dates back to the import substitution period when there 
was little incentive for universities and firms to cooperate with one 
another, because the protected market conditions did not require firms 
to innovate and universities depended financially on the state, rather 
than on the business sector (Peres 1997; Plonsky 1993). They had no 
need to sell their services to generate their own funding and be self- 
sufficient.20 Hence, the choice of research was independent of business 
needs. More recently, there have been attempts at commercialising the 
output of industrial R&D institutes. Since the 1990s a number of modes 
of cooperation such as transfer offices, university companies, joint 
programmes and projects to promote integration between university 
and industry have emerged. Most programmes have had limited 
success (Alcorta and Peres 1998; Casas 2000).
When interviewed, entrepreneurs who have recently developed 
technology projects reported that when they approached academic and 
research institutions, they found good technical advice but were 
disadvantaged by the poor commercial vision of the academic 
institutions to help them thoroughly.21 Another problem was that the 
institutions were not able to clearly develop a proposal with its 
associated costs. Some of them 'could not give an estimate of their 
costs, some were too expensive, some too cheap and that did not give 
us confidence'.22
19 Interview #20.
20 Interviews #3, 11 15 and 20.
21 Interviews #2 and 8.
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The results of the survey conducted for this thesis show some 
interesting evidence of the way in which firms interact with academic 
and research organisations. Out of the firms that developed a 
technology project, 54.7 percent did so on their own, and the remaining 
45.3 percent used some kind of service from an R&D agency.23 Figure 
3.A shows the type of institution used by the latter firms, and evidences 
the weight of public universities and R&D centres compared to private 
and foreign ones. Public universities' services were used by 51.7 
percent of the firms, while 37.9 percent hired public R&D services.24 
Respondents were asked to rate the service provided by these 
agencies. Figure 3.B shows that most of them were satisfied as 82.7 
percent rated the service from adequate to very good, and only 17.2 
percent complained about a bad or poor service.25
There is a need to bring closer together all the players involved in the 
technology development process to overcome the historical lack of 
communication between them. In order to foster such interactions, 
Conacyt has the Industry-Academy Linkage Programme, established 
since 1991. It provides firms with grants of up to 50 percent of project 
costs and covers expenditures for personnel training, joint research, 
and joint commercialisation. Moreover, one attempt to find agreed 
solutions to the problems of technology modernisation and innovation in 
the country was launched in 1992. Conacyt's authorities considered that 
it was required to bring issues to the top of the economic, social and 
political agenda. In June of that year by an agreement with the 
Ministries of Public Education (SEP), of Finance (SHCP), of Trade and 
Industrial Development (Secofi), Conacyt established the National 
Coordinating Committee for Technological Modernisation, CONCERTEC 
(Comite Nacional de Concertacion para la Modernizacion Tecnologica). 
Its main objectives were (Conacyt 1992):
22 Interview #8.
23 Author's Survey: Question #27.
24 Author's Survey: Question #27, part 2.
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1. To facilitate the linkage between Mexican firms in need of technology 
and the country's research and educational institutions which can 
supply technology related services.
2. To intensify communication and coordination amongst the public 
agencies which share responsibilities and challenges in the 
technology sector, as well as between them and private firms and 
academic institutions.
3. To establish an integral financial scheme to cover effectively all 
stages of the process of technological modernisation, with special 
emphasis to address the needs of SMEs struggling to compete and 
survive in a global environment.
Figure 3.A. Respondents' answer to the question: What type of R&D 
institution did you use to develop your project?










25 Author's Survey: Question #28.
Public University
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Figure 3.B. Respondents' answer to the question: How do you rate the
service of the R&D centre that you used for your project?





Bad Service Adequate Service Very Good Service
Poor Service Good Service
Service Rating
Source: Author's Survey
The Committee was formed by high-level representatives from the 
public, private, financial and academic sectors. Chaired by the Minister 
of Education, it comprised 60 members of the above-mentioned groups, 
including members of Congress and labour leaders, as well as the 
Ministers of SHCP and Secofi who co-chaired the committee (Conacyt 
1994d; OECD 1994). During his intervention at the inauguration session 
of the Committee, Fausto Alzati, Director General of Conacyt, 
recognised the need to create 'the institutions to facilitate the formation 
of a complex and dynamic network' so that users and providers of 
technology, government and financial institutions can meet the goals 
established by CONCERTEC (Conacyt 1992, 9).
Present at the same session, the Minister of Education and Chairman of 
CONCERTEC, Ernesto Zedillo, addressed the Committee and highlighted 
the importance of CONCERTEC, which in his own words was 'embedded 
in the lines established by the National Programme of Science and 
Technological Modernisation...and will be a forum where the needs and
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opinions of the productive apparatus, of the financial services 
institutions, and of the research and education centres will converge' 
(Conacyt 1992, 22).
Regardless of its importance, there was a visible decline in the 
attendance of the high-ranking representatives from the different 
sectors. There were only two sessions following the inauguration one 
for the rest of the Salinas' administration. There were some attempts to 
reconvene the Committee, but it has not got back together.
Financing of industrial R&D
As discussed thoroughly in Chapter 7, there are two basic programmes 
for financing R&D within private firms: the Research and Development 
Fund for Technological Modernisation, FIDETEC (Fondo de Investigacion 
y Desarrollo para la Modernization Tecnologica) managed by Conacyt, 
and the Technology Development Programme, managed by the National 
Development Bank, Nafin (Nacional Financiera). FIDETEC provides loans 
and risk-sharing guarantees to those commercial banks which lend to 
firms engaging into pre-commercial technology development and 
innovation efforts. The Nafin programme deals with the 
commercialisation or scaling-up of product or process development and 
it complements FIDETEC.26
The legal protection of industrial property
Another important aspect of technology policy, if not sometimes 
classified directly within its lines, concerns the legal and protective 
schemes for technology, R&D and innovation. Under the Salinas 
administration and in the NAFTA negotiations environment, the patent 
and trade mark legislation was radically transformed in June 1991 with
26 Chapter 7 examines the policies and programmes for direct project 
financing.
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the Law to Protect Industrial Property Rights (Aboites 1994). The law 
was an important step forward in the Government's efforts to provide 
industry with an adequate legal framework for promoting technological 
modernisation and industrial innovation. It is comparable to those of 
industrialised countries. It clearly defines and establishes protection for 
diverse industrial property instruments, ranging from patents and trade 
marks to industrial secrets and design. With the new law, there are no 
excluded areas for patenting, it is equal to that of any industrialised 
country.27
The new law included the creation of the Mexican Institute of Industrial 
Property, IMPI (Instituto Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial), 
responsible for the entire system, which became operational at the 
beginning of 1994 (OECD 1994; Phillips Greene 1995). IMPI is a 
decentralised governmental organisation, responsible for providing 
advice and technical assistance on industrial property-based issues, 
developing and updating databanks on patents and trade marks, both 
national and international, and disseminating information on current 
international technology. IMPI has specific areas in charge of the 
following: issuing trade mark registrations and property titles,
repression of unfair competition and provision of technological 
information services (IMPI 1997). According to its Director General, the 
institute is not only self-financing, but gives back money to the Ministry 
of Finance every year.28
Another important development is the new metrology and normalisation 
law issued in June 1992. Its main objective is to encourage higher- 
quality standards among Mexican firms and, in consequence, enhance 
their competitive capabilities (OECD 1994). The most recent issue 
regarding the protection framework is that Mexico adopted the Patent 




In different forums towards the end of the Salinas administration, top 
officials of the Ministry of Trade and Industry were emphasising the 
importance of technology aspects within industrial policy(Clavijo 
Quiroga and Casar 1994a; Clavijo Quiroga and Casar 1994b). When 
Jaime Serra Puche, former Minister of Trade and Industry, addressed 
the Assembly of the Confederation of Industrial Chambers, CONCAMIN 
(Confederacion de Camaras Industriales) in March 1994, he said that 
the legal framework changes responded to the new promotion spirit of 
the Mexican government and referred to the creation of the IMPI (Serra 
Puche 1994). Nevertheless, the experiences of entrepreneurs still 
highlight that the mechanisms are not fast enough compared to those 
in other countries like the US; though they do acknowledge the 
improvements in the legal framework, and the Importance of Mexico's 
adherence to the Paris Convention which results in lower costs for 
patenting.29
Answers to the Author's Survey questions regarding the protection of 
the respondents' technology projects reflect further the way in which 
Mexican entrepreneurs see the legal framework and the procedures to 
protect industrial property. Only 26.6 percent of the firms with a 
technology project had received some sort of protection advice, while 
the remaining 71.9 percent had none at the time the survey was 
conducted.30 From those that had been advised, 47.1 percent referred 
to private bureaux as their source of information, followed by 35.3 
percent that mentioned IMPI or Secofi. 11.8 percent had been advised 
by public universities or R&D centres, and the remaining 5.9 percent by 
foreign patent bureaux. See Figure 3.C.31
29 Interviews #1, 4, and 9.
30 Author's Survey: Question #66.
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Figure 3.C. Respondents' answers to the question: From which agencies
did you receive protection advice for your project?
Source of Protection Advice to Firms




What is most striking is that only 32.8 percent said they had started 
their protection procedure32 but almost half of those were not able to 
rate the procedure as yet; and 60 percent of those who could rate it 
considered it adequate or good, 9 percent very good, while 39 percent 
found it bad or very bad.33 It seems as though the new legislation is of 
international standards, but Mexican firms still need to learn to use it in 
their favour.
3.5 -  SOME INDICATORS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
MEXICAN SYSTEM OF INNO VATIO N
Using some of the most conventional indicators for the performance of 
a national system of innovation, this section shows results of the 
Mexican system for recent years, and compares them with different 
countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador,
31 Author's Survey: Question #67.
32 Author's Survey: Question #68.
33 Author's Survey: Question #69.
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Greece, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, the 
UK and the US.34
Patents
As a result of the new legislation, there were 6961 patent applications 
in 1992, a 32 percent increase over the previous year. Total patent 
applications rose from 4251 in 1990 to almost 11,000 by the end of 
1997. Patents granted totalled 3186 by the end of 1996, while in 1987 
only 1156 were given. Regarding applications by Mexican nationals, 
there has been a decrease from 742 in 1987 to 420 by the end of 1997. 
In 1996, only 116 patents presented by Mexicans were given 
registration (IMPI 1997; OECD 1994). In 1996, applications filed by 
residents in other countries were as follows: 3,316 in Canada; 189 in 
Chile; 434 in Greece; 340,861 in Japan; 68,446 in Korea; 203 in 
Thailand; 367 in Turkey; 25, 269 in the UK; and 111,883 in the US 
(World Bank 2000).
Expenditure and investment
In 1999, Mexico's total spending in R&D as a percentage of GNP was 
0.33, ranking 45 out of 59 in the Global Competitiveness Report 2000. 
Thailand (0.13 percent) and Ecuador (0.02 percent) are the only ones 
out of those used for the comparisons which spent less than Mexico. For 
instance the percentage spent by Korea was 2.82 , Japan 2.80, the US 
2.63, the UK 1.95, Bolivia 1.67, Canada 1.66, Singapore 1.13, Brazil 
0.81, India 0.73, Chile 0.68, Greece 0.47, Turkey 0.45 and Argentina 
0.38 (World Economic Forum and Harvard-CID 2000).
34 The sample of countries was chosen to include examples from different 
geographical regions, different levels of industrialisation, and Mexico's most 
important trading partners.
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Public expenditure and investment
One of the main characteristics of the MSI is the very low level of 
aggregate expenditure in R&D. In 1995, almost 80 percent of total R&D 
expenditure was funded by the government, most of which went to 
universities (Conacyt 1996b). The equivalent average figure for OECD 
countries is 43 percent, for Asian 'tigers' 36 percent, and for European 
NICs 44 percent (CEPAL and UNESCO 1992; UNESCO 1996). Not only 
do most of the public resources go to the public education sector, but 
most of those go to Conacyt, the SEP-Conacyt Centres System and 
UNAM, which together received 42 percent of the total federal 
expenditure (Alcorta and Peres 1998).
Total federal expenditure in science and technology as a percentage of 
GDP rose from 0.28 percent in 1990 to 0.35 percent in 1995, being 
among the lowest in OECD countries. For instance, in the US, S&T 
expenditure accounts for 2.58 percent of GDP, in Japan 2.64 percent 
and in Canada 2.27 percent. Mexico's is lower than Greece (0.49 
percent) and Turkey (0.39 percent) (Conacyt 1996b).
Private expenditure and investment
The small participation of the private sector in aggregate R&D 
expenditure financing discussed above is the first indication of such 
conduct. There is no technological culture among Mexican firms (Alcorta 
and Peres 1998). Firms invest little in innovation. Privately-funded R&D 
expenditure is around 25 percent, half of what the private sector 
finances in other countries of the region (CEPAL and UNESCO 1992). 
The private sector is mostly composed of small and medium-sized firms 
with limited R&D capabilities, so large firms finance R&D areas and may 
spend most of the private business expenditure in R&D. Moreover, 
Mexico's private sector is spending only 0.06 percent of GDP on R&D, 
compared with 2.15 percent in Japan (1991), 1.81 percent in the US 
(1992), and 1.32 percent in the EU (1991) (OECD 1994). Furthermore 
and contrary to public universities and higher education centres, R&D
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activities in private universities are funded primarily by non-government 
sources. According to the Global Competitiveness Report, Mexico's 
private sector spending in R&D ranked 48 out of 59, while countries 
ranking above are Argentina 44, Brazil 32, Canada 18, Chile 39, Greece 
43, India 42, Japan 4, Korea 14, Singapore 13, Thailand 45, Turkey 38, 
the UK 15 and the US 3; and countries ranking below are Bolivia 59 and 
Ecuador 49 (World Economic Forum and Harvard-CID 2000).
Human capital formation
Education and human training play a pivotal role in technological 
change and growth of the NSI (Alcorta and Peres 1998). Nevertheless, 
human resources dedicated to science and technology are scarce. In 
1995, only nine in every 10,000 inhabitants were involved in these 
activities. This level is inferior to other OECD members. In Japan the 
figure is 125, and in Canada 86. Regarding the number of scientists and 
engineers, in Mexico there are five in every 10,000 inhabitants, while in 
the US there are 74. The only country comparable in this regard with 
Mexico is Turkey, with seven in every 10,000 inhabitants (Conacyt 
1996b). Furthermore, scientists and engineers (per million people) 
involved in R&D activities between 1985-1995 amounted to 213. In 
contrast, the numbers for Argentina were 671, for Bolivia 250, for Brazil 
168, for Canada 2,656, for Greece 774, for Japan 6,309, for Korea 
2,636, for Singapore 2,728, for Turkey 261, for the UK 2,417, and for 
the US 3,732 (World Bank 2000).
Science and technology publications
As described in Section 1, apart from the traditional performance 
measures of a NSI, there are other complementary or alternative 
indicators that can be used to evaluate the functioning of an system of 
innovation. In the case of Mexico, some attempts to include these 
measures have been made by Conacyt, and include science- and
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technology-related publications. The average number of such 
publications in Mexico between 1993 and 1995 was 2258. For the same 
period in Argentina there were 2,430, in Brazil 4,577, in Canada 
31,116, in Chile 1,261, in Japan 54,536, in the UK 52,871 and in the US 
257,414. Nevertheless, in Mexico the number of such publications has 
increased by 97 percent from 1980 to 1995 (Conacyt 1996b; Robles de 
la Rosa 2001).
CONCLUSIONS
One of the main reasons why the Mexican System of Innovation lags 
behind other comparable countries is that for a long period the 
economy was not exposed to competition. Businessmen did not have 
incentives to adopt strategies based on technology and innovation The 
former government policies regarding protected markets and public 
ownership encouraged the growth of many enterprises, but they also 
encouraged inefficiency and a lack of attention to technological 
innovation. Mexican industry had no need to exploit its own 
technologies to compete. At most, the manufacturing of 
undifferentiated goods needed only process innovation, which could be 
acquired by embodied technology in plant and equipment. Foreign 
subsidiaries received manufacturing know-how directly from 
multinational enterprises.
Mexico's system of innovation developed into a weak entity. Although 
emerging in an institutionalised way at the end of the 1950s and 1960s, 
and expanding considerably during the 1970s, it has since proved 
unable to consolidate into an effective promoter of technological 
upgrading and innovation. There have been significant specific 
accomplishments in policy-making, institutional development, education 
and training but it has not been possible to replicate such advances 
throughout the whole system.
112
During the 1990s, and in response to the major changes in the 
country's economic environment, Mexico underwent important 
modifications in its science and technology system. However, the 
system is still not well articulated in its decision-making processes and 
the interactions between its players are not yet well coordinated, not 
just within the public sector, but between the pubic sector and the rest 
of the participants of the system.
Mexico's government has played a central role in the shape and 
orientation of the technology and innovations system, but has been 
unable to establish and implement a long-term, coherent technology 
policy which would be required for a more successful outcome, as 
shown by the performance measures presented in the chapter. Almost 
30 years ago the country saw the birth of the first formal institution in 
charge of technology policy, Conacyt, but despite its longevity, its 
programmes have not yet given high impact results, undermining the 
development of a strong technology community in Mexico.
It can be said that the 1984-89 Programme for Science and Technology 
and its successor, the National Programme for Science and 
Technological Modernisation 1990-94, traced a fundamental difference 
between scientific endeavour and technological activity: science is for 
the academic sector and technology is for economic activities. 
Therefore, the importance of technology for the country's growth has 
been recognised and the spirit of the new vision is that technology 
development is to be pursued through linkages of university research 
with private industry, and federally-supported R&D to be carried out 
directly by private firms. Thus, as this chapter has discussed, links 
between academy and firms are still loose. On one hand, enhancing the 
operation of the national system is the major route to increasing the 
creativity of firms. On the other, private businesses can make their 
contribution to strengthening the technological system of which they 
are a part -  while at the same time enhancing the chances of their own
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success -  by increasing their economic competence in all areas, 
increasing their R&D efforts, initiating, building and strengthening 
linkages with academic institutions, articulating the requirements to 
which the academic sector can respond, and broadening their 
technological base.
While firms are the primary actors in the generation of technology, their 
activities are supported by the accumulation of knowledge and skills in 
a complex milieu of other research and training institutions. Technology 
policy cannot be concerned with innovative activities of firms alone, it 
must encompass the broader context: the whole of the Mexican 
national system of innovation. Chapter 4 deals with the way in which 
the government promotes the country's technology development and 




CREATING TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN  MEXICO
'Few would disagree that in all 
countries the state plays a central role 
in shaping, stimulating and inhibiting 
various forms of technical change/
Martin Fransman, 1986
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is concerned with how the forces of the Mexican political 
and bureaucratic system condition the manner in which decisions 
concerning science and technology are adopted and implemented. 
Decisions governing the allocation of resources for the acquisition of 
technologies, whether through domestic R&D or licensing agreements, 
emanate from a political process. And the choice of the array of specific 
policy instruments through which these decisions are actually 
implemented is dependent on the political forces acting in this 
environment.
As policy-makers struggle to improve the performance of their 
innovation systems, and in particular to help firms in their countries 
become more innovative and more able to draw upon science and 
technology in the enhancement of their competitiveness, it is not 
surprising that there is a strong desire to know what works and how to 
make it work better.
The history of policy to stimulate innovation has been outlined by 
several authors discussing the experience in different countries 
(Johnston and Gummett 1979; Pavitt and Walker 1976; Ronayne 
1984). Policy tools available to policy-makers include: direct
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government participation in research; attempts to stimulate private 
research by placing government contracts with innovators; ail manner 
of subsidies, tax reliefs, loans, and investment allowances; centralised 
coordination of research activity; the patent system; attempts to 
reduce market imperfections; honours and awards; general economic 
management aimed at providing the most attractive climate for 
innovation; and educational and training schemes (Hall 1986).
In the case of Mexico, most of the technology policy literature dates 
from the period of import substitution. There is much less written which 
expressly addresses the questions of technology policy under the aegis 
of trade liberalisation, and this chapter presents empirical evidence of 
the experience in recent years.
Section 1 introduces the Mexican political system under the main 
conceptual framework of the notions of the State, institutions, 
politicians, bureaucracy and policy networks. Section 2 then describes 
the origins of technology policy in Mexico during the protected economy 
era, from 1970 to the mid-1980s. The evolution of the technology policy 
context since the 1980s is presented in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on 
the importance of technology policy per se and provides an evaluation 
of the way the government in Mexico has used the array of technology 
policy tools to promote technology and innovation activities in the 
country. Section 5 uses the experiences of firms that have interacted 
with public agencies as an example of the obstacles and limitations of 
the political system when designing and implementing technology- 
oriented programmes.
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4.1 -  THE STATE, INSTITUTIONS, POLITICIANS, BUREAUCRACY 
AND POLICY NETWORKS: THE CONTEXT OF MEXICO'S
POLITICAL SYSTEM
Mexico is a federal republic with a written constitution, promulgated in 
1917. The Mexican territory is divided into 31 states and a Federal 
District, DF (Distrito Federal), where the national government and 
federal administration are located. The federal government consists of 
three equal but separate organs, the executive, legislative and judiciary 
branches. The executive function is vested in a single individual, the 
president, who is selected by universal suffrage every six years. The 
political system in Mexico allows for party competition and there are 
several political parties. The Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) 
remained in power from 1929 to 2000.1 The National Action Party (PAN) 
represents right-wing political groups: it has been growing over the 
past 15 years, participates in state and municipal governments, and has 
won the presidency for the 2000-06 administration. The Democratic 
Revolution Party (PRD) is formed of a broad coalition of left-wing 
groups and parties and has grown in some states and regions. The 
other national parties represent smaller constituencies (OECD 1994).
In order to better understand the context in which Mexico's government 
operates, and the way in which it designs and implements technology 
policy, it is important to briefly review some of the most relevant 
concepts related to the State and the inherent characteristics for the 
case of Mexico.
Institutions
During the last few decades, economists have given increasing 
attention to the role of institutions in the functioning and change of
1 On December 1st 2000, the first President from an opposition party (PAN) was 
inaugurated, ending the long-ruling regime of the PRI.
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economic systems. Institutions have also become increasingly 
important in innovation theory. Their role is also emphasised in all 
versions of the system of innovation approach (Edquist and Johnson 
1997, 41). Institutions are sets of habits, routines, rules, norms and 
laws which regulate the relations between people and shape human 
interaction.
Different nations have developed different institutions, formal and 
informal, for making political decisions. The formal institutions of 
government as defined by constitutions are critical to these decisions. 
But equally important to public policy are the informal practices that 
have developed around these institutions as interest groups, political 
parties, individual politicians and bureaucrats have struggled to bend 
these institutions to their wills. These 'rules of the game' define a 
different political logic for each nation. This is a logic that public policy, 
no matter how technical the subject matter, cannot escape (Immergut 
1992, 3).
Mexico is experiencing a profound transition. Long operating under a 
semi-authoritarian political system based on a tight structure of 
economic as well as political controls, the country has been dramatically 
changed by recent and ongoing reforms. Many of the old institutions -  
economic, political and social -  still exist, but most are mere shells of 
what they used to be. Rapidly emerging new institutions are gradually 
transforming the political landscape of Mexico (Rubio 1995).
The State
One conception of politics makes it essentially equivalent to 
government. By government we mean the formal political machinery of 
the country as a whole: its institutions, laws, public policies, and key 
actors. Politics then refers to the activities, processes, and structures of 
government (Caporaso and Levine 1992). According to Smith, the
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state2 is 'a collection of institutions and rules' (1993, 49). Moreover, 
'state action' is shorthand for individuals acting within particular 
agencies or institutions (Smith 1993, 49). Officials and politicians 
behave in ways that result in state autonomy when it serves their own 
career interests to do so, and the content of their decisions will reflect 
their interests (Geddes 1994, 7-8). According to Philip, the Mexican 
system is a set of arrangements in constant redefinition 'around its only 
fixed element -  which is the presidency... A strong presidency can 
survive a weakening of elite institutions such as the PRI. What any 
president will need is to create new political institutions to replace the 
old declining ones' (Philip 1992, 183).
Judging from the relative political stability of Mexico during times of 
prosperity as well as during times of crisis, one would presume that the 
state has been quite effective at relieving social and political pressures. 
Yet the presence of a highly centralised state, practically unlimited 
powers of the subsequent presidents and a one-party political system 
have accounted for corruption, disruptions, bureaucratic and technical 
inefficiencies (Lustig 1992, 243-251; Wionczek and Marquez 1993).
State autonomy and interest groups
Governments can and often do act independently of underlying 
socioeconomic forces (Evans 1995, 39-40; Geddes 1994, 1-5). 
Governments sometimes effect radical shifts in economic policy without 
the support of important interest groups: in other words,
autonomously. In consequence, there is a need to understand the 
state's role in bringing about change. The notion of state autonomy 
maintains that the state and state actors have interests of their own 
and, in certain circumstances, the ability to transform these interests 
into policy (Smith 1993). As previously mentioned, in order to
2 The concept of the 'state' is used in the thesis as synonymous with 
'government', though differences in their definitions exist.
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understand state behaviour one must understand the behaviour of the 
individuals, as shaped by the political institutions that determine the 
costs and benefits of the different actions they can choose (Geddes 
1994, 182-196; Schneider 1991, 202).
State officials sometimes have policy preferences independent of those 
of major social and economic groups in society, and these officials can 
sometimes, by virtue of their positions in government, use state power 
and resources to pursue their own ideas and interests. Government 
policies often reflect the economic ideologies of state officials rather 
than those of domestic groups. These policies in turn create the 
incentives that shape the choices of individuals in society. And these 
choices then affect the rate of growth, the distribution of the benefits of 
growth, and, in sum, the way political, economic and social systems 
work (Geddes 1994; Reis 1994).
State and society are not just linked together: each helps constitute the 
other. Most of the independent institutions -  chambers of commerce 
and industry, research centres, universities, the media, political parties 
-  that exist in Mexican society today were originally shaped under a 
monopolistic political system organised around a given party line. 
Although the party line changed every six years, all allegedly 
independent entities were expected to conform to, and be disciplined 
by, the system. Mexico's State has been moderately semi-authoritarian 
but highly participatory. The regime has not been repressive or 
monolithic but it has demanded discipline and conformity (Rubio 1995).
Despite the economic strength of business, it often has great difficulty 
in establishing stable and well-integrated relations with government 
which often limits its political impact. The instability of business policy 
communities derives from the unwillingness of business to encourage 
state intervention, the large number of actors involved, the conflicts of 
interests between actors, the political nature of many of the areas
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where business is involved and the organisation of the state (Smith 
1993, 160). Thus, if the existence of an autonomous Mexican state is 
accepted, certain consequences in its relationship to the private sector 
can be identified. Many recent analysts admit to the existence of 
Mexican state autonomy, but considerable disagreement exists as to its 
extent and limits. Some believe that the state has relative autonomy 
from short-term business interests but acts in the long-term interests of 
Mexico's private sector. Others believe that the state is not the 
instrument of the private sector even though the state has favoured the 
latter's interests (Camp 1989, 222-252).
Bennett and Sharpe (1980) suggest that there are three principal 
explanations of Mexico's state autonomy. First, the weak condition of 
the private sector itself explains state intervention. Second, state 
intervention institutionalised a larger, visible role for the state in the 
economy. Finally, they believe that each presidential administration 
alters state orientations. Carried to an extreme, one can argue that 
state autonomy might be extremely weak if not for the fact that 
Mexicans expect an activist state, thus giving political actors more room 
to make policy choices (Bell 1991).
Policy networks
The notions of the state, its autonomy and its organisation through its 
bureaucracy3 are not enough to explain the dynamics of the way 
policies are designed, implemented and evaluated. Even the most 
bureaucratically coherent state cannot effect transformation without a 
network of ties to social groups and classes with which it shares a 
project. Connectedness is as important as coherence (Evans 1995, 
249). Thus, the theories of policy communities and policy networks4
3 For the purpose of this study, 'bureaucracy' is used as a generic term, 
equivalent to the organisational apparatus of the state (Evans 1995).
4 The literature on networks has been developed primarily in Europe, although 
there have been several important contributions from North America (Atkinson
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serve to know more about the politics of the decision-making process 
within organisations.
These theories deal with how individual governmental and non­
governmental actors (or dominant coalitions) decide to use and exploit 
their resources of authority, money, expertise, information and 
organisation: in sum, how their strategies are formulated and converted 
into policies. Public policy instruments are the set of techniques by 
which government authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure 
support and to effect or prevent social change (Vedung 1998, 21)
Policy network and the related notion of policy community refer to 
actors and relationships in the policy process that take us beyond 
political-bureaucratic relationships. Political scientists use the term 
policy network to refer to interdependent relationships that emerge 
between both organisations and individuals who are in frequent contact 
with one another in particular policy areas The community refers to the 
actors and the network refers to the relationships (Benson 1982, 148) 
among actors.
The membership of a community is defined by a common identity or 
interest: members share a direct or indirect, actual or potential interest 
in the public policy issues and problems which arise for their 
community. They possess resources of authority, money, information, 
expertise and organisation, with the potential for their use at some 
stage in the policy process. The actors of the community will transact 
with each other, exchanging resources in order to balance and optimise 
their mutual relationships. So, network is the linking process, the 
outcome of those exchanges, within a policy community or between a
and Coleman 1992; Heclo 1978; Peters 1998; Sabatier 1991). Rhodes and 
Marsh argue that the American literature served as a foundation for this body 
of research and served as a precursor of attention to concepts such as 
corporatism, networks and communities (Rhodes and Marsh 1992).
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number of policy communities (Atkinson and Coleman 1992). A policy 
network may evolve or be constituted around a discrete policy issue or 
problem, a set of related issues or around a policy process. The 
members of a network may be drawn from one policy community or 
several. Policy issues and problems provide the occasion for a policy 
network (Hay 1998; Wright 1988).
Fragmented policy processes are a significant obstacle to the generation 
of a coherent body of knowledge. It is common that within the same 
political system, things work differently in agriculture, transportation, 
monetary policy, and so on (Atkinson and Coleman 1992). For Dowding 
(1995, 142) the explanation of the outcomes lies in the characteristics 
of the actors. They explain both the nature of the network and the 
nature of the policy process (Dowding 1995, 142; Marsh 1998)
The concepts of state autonomy and policy network demonstrate that in 
order to understand both how policy is made and the role of groups in 
its development, it is important to understand the interests of the state 
and the type of relationships that exist between groups and the state 
(Smith 1993). In order to complete a general frame of reference of the 
technology policy network in Mexico, the lack of a democratic 
government for several decades and of a juridical institutional 
framework must be emphasised. This has made policy design and 
implementation extremely vulnerable to manipulation by government 
and private interest groups. Manipulation is thus far removed from the 
public eye and there is almost no accountability for the actions of public 
officials, nor for the actions of interest groups. (Nadal Egea 1995). With 
these concepts and its related aspects of the Mexican political system in 
mind, the next section introduces the history of technology policy in 
Mexico since the 1970s.
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4.2 -  OUTLINE OF THE ORIGINS OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN  
MEXICO (1970-mid 1980s)
Background
The 1970s saw a growing consensus about the importance of market- 
oriented policies, but the increasing importance of liberalism was not as 
widely accepted as it would prove to be later.5 Mexico, among other 
countries, experienced this conflict during the Echeverria and Lopez 
Portillo governments. From 1970 to 1982, under these administrations, 
state intervention was characterised by attempts to strengthen the 
weight of government in the economic process rather than to mitigate 
it. The essence of state intervention during that period lay in its refusal 
to give up the import-substitution model (ISI) (Valdes-Ugalde 1996).
Arguably, before 1970, the federal government had not perceived the 
fundamental need of a modern state to develop a national scientific and 
technological capacity (Flores 1982). With the start of the process for 
presidential succession in 1969-70, the National Institute for Scientific 
Research (INIC)6, a body created in 1950 and dependent on the 
Ministry of Education, was charged with the task of carrying out a series 
of studies in order to define the main lines of a national policy for 
science and technology. A committee was created for the study and 
promotion of science and technology, integrated by the Rector of 
UNAM, the Director of IPN and the Secretary-General of INIC (Nadal 
Egea 1995). The committee's work centred on the preparation of a 
draft law designed to reorganise INIC but its work was interrupted by a 
serious political students' movement in 1968. After that year, politicians 
were highly concerned about the lack of a firm grasp or political control 
over scientists and researchers. Thus, the creation of Conacyt had
5 For a more detailed discussion of the growing importance of neo-liberal 
policies in Latin America see Calvert (1994, 32-34).
6 See Chapter 3.
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important political considerations during the first year of President 
Echeverria's mandate (Casas and Ponce 1986).
During the first quarter of 1969, the Ministry of the Presidency 
convened a series of meetings with the directors and top staff of the 
main research institutions in Mexico. The outcome of this process was 
an executive order to INIC, charging this institute with the task of 
carrying out the necessary steps to establish the institutional base for 
the development and implementation of S&T policy in Mexico (Nadal 
Egea 1995).
1970-1976
By the end of 1970, INIC produced a final report with a series of 
recommendations. In December of the same year, President Echeverria 
created the National Council for Science and Technology (Conacyt) as 
one of his first government acts. Since that year, Conacyt has been the 
focus of dialogue and communication between government and the 
scientific community (Marquez 1982). It was set up as a decentralised 
body responsible for the design and implementation of S&T policy in 
Mexico. In its capacity as obligatory adviser to the public sector on all 
matters regarding science and technology, Conacyt has not been able 
to influence the substance of S&T decisions mainly because, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, it is a decentralised body and not a ministry.
The President's benevolent attitude during Conacyt's formative phase 
permitted the agency, between 1971 and 1976, to undertake a number 
of activities not limited to the attempt to develop a national policy for 
science and technology. They included a significant number of initiatives 
and measures that, on the one hand, tended to strengthen the science 
and technology infrastructure of the country with regard to diffusion, 
information, statistics, equipment and instrument imports, and technical 
norms, but on the other tended toward the establishment of permanent
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links between science and technology and the educational and 
production systems, such as the creation of new research centres, 
without the interference of the federal bureaucracy (Nadal Egea 1977).
Ministers of state and all members of the board of directors were well 
acquainted with the President's attitude, and adopted a position of 
extreme tolerance towards Conacyt. However, in retrospect it is clear 
that this situation was both circumstantial and temporary. Thus, 
between 1971 and 1976, the council lived largely as a result of being 
viewed favourably by Mexico's president who, at the same time and in 
contrast to his particular style of government,7 intervened very little in 
its activities (Marquez 1982; Wionczek 1981).
During the National Conference on Education, Science and Technology, 
held in June 1976 as part of the political campaign just prior to the 
change of administration, the spokesman for Conacyt stated in the 
presence of the incoming president of Mexico that for science and 
technology to give results, its strategies must be designed not for six 
years, but for 20-25 years, considering the gestation period of science 
and technology; therefore a national plan for science and technology 
that lacks a long-term perspective runs the risk of being a meaningless 
exercise.8
On the basis of these criteria, Conacyt presented the National Plan for 
Science and Technology to both the outgoing president of Mexico and 
the president-elect in November 1976. Representatives of the private, 
public and scientific sector collaborated in the elaboration of the plan 
(Amadeo 1978), but after the new government took office, nothing 
more was heard of it. Concern became widespread about the lack of
7 According to Centeno, President Luis Echeverria began the process through 
which the Mexican presidential office came to completely dominate the 
bureaucracy without checks and balances from other powerful institutions. He 
centralised power in the already dominant presidency (Centeno 1994).
8 See Wionczek (1981).
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continuity that had led to the failure of scientific research and 
technological development programmes that had been financed and 
encouraged by the federal government (Nadal Egea 1977; Wionczek 
1981).
1977-1982
According to the 1976 Plan, it was necessary that national spending on 
science and technology continue to grow during the next administration 
at a real annual average rate of about 20 percent. Nevertheless, due to 
the economic/financial crisis of the end of 1976 and to the cyclical 
political process of forgetting the earlier attempts to establish long-term 
national policies, the goals of the 1976 Plan vanished, including the 
need to increase the spending on science and technology to 1 percent 
of GDP.
Traditionally, plans inherited by a new President from a previous 
administration are not implemented: in fact, they are substituted as 
soon as possible (Conacyt 1978; OECD 1997). By the end of 1978 there 
were negative feelings within the Federal Government towards 
Conacyt's performance. It seems as if it were impossible to isolate 
science and technology policy from the institutional aberrations and 
discontinuities that result from the Mexican six-year political cycle 
(Wionczek 1981). Conacyt's lack of real social and political support 
under the new presidential administration showed how a bureaucratic 
change exposed the fragility of Conacyt and its functions (Amadeo 
1978).
In June, 1977, President Lopez Portillo9 summoned fifty members of the 
scientific community and high-level officials of Conacyt to discuss before 
the President and members of his Cabinet the problems of science and
9 President Jose Lopez Portillo shared Echeverria's desire to maintain control 
over government policy (Centeno 1994).
127
research in Mexico. The President asked Conacyt to detail a National 
Programme of Science and Technology. In the process, Conacyt 
consulted members of the scientific and technological communities, the 
different public agencies related to the subject, and representatives of 
the private sector.
As a result, in October 1978 the National Programme of Science and 
Technology 1978-82 (PRONCYT) was presented. Most of the document 
was concerned with previous results and new goals in the areas of basic 
research and science. PRONCYT dedicated its pages of technology policy 
mainly to the concept of technology transfer. The Programme was also 
concerned with specific sectors of industry and of the economy and 
established particular goals for each of those priority sectors. During 
those years Conacyt concentrated on a big scholarship programme 
designed to form human resources in foreign universities (Amadeo 
1978; OECD 1997).
4.3 -  TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN  MEXICO SINCE THE MID-1980S 
1983-1988
In his presentation of the National Programme for Technological and 
Scientific Development 1984-88, PRONDETYC (Programa Nacional de 
Desarrollo Tecnologico y Cientffico), President de la Madrid10 declared 
that the state's actions in the science and technology fields had to be 
coordinated among different agencies of the government to make 
federal expenditure more efficient and to avoid duplicity of functions. 
PRONDETYC established that state intervention in the planning of 
science and technology is justified because more than 90 percent of 
national expenditure on those activities came from the public sector 
(Hodara 1985; Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1984). Nevertheless, the plan
10 The de la Madrid administration in some ways represented a return to a 
balance of power between the president and his ministers (Centeno 1994).
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promoted communication by the government with the productive sector 
in order to link politicians, scientists, researchers, technology 
developers and the users of technology. PRONDETYC recognised that in 
the past there had not been proper scientific and technological planning 
as those activities had not been integrated with the country's national 
planning. Therefore, the science and technology policy had been merely 
an institutional policy and a public expenditure policy, without 
considering the complex interrelation of science and technology with 
economic and social development.
In PRONDETYC's diagnosis of the technology development promotion 
activities, until the early 1980s, it explicitly mentioned that they did not 
emphasise the direct participation of the industrial plant in R&D 
activities. This left productive processes dependent on imported 
technology with very little assimilation into the local processes. 
Excessive protectionism led to low competition and lack of incentives to 
incorporate technological innovation into the industrial plant of the 
country. The government's efforts had been limited with regard to the 
promotion of indigenous technology. The programmes designed to 
support technology development in SMEs imposed non-favourable 
conditions for those kinds of firms. In particular, the operation of 
federal programmes to finance technology activities of firms did not 
flow as it was supposed to, because the funds had to be given via 
commercial banks which stopped the process for months. Based on the 
diagnosis, PRONDETYC set the new goals to promote technology 
progress as a means of improving national production and competition 
in foreign markets (Hodara 1985; Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1984).
As outlined in the previous chapter, the 1984-89 Programme and its 
successor for the 1989-1994 administration, the National Programme 
for Science and Technological Modernisation 1990-94, drew the line 
between scientific endeavour and technological activities, leaving 
science to the academic sector and technology to economic related
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activities. Therefore, technology development is reckoned as linkages of 
university research with private industry, and federally-supported R&D 
to be carried out directly by private firms.
1989-1994
During his presidential campaign, Carlos Salinas11 talked about the 
importance of giving science and technology a top place in the 
development of Mexico. In one of his speeches, he set the lines on 
which his administration would base its technology policy when he 
declared that 'the state has to support research in all its areas, but for 
technology development to be efficient, it has to be financed preferably 
by the productive sector' (SPP and Conacyt 1990, vii).
Therefore, it is not surprising that, in the orientation of most 
programmes of technology development, support for the different 
agencies involved shifted to the promotion of a more active 
participation of the private sector for the acquisition, assimilation, 
adaptation and diffusion of efficient technologies to strengthen the 
national productive apparatus (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1989; Villarreal 
Gonda 1993). State reform, along with economic reform, was the key 
goal of Salinas' policies. It was meant to consolidate the modernisation 
project that was initiated by his predecessor Miguel de la Madrid. 
Salinas' reform reshaped state structure in order to reduce its economic 
intervention and to foster private investment as a substitute for the 
past role of public investment (Valdes-Ugalde 1996).
The government adopted a new technology policy in the 1990s. The 
National Programme for Scientific and Technological Modernisation
1990-94, PRONACYMT (Programa Nacional para la Ciencia y
11 Salinas constructed an even more powerful presidency than had existed in 
the 1970s. By 1992 he had reestablished the predominance of the presidency
130
Modernization Tecnologica) established that there was an urgent need 
for private firms to participate in the financing of the technological 
modernisation of the country through shared funding with the public 
sector. Once again, PRONACYMT, as PRONDETYC before it, linked the 
lack of interest among the productive sector in participating in 
technology activities with the development model of the country in the 
previous decades. A closed economy, isolated from foreign competition 
and highly regulated, prompted most Mexican firms to operate without 
the worries of scientific and technological development, without the 
need for a skilled workforce, and without the need to offer quality goods 
and services to the protected market (SPP and Conacyt 1990). In order 
to comply with the requirements of the US while negotiating NAFTA, 
and to encourage the private sector's interest in technology, the 
government provided better protection of industrial property rights 
(Micheli 1996).12
PRONACYMT viewed the new macroeconomic strategy of opening and 
deregulating the country as a corrective tool for the distortions caused 
by the previous model. The programme considered that the new 
structure of incentives would encourage the productive sector to 
participate in science and technology activities. At the beginning of the 
new model, the state would have to broaden its support programmes 
and funds to help those firms wanting to develop technology projects. 
Eventually, the private productive sector would finance most of its own 
technology needs (Clavijo Quiroga et al. 1994; Micheli 1996; SPP and 
Conacyt 1990).
This new approach to technology policy was made within the context of 
trade liberalisation and NAFTA.13 Even if the state was to leave private 
firms, of whatever size, to compete with foreign ones, President Salinas
in practically every political sphere. The Salinas administration represented a 
technocratic revolution directed from above (Centeno 1994).
12 See Chapter 3.
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recognised that some form of governmental support could be justified 
for the smaller ones at the beginning of the economic opening 
process.14 Therefore, Conacyt implemented programmes to support the 
technology activities of small and medium-sized firms with pre­
commercial technology and innovation projects, giving emphasis to the 
agency's technology areas, and involving the private sector and 
academia to develop new linkage programmes. Secofi was in charge of 
the promotion of foreign direct investment which also contains 
important technology transfer elements.15
During the process of evaluating Mexico's request to become a member 
of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
an analysis of the national science and technology system was carried 
out by the organisation. The document presented in 1994 reflects some 
interesting aspects of the evolution of technology policy and the status 
of its institutions. Several observations and recommendations were 
made, including the following most important ones (OECD 1994):
• There is a need for a consistent S&T strategy across the functions of 
the secretariats and agencies, especially the relationship to 
economic objectives.
• Conacyt seems an innovative and disciplined agency for building up 
Mexican scientific and technological capacity. However, it is not well 
placed to play this role, because of its present location under SEP.
• Even if nominated by the President, and thus a member of the 
President's extended cabinet, the Director-General of Conacyt is 
perceived by all other members of the Government to be 
subordinated to SEP. Therefore, he lacks the power to advise them 
on science and technology matters.
13 Interview #10.
14 Interview #19.
15 Interviews #10 and 20.
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• The lack of a robust, well-endowed agency or secretariat for 
providing policies and operational S&T programmes in pursuit of the 
economic and other missions of government is an anomaly in the 
governmental structure.
• The Ministry of Trade and Industry (Secofi) in its dedication to 
market principles, has not invested vigorously enough in S&T 
activities to compensate for market failures and to prepare the 
knowledge infrastructure for the coming competitive struggle.
• It is illogical to have a Ministry of Public Education with major 
activities in support of industry, yet little control over economic and 
industrial policy, while Secofi pays little attention to the technological 
capabilities that will determine whether Mexican firms can compete 
under NAFTA trade conditions.
• Mexico should be ready to invest one percent of GDP in S&T and 
technological innovation at the beginning of the next century, if it 
wishes to compete in a globalised economy.
The observations and recommendations outlined above, were severely 
affected by the economic and financial crisis that hit Mexico at the end 
of 1994-beginning of 1995. The new context shaped the way in which 
technology—related programmes were going to be carried out from 
then on.
The years after the 1995 crisis
In May 1995 the Mexican government launched the National 
Development Plan (1995-2000), which aimed to modernise the 
country's industry. The first Report on the State of the Nation (1995) 
expressed the government's intention to develop research and increase 
the number of researchers, improve the quality of research 
infrastructures, and decentralise science and technology activities. In 
1995 new legislation was introduced making firms' R&D investment tax- 
deductible (OECD 1997). That same year, the Technology Development
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Plan, PDT (Plan de Desarrollo Tecnologico) was formulated. In this plan, 
the government expected that investment in R&D activities would rise 
from 0.3 to 0.7 percent of GDP, and that the increase would come 
mainly from the private sector (Quintero 1999, 31).
The Plan stated that Secofi, in coordination with SEP and Conacyt, 
would foster a scientific and technology innovation culture in the 
Mexican society. Within the framework of the Education Development 
Programme 1995-2000, Secofi would collaborate with SEP to 
incorporate the subjects of innovation, experimentation, science and 
technology into the study plans of different education levels. In the 
context of the Science and Technology Programme 1995-2000, Secofi 
would aid Conacyt to increase the number of media programmes and 
printed documents about technology and innovation subjects. They 
would promote successful cases of technology developments of firms, 
the capacities of R&D centres; and those events related to S&T. 
Together, they would also establish a scholarship programme for those 
researchers who wished to spend a year working for a productive 
company developing technology projects. Moreover, Secofi and Conacyt 
would implement a system for financing quality programmes in small 
firms (Poder Ejecutivo Federal and Secofi 1995).
In August 2000, towards the end of President Zedillo's administration, 
Carlos Bazdresch, who had been Director-General of Conacyt for the 
whole of the presidential term, defined what he saw as some of the 
main obstacles for scientific and technological development in Mexico.
These were:
• the lack of infrastructure for R&D, as investment was stopped during 
the six years of the administration due to economic problems;
• the high dependency on government expenditure;
• the budget restrictions resulting from the 1995 economic crisis;
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• the loose links between science and society; and
• the public expenditure figures, which remain at 1994 levels.
On the other side, he added that the goal of achieving an annual 
expenditure of 1 percent of GDP was not met, partly because Mexican 
entrepreneurs did not increase their investment in these activities, thus 
ending the presidential administration with an aggregated total 
expenditure of 3.5 percent of GDP over the six years. Moreover, he 
admitted that in the previous few years, the PRI did not worry much 
about the promotion of scientific and technological knowledge (Herrera 
Beltran 2000).
Regarding the debate that started at the end of the Salinas' 
administration following the OECD's recommendation to establish a 
Ministry of Science and Technology in Mexico, Bazdresch assessed that 
during Zedillo's administration such a Ministry was not created because 
it was perceived that Conacyt should have a 'horizontal' character. He 
added that there are pros and cons of this situation, an advantage 
being that a Ministry will have greater weight as it would be closer to 
the President, a situation which, in Mexico, is very valuable. The 
transition team of the president-elect for the 2000-2006 period began 
to reconsider the division of the Ministry of Education to create a 
Ministry of Science and Technology, instead of maintaining Conacyt 
(Herrera Beltran 2000). Nevertheless by the time President Fox 
announced the reforms to the executive and appointed his cabinet, no 
mention of the creation of a ministry of science and technology was 
made.
4.4 -  TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND NETWORKS IN  MEXICO
This section examines the way in which public policies can assist firms 
with becoming involved in technology-related activities, and with 
overcoming the complexities and uncertainties of innovation so as to
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enhance their own and their nation's competitiveness. I t  is important to 
try to specify the circumstances under which the public sector 
participates in innovation processes as a competent pacer stimulating 
long-term positive learning effects, internal as well as external to the 
public sector. This helps to understand the circumstances, presented in 
Section 4.5, where public sector activities seem to inhibit innovation 
capabilities.
The state as promoter of technology and innovative activities
A new breed of market-oriented theoretical ideas and policy proposals 
seems to be gaining ground throughout the economics profession. 
Protectionism, inward-orientedness and direct investment subsidies are 
increasingly identified as the main source of poor economic 
performance, all of them resulting from a high degree of government 
intervention in the economy (Katz 1995, 109). Nevertheless, it can also 
be argued that the character of state institutions helps determine 
whether and how countries change their position in the international 
division of labour (Evans 1995, 247). There can be little doubt as to the 
crucial role innovation and technological change play in the building up 
of international competitiveness.
It is precisely here that the role of governments in strengthening the 
workings of the national system of innovation,16 in supporting the 
process of technical change and in promoting a greater degree of 
technological innovation at enterprise level can be conceptually 
defended, even under strict laissez faire rules (Fransman 1986). Many 
issues in relation to the generation, diffusion, and utilisation of technical 
knowledge, and to the functioning of the national system of innovation 
in supporting the process of technical advance in the production of
16 The concept and dynamics of National Systems of Innovation are discussed 
in Chapter 3.
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goods and services, are directly linked to the governmental role in 
developing economies (Katz 1995, 114).
In a period characterised by increasing internationalisation and 
transnational political regulation, the traditional role of national 
government in relation to industrial and technology policy is challenged. 
In this context it becomes important to understand which role the 
public sector plays in relation to innovation and technical change within 
nations (Gregersen 1992, 129-132). For the Mexican case,
entrepreneurs consider the federal government as the main promoter of 
technology development, which is beneficial for the society as a whole 
and not simply for firms themselves, especially in the open-economy 
environment.17 Moreover, according to the surveyed firms, the federal 
government plays a very important role in the promotion and support of 
the country's technological development. Figure 4.A shows that 80.6 
percent of the respondents consider it most responsible (highest 
category). None responded 'not responsible'.18 When asked whether the 
government should participate in the promotion of technology activities 
which are of benefit to individual firms, 98.4 percent of the respondents 
answered that it should.19
A nation's ability to undergo structural industrial transformation will 
depend to a large extent on the abilities and propensities of industrial 
managers, though there seems little doubt that public policies also have 
an important role to play in this process. Public policies can enhance the 
technological potential both of individual companies and public R&D 
institutions; they can promote an overall environment conducive to 
firm-based investment in techno-market activities, and public bodies 
can create an innovation demanding market through their procurement 
activities (Rothwell 1986, 65-83). Six basic principles may help policy-
17 Interviews #2, 3, 5 and 8.
18 Author's Survey: Question #14.
19 Author's Survey: Question #65.
137
makers determine useful answers to questions related to technology 
and innovation policy structure and purpose (Branscomb and Keller 
1998, 463-464):
• encourage private innovation;
• emphasise basic technology research;
• facilitate access to new and old technologies;
• use all policy tools;
• leverage globalisation of innovation; and improve government 
effectiveness in policy development.
Figure 4.A. Respondents' answers to the question: How responsible is 
the federal government in the promotion and support of technology 
development in Mexico?
Government's Responsibility to Promote
100-











Low Responsibility High Responsibility
Medium Most Responsible
Levels of Responsibility 
Source: Author’s Survey
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Technology policies and tools
There are considerable differences between the innovation policies 
adopted by different countries. Some opt largely for rather general 
policies designed to create the right environment for innovation. Others 
intervene more directly in the innovation process, promulgating some 
combination of technologically or industrially non-selective measures 
and measures of technology/industrial selection. The specific forms of 
public policies for innovation support are shown in Table 4.1.
As this thesis concentrates on finance-related policies20, it is relevant to 
mention that for this case there are three levels of policy (Rothwell 
1986, 65-83):
• Finance for R&D: this includes orienting finance of infrastructurally- 
based R&D towards stimulating developments in main priority areas 
and in facilitating transfers to industry. It  includes also utilising 
government grants to orienting industrial R&D towards 
reindustrialisation projects.
• Finance and industrial structure: this involves influencing financing 
systems (both public and private) towards achieving the appropriate 
industrial structural dynamic; in general, it means increasing the 
availability of long-term money for restructuring programmes in 
firms and of venture capital for new technology-based startups.
• Overall fiscal climate: this involves establishing an overall climate 
conducive to private investment in technology projects; favourable 
tax regimes, directed public expenditures, moderate interest rates, 
and so on.
20 See Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
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Table 4.1. Technology policies and tools for innovation support.
Policy Tools
Direct financial support Grants, subsidies, loans, provision of 
equipment or services, loan guarantees
Indirect financial support Schemes encouraging investment in 
innovation, venture capital
Information Networks, advisory centres, consultancy 
services, specialist libraries, databases
Scientific and technical 
infrastructure
Public laboratories, research associations, 
learned societies, research grants
Educational infrastructure General education system, universities and 
polytechnics, technical education system, 
apprenticeship schemes, retraining system
Public procurement Central or local government purchasing and 
contracts, R&D contracts
Taxation Company, personal, indirect and payroll 
taxation, tax allowances
Regulations Patents, regulations like environmental 
control, inspectorates, monopoly and anti­
trust legislation
Public enterprise Innovation by public-owned industries, use 
of these as pioneering facilities, 
establishment of new industries
Political Planning, regional policies, honours and 
awards for innovation, encouragement of 
mergers or joint ventures
Public services Procurement, maintenance, supervision and 
innovation in public services such as 
telecommunications, transport, health care
Trade Trade, tariffs and currency regulations
Source: Braun (1994, 97), Dodgson and Bessant (1996, 48), Rothwell (1986, 
65-83), Schienstock (1994, 12).
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Technology policies, among other public policies, are a result of 
complex social and political processes which qualify the rationality of 
the choice of alternative options (Bastos and Cooper 1995). Whatever 
type or combination of policies is adopted, it can be stated that it should 
contain the following features (Rothwell 1986, 65-83):
• Coherence: the actions of the various institutions involved in policy 
formulation and implementation should be coordinated in order to 
avoid contradictory measures, especially between innovation and 
other policies: innovation policies and general macro-economic 
policies must pull together.
• Consistency: Innovation policies must be insulated from the dictates 
of the short-term political cycle. Innovation policy should not be 
manipulated by party dogma.
• Flexibility: Policies must be capable of responding to changing 
industrial needs, threats and opportunities. They should incorporate 
ongoing evaluation, with positive feedback to the policy system in 
order to continuously improve policy effectiveness.
• Complementarity: policies should not only complement each other, 
but should also complement the strategic interest of domestic 
companies. This means policy-makers should be aware of the long­
term strategic thinking within national companies.
• Realism: policy-makers must recognise the inherent limitations of 
public policy and accept them. Over-optimistic expectations, unmet, 
might result in disillusionment and the termination of promising 
initiatives. Policies should thus be based on a realistic assessment of 
industrial potential. Public policy-makers should also recognise their 
own limitations and leave the choice of individual projects in the 
hands of industrial managers.
Above all, government policy should aim at creating a psychological 
climate favourable to research and innovation. Campaigns designed to 
inform and convince enterprises of the importance and profitability of
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research are often effective in converting managers to the idea that 
research is a paying proposition. However, even the most skilful 
propaganda will be of little effect without concrete and specific policy 
measures aimed directly at encouraging business enterprises to 
undertake or expand research activities (Freeman, Poignant, and 
Svennilson 1963).
Technology policy networks and interest groups
With the reduction of state protectionism, it is argued that science and 
technology will depend much more upon market criteria, owing to their 
close connections to industrial policy. For the case of science and 
technology, the immediate beneficiaries have much more bargaining 
power than the mass of those who are the targets of social policies. The 
academic-scientific community constitutes a very visible and articulate 
pressure group, if not a powerful one.21 The big economic interests at 
stake on the technology front render the market much more relevant to 
decision-makers than in other areas of state action (Reis 1994, 131- 
137). Therefore, the agency responsible for advising the government in 
S&T policy matters has to be of high governmental level and closely 
linked, though not subordinated, to that in charge of economic planning 
(Comite Asesor de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Aplicacion de la Ciencia 
y la Tecnologia al Desarrollo 1973).
The manner in which science and technology policy initiatives are 
triggered and carried out is of critical importance. The study of how 
different actors play their roles in launching and implementing diverse 
policy initiatives, and the circumstances surrounding their actions, 
including the institutional framework, provides important insights for 
the design of viable science and technology policies. The viability and
21 In Mexico, the 'scientific community' is considerably organised, while the 
'technology community' is not. There are some leading entrepreneurs but a 
strong group can not be identified (Interview #20).
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effectiveness of a particular S&T policy are heavily dependent upon the 
relative composition of political forces and coalitions encompassing 
these agents' actions. The decisions to establish effective links between 
science and technology on the one hand, and economic and social 
planning on the other, are of a political nature. They are a matter of 
consultation, cooperation, interaction and feedback amongst the 
participating agencies. The first step towards a national S&T policy is 
the government's decision to jointly consider S&T policy and economic 
and social policy when planning the development strategies for the 
country. In addition, the nature of the political regime and its proneness 
to manipulation by interest groups, its flexibility or its rigidities, and its 
capabilities for response to different demands from political and private 
actors and of international context are all determinant variables of the 
applicability of S&T policy (Comite Asesor de las Naciones Unidas sobre 
la Aplicacion de la Ciencia y la Tecnologfa al Desarrollo 1973; Nadal 
Egea 1995, 110-112).
An example of the latter is the recent experience of an organised 
interest group, the Mexican Association of Directors of Applied Research 
and Technology Development, ADIAT (Asociacion Mexicana de 
Directores de Investigacion Aplicada y Desarrollo Tecnologico). This 
Association comprises more than 220 firms and institutions dedicated to 
research. ADIAT presented before the Chamber of Deputies of the 
legislative branch of government a proposal for the tax deductibility of 
R&D investments. The negotiations started in 1997 with a commission 
of the Chamber (Quintero 1999). The proposal mainly asked for fiscal 
incentives similar to those existing in countries trading with Mexico, 
including Canada, the US and Japan, among others. I t  consisted of 
three main points to approve:
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• Fiscal credit for 35 percent of investment and expenditure in R&D
• Duty-free imports of equipment bought abroad with research 
purposes
• Non-accumulation for tax accountancy of revenue coming from the 
sales of Mexican technology abroad (royalty).
In December 1997, an initiative to promote R&D was approved, but it 
was quite different to the one presented by ADIAT. Of the three main 
lines negotiated by ADIAT, only the first was approved and that for a 
reduced credit, 20 percent. According to the information available, this 
result was negotiated between the officials of the Ministry of Finance 
and the representatives of the Chamber in charge of the science and 
technology commission. Later on, it was agreed with ADIAT that it 
would collaborate with the Ministry of Finance in the design and 
promotion of the operation rules of the new legal article. The rules were 
never implemented and at the end of 1998 a new initiative presented 
by the Executive was approved by Congress. This new fraction includes 
fiscal incentives similar to the previous article, but the 20 percent fiscal 
credit can not exceed 500 million pesos.22 Moreover, those firms willing 
to claim the benefit have to present their projects for evaluation by an 
interinstitutional commission integrated only by public agencies: SHCP, 
Secofi, SEP, and Conacyt (Quintero 1999). Thus, not allowing the 
private sector to be involved in such a Commission shows more of the 
autonomy of the government to make decisions unilaterally.
4.5 - OBSTACLES AND LIMITATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
IN  MEXICO
Successful policies are perceived by users to be consistent. Where 
general policy direction is clearly understood and particular initiatives 
are seen as contributing to these aims, confidence in the system and a
22 Equivalent to US$ 55 million approximately.
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willingness to participate build up. Government thus moves into the role 
of partner with the industry, rather than that of occasional benefactor 
or supporter. The effect is to articulate needs more clearly and to help 
focus policy-making more accurately towards meeting them. Therefore, 
the task of creating policy is highly problematic for governments. The 
uncertainties involved and amount of specialised information needed 
are daunting. Governments lack clear guidelines or institutions with 
well-defined routines to guide innovation policy (Peterson 1993). Before 
making decisions, policy-makers should examine existing institutional 
incentives and knowledge competences that affect retention and 
transmission and the generation of novelty (McKelvey 1997, 220). 
Otherwise, the following obstacles can obstruct the implementation and 
operation of effective policy:
Short-termism/long-term vision
The possibility of building infrastructures and innovation networks into 
effective national systems of innovation, such as the German, Swedish 
and Japanese systems, is improved with long-term consistency as 
opposed to short-term political shifting in industrial policy (Dodgson and 
Bessant 1996, 173-179; Rothwell and Zegveld 1982). In Mexico, short­
term political shifts resulting in policy shifts have been a major problem 
in building a consistent and realistic long-term technology and 
innovation policy. There are no historical institutional bases, and policies 
are designed and implemented from scratch over and over again. Not 
only are there effects every six years with the ending of the presidential 
terms, there are also annual changes of public officials who bring their 
own teams of people and new ways of seeing things. The bureaucracy 
has to comply and put the new programmes into practice.23
23 Interviews #  3, 5, 13, 15, 17, 20.
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This in turn impacts on the way firms interact with the government 
agencies. For instance, 73.3 percent of the surveyed firms expressed 
the view that a presidential change had some kind of effect on their 
project.24 Those effects range from redesign of main policies to the loss 
of interest from new officials due to a lack of civil service; the latter 
being the most relevant of the effects mentioned by the respondents of 
the survey (see Table 4.2).25
Long-term consistency of purpose, and the underlying financial 
commitment which that implies, are difficult to reconcile with political 
systems which are subject to short-term turbulence and wild swings in 
philosophy (Dodgson and Bessant 1996, 173-179). For instance, Mexico 
has gone through rapid changes in its economic policy, thus affecting 
specific areas like technology policy.
Table 4.2. Respondents' answers to the questions: Did the change of 
President affect your project? In which ways?
Yes / percent No / percent
General effect of presidential change 73.3 26.7
Policy and programme changes; Destroy the former; 
No continuity
40.9 59.1
Internal institutional disorganisation; Less follow-up; 
Slow procedures; Bad service
31.8 68.2
Lack of civil service; Change of attitude; 
Unexperienced personnel; Less interest
59.1 40.9
Source: Author's Survey
Moreover, the fact that one party dominated the government for over 
70 years made it easier to implement those changes. Additionally, there 
is a 'tradition' of abandoning whatever the former administration has 
done, and the main concerns are to show some kind of successful
24 66.7 percent of the surveyed firms confirmed that their project had started 
during one presidential term and continued during another (Survey Question 
#57).
25 Author's Survey: Questions #58 and 59.
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results within an administration even if the users of programmes are 
affected.26 Fausto Alzati remembers that when the new administration 
began, the new team in charge of Conacyt 'questioned everything done 
by us, from the creation of the programmes to the giving of funds to 
firms' projects via FIDETEC...they did not understand what had been 
done and we were not given the opportunity to explain it...it became a 
relationship of adversaries'.27
Therefore, a critical policy question when examining less-developed 
countries (LDCs) that participate in an increasingly liberal economic 
order is how to effect the transformation from a regime of short-term 
defensive reactions to a pattern of strategic actions. In the case of a 
country like Mexico which has been dealing with macroeconomic crises 
so often, long-term strategic actions may be more difficult to achieve. 
Thus, short-termism, in the broadest sense, may continue to be a 
syndrome affecting all actors in the economy: firms, business 
associations, labour unions and government. In contrast, a policy that 
places LDCs on a sustained path of industrialisation must overcome 
short-termism at many levels simultaneously (Thomadakis 1998, 113). 
This means that policies being developed and introduced today will 
probably not begin to have a significant impact for five to ten years.
Governments should be prepared to adopt a strategic long-term 
approach to innovation policy, which should be largely divorced from 
the short-term, and often rather cynical, dictates of party politics. 
Policies based on a consensus between government, industry and 
society regarding long-term economic aims can help achieve such an 
approach (Rothwell and Zegveld 1981).
It is also important to recognise that some particular measures are 
relatively time-consuming to implement. This commitment over an
26 Interviews #3 , 4, 10, 15 and 17.
27 Interview #10.
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extended period of time -  years rather than months -  may, however, 
have a much greater effect on user firms, since technology transfer 
becomes reinforced as a day-to-day process within the company and 
thus the capability for managing it effectively is developed (Dodgson 
and Bessant 1996, 173-179). Within a context of continuous crisis, 
there is a high degree of uncertainty for both private firms and public 
agencies involved in the technology activities and policies. For instance, 
if a technology project is expected to take ten years to reach its 
commercial phase, it is difficult for entrepreneurs to take the risks 
knowing that policies tend to change and crises likely to occur. On the 
side of the government, when crises happen, budgets are restricted and 
funds have often been cut for S&T activities, like in the case of the 1995 
crisis.28
Stability/instability of the bureaucratic apparatus
Similarly, the ability to build close links with the user community 
depends upon a stable infrastructure and a policy platform which 
appears to those users to be clear, consistent and broadly supportive. 
According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2000, Mexico's 
institutional stability ranks 52nd out of 59, meaning that the legal and 
political institutions are perceived to be likely to change dramatically in 
the next five years (World Economic Forum and Harvard-CID 2000). 
Learning also requires some continuity of staff involved in policy design 
and implementation together with the time, resources and information 
necessary for effective review (Dodgson and Bessant 1996, 173-179). 
Mexico lacks a tradition of civil service and changes of personnel are a 
common practice, thus experience is not accumulated and is often 
lost.29 Changes of personnel also disorient the users of the 
government's programmes, and bring about negative effects for
28 Interviews #10, 13, 19, and 20.
29 Interviews #4, 5, 8, and 13.
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technology projects.30 Following the Global Competitiveness Report 
2000 ranking, the country is 42nd out of 59 in time spent by 
entrepreneurs dealing with government bureaucracy (World Economic 
Forum and Harvard-CID 2000).
Isolation/consultation
Technology policy based on the logic of the beneficiaries should be 
more democratic and more open to the public (Tanaka and Hirasawa 
1996). Nevertheless, in Mexico there is almost no consultation with the 
users or beneficiaries of the government's programmes. Only 33 
percent of the surveyed entrepreneurs said they had been asked for 
some kind of feedback regarding their experience with the programmes 
they used, or had been asked for suggestions as to how to improve 
them.31 And when they are consulted, their views and suggestions are 
rarely put into practice.32 For instance, at the end of the 1989-1994 
administration, Conacyt invited firms, clients of FIDETEC, technology 
evaluators, banks executives, and representatives from other 
government agencies involved in the operation of the programme to 
discuss its problems and potential solutions.33 A document with 
recommendations endorsed by those third parties was given to the new 
directors of Conacyt and FIDETEC. Participants considered the exercise 
as a very important step towards the improvement of the programme 
based on the experiences of the users. Nevertheless, the 
recommendations were not taken into account by the new 
administration, and decisions were made isolated from the needs of the 
beneficiaries.34
30 See Chapter 7.
31 Author's Survey: Question #56.
32 Interviews #  4, 9, and 16.
33 See also Chapter 7.
34 Interviews #4, 9, 15 and 17.
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Rigidity/flexibility
Another factor of innovation policy is the way it is operated, managed, 
controlled and tuned. The programmes must have rapid and flexible 
response systems, with a flexible structure which permits modification 
and development within the life of the programme, tailoring to and 
focusing on user needs; thus allowing for learning and further 
improvement (Dodgson and Bessant 1996, 173-179). Incentive 
programmes are in general too inflexible and too demanding in terms of 
required administrative details and liaison effects. In the administration 
of incentive programmes, governments are usually too slow and 
complex in their response to the needs of industry (Rothwell 1986). For 
instance, a Mexican entrepreneur complained about the fact that his 
firm's technology project had unexpected technical delays, common in 
projects of this nature, and the government agencies that were 
financing the project did not respond to their requests to restructure 
the plans, thus losing time and commercial opportunities: 'nobody had 
the criteria to make decisions', he explained.35
Fragmentation/coherence
Another of the main causes of the inflexibility of the government's 
programmes to respond to their users' problems is that responsibility is 
normally divided between several different government departments. 
Some have a direct responsibility for stimulating, encouraging and 
supporting invention and innovation in sectors like agriculture, industry 
and services. Others have responsibility for safety, employment, 
consumer protection, education, environmental conditions, international 
trade, health and so forth. The government departments involved are 
often imperfectly aware of the implications of their departmentalised
35 Interview  # 5 .
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policies for innovation elsewhere in the economy (Rothwell and Zegveld
1981).
In Mexico, public agencies tend to be individualistic and pursue their 
own and specific interests; there is very little coordination amongst 
them and they usually lack a common goal.36 For instance, technology 
policy is partly designed by Conacyt, but the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry play an important role.37 Sanchez 
Ugarte, former Vice-Minister of Industry at Secofi, recalls the ongoing 
debate of whether the instruments of technology promotion should be 
on the side of the industrial policy or on the side of human 
resources/education policy; at the time, they were more concentrated 
on the education side, resulting in weaker links between the agencies 
involved with industrial promotion and those promoting activities of 
universities and research centres.38 According to Carlos Bazdresch, 
Director-General of Conacyt during Zedillo's administration, the 
government's expenditure on S&T is approximately 600 million US$ per 
year, but results are not evident due to their dispersion among small 
programmes of different state agencies, which are operated in isolation 
from each other, without rules and no integration (Herrera Beltran 
1999).
Centralised/decentralised operation
One last important consideration is the way policy is moving away from 
highly centralised administration and towards greater devolution to 
agencies closer to the target of the programmes. Several benefits flow 
from such decentralisation, including faster response time and 
opportunities for much closer contact with user firms than would be 
possible from a single, large bureaucratic centre. Nevertheless there




can be some disadvantages with decentralised policy. Good policy builds 
in some form of monitoring and evaluation in order to improve the 
design of subsequent programmes, but when the system is extended 
through decentralisation, there is a risk that much of the valuable 
feedback from implementation will be lost (Dodgson and Bessant 1996, 
173-179).
In a highly centralised system like Mexico's the experience of 
entrepreneurs dealing with a federal government agency shows that 
even if there are regional and local representations, they have very 
little decision-making power to deal effectively with government, thus 
having to complete almost every procedure directly with the central 
offices in Mexico City.39 Instead of encouraging regional offices to look 
for potential technology projects in firms, very little responsibility is 
delegated to the regional offices and that increases the costs of 
applying for support from the government.40
CONCLUSIONS
Mexico has gone through four economic crises in the last three decades 
(1976, 1982, 1987 and 1995) and the government has sacrificed 
resources previously allocated to science and technology activities to 
help resolve these crises. When in crisis, to stop implementing a 
comprehensive S&T policy can lead to obstruction of the long-term 
goals of increasing productivity and industrial development.
This chapter has suggested that Mexico's scientific and technological 
backwardness can be partly explained by the persistence of policies 
aimed at accelerating growth without structural change and by the 
subsequent lack of reasonably coherent long-term science and 
technology strategies. Successful policy-makers and programme teams
39 Interviews # 1, 2, 5 and 8.
40 Interview #13.
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retain what they have learned over time about the most effective form 
of policy formulation and delivery. When policies are short-term and 
frequently changed there is no opportunity to make this learning 
cumulative. Maintaining continuity, however, is a problem; with 
politicians ever eager to launch their new policies it is difficult not to 
succumb to the pressures of continual policy relaunches. Furthermore, 
the results of the rapid and forced rotation of the state bureaucracy at 
all levels are obviously lamentable in the case of science and technology 
policy. Another aspect that is important for a better performance of 
private innovation is the need for the government to make use of the 
full range of policy tools while sharing more decision-making with the 
private sector.
The cohesion of elites is also crucial. No programme can proceed if 
there are divisions regarding appropriate policies within the ruling 
circles. A lack of inter-departmental coordination and occasionally 
cooperation between the relevant organisations and agencies involved 
in the technology policy process can result in a complementarity 
problem between different initiatives, and might also lead to the 
propagation of contradictory measures. The more radical a reform, the 
more important such cohesion becomes. Precisely because of the often 
traumatic social costs involved, the state must speak with one voice 
and must remain committed to the programme, especially during the 
initial and most difficult stages. As former President Salinas confirmed, 
the need to continue with the macroeconomic policies and trade reform 
made it impossible for his government to allow for exceptions of 
intervention as in the case of technology policy. 41
Furthermore, the state has to rely on a bureaucratic apparatus able to 
respond effectively to new policy directions. For instance, it can be said 
that the government's overloaded effort of free market reform and
41 In terv iew  #  19.
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democratisation in the 1990s did not give time to implement an 
organisational/administrative reform as well. Thus, the rather 
patrimonial state has not been able to effectively carry out the project 
of modernisation.
A weak rule of law coupled with a lack of accountability and of a 
democratic political system have undermined the possibility of designing 
and implementing a sound and robust S&T policy which is not prone to 
manipulation. Technology policy can be present in strong authoritarian 
states, and it can be argued that Mexico is an authoritarian state, but 
this does not mean that authoritarianism is the perfect condition for a 
successful S&T policy, or even an advantage for it. Therefore, the 
Mexican government has the tasks ahead:
• to provide a favourable overall economic climate, e.g. less 
vulnerable to recurrent crises;
• to also provide a favourable social climate, e.g. stimulate the social 
acceptance of new technology and help overcome social and 
institutional rigidities and resistance to change;
• to establish a relatively stable political climate, as dramatic political 
swifts create uncertainty;
• and to avoid rapid policy changes, as stop-go policies can deter the 
adoption by firms of the necessary long-term development 
strategies.
The next chapter discusses the role of private firms, which ultimately 
are the ones affected by the prevailing environment - namely the 
economic context, the national system of innovation and the 




SMALL FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AND INDIGENOUS 
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION IN  MEXICO
'...in the modern era of 
globalisation...the pace of technology 
change has been further accelerated, 
so in industry after industry, there is a 
sense of research or die.’
Louis Turner and Michael Hodges, 1992
INTRODUCTION
Commonly, studies of economic development in Mexico concentrate on 
the government, its policies, and its role in economic growth, ignoring 
the impact of the private sector and the entrepreneur. Yet businessmen 
and entrepreneurs contribute greatly to the evolution of new cultural 
values and the modernisation of structures essential to economic and 
political development. Entrepreneurship, defined broadly, embraces 
small firms, innovation, and regional and local development policy. In 
the long-term, innovation is the most important form of 
'entrepreneurship'(Casson 1982, 391). In a study of technology as a 
central factor for a nation's development, a more complete picture of 
Mexico's private firms is needed.
The limited studies of the attitudes of firms and business associations 
towards technology transfer and autonomous or indigenous technology 
development can be related to the restricted information available. The 
following historical causes1 contribute to this problem:
1 For further details, see Wionczek, Bueno, and Navarrete (1974).
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• The scarce and incipient research on firms and their attitudes
• The historical lack of interest in exploring the role of technology in
the industrial development of the country
• The hermetic attitude and operation of firms regarding technology 
issues.
Therefore, this chapter aims to contribute to the study of firms and
their capacity to innovate, both in Mexico and in similarly developing
countries recently opened to global competition. Evidence from 
fieldwork will be presented along with theoretical issues and historical 
facts of Mexico's most recent events.
Section 1 presents the main theoretical discussion concerning the 
capability of developing countries to engage in innovation activities. The 
importance of indigenous technology is reviewed. The increasing role 
acquired in international markets by small and medium-sized 
companies, which through very different methods have extended their 
range of activity beyond national frontiers, shows that this possibility is 
not reserved simply for multinational units. SMEs are important actors 
in economic life and in technological progress (Alonso 1995; OECD
1982). The second half of this section discusses SMEs in relation to 
larger firms and their technology capabilities, with an emphasis on 
cases from the less developed countries. Section 2 presents an 
overview of the evolution of Mexico's private sector, its structure and 
the way Mexican firms have been involved in the creation of an 
innovation culture. Section 3 describes the role of business associations 
in helping the nation's industries achieve their goals, and whether in 
Mexico their participation has had an important effect. As this thesis is 
concerned with the way in which government and firms interact in the 
process of technology development for the country, Section 4 analyses 
the relations between private and public sector, from the protectionist 
era to the recent economic liberalisation in Mexico, under the 
understanding that rapid changes in the government's economic policy
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stimulated companies to export and generated a new interest in 
technology (Barrientos 1994). The impacts on small and medium-sized 
firms are also assessed.
5.1 -  THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIGENOUS TECHNOLOGY FOR 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM­
SIZED FIRMS
Innovation and technology in less developed countries
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, innovation is the initial introduction 
of a new product and/or the first use of a new product process. 
Innovation usually rests upon research, and following Schumpeter's 
ideas and his concept of 'creative destruction', innovation primarily 
appears not as a single event, but rather as a process (Schumpeter 
1934).2 Innovation or new knowledge about technology is critical for 
developing countries seeking to close the so-called technology gaps 
between poor and rich nations.
Developing countries have the option of acquiring technical knowledge 
already available in industrial countries, or creating their own. Due to 
the high costs of creating technical knowledge, much of it is created in 
industrial countries (World Bank 1999, 1-2). When discussing the 
importance of indigenous research and innovation, it could be argued 
that it may be a waste of time in view of discoveries already made by 
others. Technological knowledge and expertise is mainly acquired from 
abroad through an open trade regime, foreign direct investment, or 
licensing agreements. Openness to FDI3 is important in itself as
2 For a detailed discussion on the issues and concepts of innovation and its 
relation to economic development see Chapter 2.
3 FDI is a very important source of acquiring technical knowledge and Mexico is 
amongst the top 12 developing countries that have attracted most foreign 
investment in the past three decades (World Bank 2000, 72). Nevertheless, as 
discussed in this section, the development of national technological capabilities 
is critical and no country can rely merely on imported technology.
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multinational investors are global leaders in innovation and their 
activities in developing countries can be important in transmitting 
knowledge of best practices (World Bank 1999, 8; World Bank 2000, 
72). But when talking of technology development, there is every 
likelihood that the end-results will be different, as different economic 
environments will influence the process of research and development.
Therefore, imported technology is rarely associated with the production 
of a wholly new product or process for the international markets (James 
1979, 95-96). Even in manufacturing, knowledge produced in other 
countries has to be adapted to local conditions (such as weather, 
consumer tastes and availability of complementary inputs). Thus, 
indigenous science and research are evidently needed if less developed 
countries (LDCs) are going to be able to engage in true product 
innovation or even take advantage of the large global stock of 
knowledge, as they need competence to search for appropriate 
technologies and to 'select, absorb and adapt' imported technology 
(World Bank 1999, 8).
Thus, an indigenous process of technological development in such 
countries requires technological capabilities based on skills and 
knowledge. The accumulation of such capabilities is as important to 
economic development as the accumulation of capital. Thus the ability 
to make independent technological choices, to adapt and improve 
techniques and products, and eventually to innovate endogenously are 
essential aspects of the process of economic development (James 1979, 
95-96; Romijn 1999, 1-8; Stewart 1981, 80).
According to the former Director of Conacyt in Mexico, 'the challenge 
lies on the ability to absorb and diffuse imported technologies, while 
simultaneously developing technology capabilities to engage in true
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innovation...if the productive apparatus is not updated, it is impossible 
to talk about innovation'.4
Since the 1970s, case studies of technological development by firms 
have been carried out in developing countries.5 Until then, the 
prevailing notion was that developing countries could advance 
economically by importing ready-made technological improvements and 
their benefits from more technologically advanced countries. There was 
very little recognition of the existence of, or the need for, indigenous 
technological activities in LDCs. Hence, the technological problem faced 
by these countries was primarily seen as transferring appropriate 
technology by making the right choices from the available alternatives. 
This goes some way to explaining the preoccupation with issues such as 
capital intensity and the relative costs of different means of transfer 
(Romijn 1999, 1-8; Weiss 1988, 236-237).
The conceptual framework underlying this appreciation was 
predominantly neo-classical. Developing-country firms face a production 
function with a number of given alternative technologies, all of which 
they know fully. The key to the progress of firms lies in the selection of 
the most appropriate technique given local factor endowments and 
relative prices (Fransman 1985; Stewart and James 1982).
The assumptions required for this model to work were challenged on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds by a number of alternative, 
more dynamic and realistic approaches that began to emerge in the 
second half of the 1970s. These approaches are referred to as 
institutionalist, structuralist or evolutionary. They emphasise the 
importance of and need for technological change in developing 
countries themselves (Romijn 1999, 11-19). Such literature on
4 In terview  # 1 0 .
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technology and development argues that imports alone are insufficient 
for improving efficiency and inducing a self-sustaining industrialisation 
process. This is because mere access to foreign technology does not 
imply mastery of it. FDI or technology licensing may be good ways to 
bring technology to a country, but mastery results from a process 
involving the local acquisition of technological skills and knowledge,6 
better known as technological capabilities (Dahlman and Westphal 
1981). The technology transfer process therefore requires the 
commitment of time and both human and physical resources to 
activities that lead to technological learning. Imports of technology can 
be very useful or even necessary starting points for that local learning 
process, but they can never substitute it entirely (Stewart 1981). Hence 
there is no automatic link between technology imports and the 
development of local technological capability.
A number of empirical studies have been inspired by evolutionary 
approaches. They deal with the development of indigenous 
technological capability in LDCs, both within firms and within countries 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Bell and Pavitt 1992; Dosi, Pavitt, and Soete 
1992; Katz 1987; Lall 1987; Lall et al. 1994). In the evolutionary view, 
technical change at the level of individual firms occurs as the result of a 
continuous learning process through activities to absorb, adapt and 
create technology, because 'simply producing a given set of products 
with a given technology will not enable a firm to survive for long' 
(Nelson 1991).7 The growth and competitiveness of firms are functions 
of the organisational routines that they build up as a result of those
5 See Amsden 1989; Biggs, Shah, and Srivastava 1995; Fransman and King 
1984; Hobday 1995; Katz 1987; Lall 1987; Lall et al. 1994; Stewart, Lall, and 
Wangwe 1992; Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman 1984.
6 Two of the economies that have come a long way toward closing the 
technology gap with the global leaders are Korea and Taiwan. Neither based 
their development on the 'wholesale recruitment of FDI' (World Bank 1999, 32- 
33)
7 An entrepreneur involved in technology projects in Mexico believes that 'it is 
for the firms to make their own technology...it is as important as living or 
dying' (Interview #7).
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learning processes. Most of the learning requires a purposeful 
commitment and allocation of resources, as it is only through practice 
that it is possible to assimilate the technology (Lall 1992b).
For the evolutionary theorists on the one hand, the process of 
technological progress within firms is gradual, comprising a series of 
successive small changes and improvements which are built into an 
existing technology, product or structure of a firm. On the other hand, 
the traditional approach equates technical change with major 
innovation, an activity still concentrated in the technologically advanced 
countries (Nelson and Winter 1982).
Recent neo-classical work has shifted away from the static model in 
which technological change was treated as exogenous, and now aims at 
endogenising innovation (Fransman 1985; Stewart and James 1982). 
However, these works still focus exclusively on radical innovations that 
emanate from formal R&D. Such a framework is not particularly suitable 
for explaining technological change in developing countries, in which 
major innovations occur only rarely and most of the technological 
efforts undertaken by firms take the form of informal research and 
experimentation on the firm's premises (Romijn 1999).
Although evolutionary theory was developed with an industrialised 
context in mind, it appears to be a relevant framework for the 
understanding and interpretation of technological change within firms in 
developing countries as well. Significant technological capabilities 
emerged in the firms studied, particularly those in Latin American 
countries, Korea and India (Amsden 1989; Katz 1987; Lall 1987). The 
findings of these studies clearly undermined the notion that LDC firms 
were mere choosers and users of foreign technology. The potential of 
those firms is enhanced by the possibility of exporting new capital 
goods to other less developed countries with similar conditions, or new 
consumer goods to countries with similar tastes and incomes.
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Yugoslavia, for instance, has been able to export technology to Egypt 
and Indonesia. Furthermore, a United Nations investigation 
recommended that Nigeria and other African nations make use of 
technology developed in Mexico and India (James 1979, 96-97).
Already the awareness of the importance of indigenous innovation can 
be detected in answers given by respondents to the Author's Surveys 
presented later on in the chapter. One of the most important results 
relevant to this section is that almost 60% of the firms surveyed 
considered innovation or adaptation as the best way to invest in 
modernisation of their technology. Less than 3% saw the purchase of 
national or foreign technologies as a good investment.8
Further results of the Author's Survey show some interesting points of 
view from Mexican SME firms which have engaged in technology 
projects themselves, on the following issues:9
• The importance of technology to the country's development: 90.4% 
responded 'Most Important' and 8.2% 'Very Important'.
• The importance of technology to their firm's development: 81.9% 
responded 'Most Important' and 16.7% 'Very Important'.
• The capacity of Mexican firms to develop their own technology: 
88.9% answered 'Yes'.
• The type of technology project developed by their firm: 65.6% 
considered their projects to be innovations; 25% as adaptations of 
national or foreign technologies; and 9.4% as improvements.
If it can be argued that developing countries like Mexico can and should 
engage in innovative activities, it is important to go further to discuss in 
detail what kind of firms are able to develop technology.
8 Author's Survey: Question #  4.
9 Author's Survey: Questions #1, 2, 3 and 22.
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Size of firms and technology development
Following the discussion of the previous section, under the evolutionary 
approach firms progress through research, but since it is a costly 
activity and the gains are uncertain they will tend to engage in it when 
they feel pressure to do so. Pressures can take the form of constraints 
that have to be overcome in order to avoid loss of market share or 
profit, or incentives that promise future gain. Pressures can arise from 
within the firm itself as well as from the firm's environment (Romijn 
1999, 11-19). An example of such pressures can be drawn from a study 
commissioned by Conacyt in 1992 which evaluated Mexico's technology 
gap. The results showed that those sectors with a narrower gap were 
those which were less protected.10 The correlation between tariffs and 
technology experience was inverse.
Furthermore, many factors operate in the environment of the firm 
which can help to explain the extent to which firms engage in 
technology-related activities. Among the most important are:
• the general economic climate
• the degree of competition and market structure
• the rate of change of the international technological frontier
• government policies aimed at regulating foreign trade and fiscal and 
monetary parameters
• government investments in a supportive science and technology 
infrastructure through public R&D and technical education of the 
labour force.
While important factors within the firm are (Romijn 1999, 11-19):
• the nature of the technology employed
10 In terview  #  10.
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• ownership
• attitude or personal factors
• firm size
In 1998, respondents to the Author's Survey were asked which factors 
within the firm were essential for the technology capability11 (see Table 
5.1). Almost 80% considered skilled personnel as essential, followed by 
financial strength, seen as highly important by 63.9%. Long 
establishment in business was considered by 90.3% to be non- 
important, so it can be assumed that they believed newly-established 
firms to have technology capabilities. Attitude or personal factors were 
only mentioned by 9.7% of the respondents. 34% thought that a firm's 
internal infrastructure was an important element. In this question, the 
firm size factor was not listed as a category, and no respondent 
mentioned it as one of the 'other factors'.
Table 5.1. Respondents' answers to the question: Which factors are 
essential for a firm to develop technology capabilities?
ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR FIRMS' TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES
|Yes / percent No / percent
Skilled Personnel 77.8 22.2
Financial Strength 63.9 36.1







*Mentioned by respondents under the field of 'other' factors 
Source: Author's Survey
A separate question asked which categories of firms were able to 
develop technology12 (see Figure 5.A). From their own experience,
11 Author's Survey: Question #7.
12 Author's Survey: Question #4.
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51.4% of the surveyed entrepreneurs believe that all firms, from 
microenterprises to transnationals, could develop technology. 33.3% 
saw microfirms as the only category not fit to develop technology. It 
can be inferred that according to 84.7% of Mexican entrepreneurs, 
SMEs can develop technology projects.
In line with the central objectives of this thesis, the factor of firm size is 
going to be developed further, and a number of significant points 
concerning this issue are now presented.
Figure 5.A. Respondents' answers to the question: What categories of 
firms are able to develop technology in Mexico?










Discussion of the relative role played by small and large firms in 
innovation is controversial and sometimes contradictory, from the 
theoretical as well as the empirical point of view (Galhardi 1994). In 
1943, Schumpeter argued that large, established corporations had
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become the most powerful engine of technological change and 
economic growth (Schumpeter 1943). Ten years later, Galbraith also 
argued that the high cost of industrial R&D activities meant that they 
could only be carried out by firms having the resources associated with 
considerable size (Galbraith 1952).
However, more recent authors maintain that small firms are an 
important participant in economic growth (Freeman 1982b; Rothwell 
and Zegveld 1981). According to their views, as well as supplying 
certain specific markets, small firms act as vehicles for the introduction 
of new technologies. These views have been accepted and acted upon 
by governments in their attempts to redirect government policies in 
favour of SMEs. In the United States, for example, measures to protect 
and assist small firms have been set up since 1953. In Europe, policies 
in favour of small firms have been strengthened since the early 1970s, 
demonstrating a growing belief in the innovative potential of small firms 
(Rothwell and Zegveld 1981).
A third position is based on the neo-Schumpeterian view that large and 
small firms are a necessary complement to each other, rather than 
alternatives. Utterback and Abernath argue that a small entrepreneurial 
organisation and a large one producing high volumes play different 
roles in relation to the different types of innovation (product or process) 
that occur during the product life cycle (Utterback and Abernath 1978).
With regard to the technological capability of developing countries, the 
focus of most literature has been on the more advanced large firms 
sector, but firms in this sector constitute only a segment of the total 
industrial structure in the great majority of developing countries. Small 
firms -  typically much more influential than large, modern firms in the 
creation of employment and income in developing countries -  are 
usually believed not to have a noteworthy role to play in the 
development of home-grown technological capability.
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Considering the quantitative importance of small-scale enterprises in 
developing countries, it appears that they have been inadequately 
represented, especially in the studies focusing on Asian and Latin 
American countries. Productivity and incomes are lowest in small firms, 
and it is there that the acquisition of more advanced technological 
capabilities would therefore be most needed.
A recent study by Romjin shows that there is no good reason to 
disregard the role of the small firm in the process of building national 
technology capability, as small firms in developing countries do indeed 
acquire technological capabilities. Moreover, this is socially and 
economically beneficial in the sense that it contributes to higher 
employment and incomes in those enterprises. He argues that 'small 
firms have their own distinct role to play in the accumulation of 
technological capacity and that capability building in large firms cannot 
go very far towards resolving the development problem on its own' 
(Romijn 1999, 3). Large firms can contribute significantly towards 
narrowing the international technology gap between developing and 
developed countries, but they might not be able to resolve the 
technology gap within a developing country itself.
Given the shortage of appropriate, efficient, small-scale technologies in 
many developing countries there are reasons why adaptation would 
assume even more importance in small firms than in large firms 
(Gamser and Almond 1989). Entrepreneurs are often forced to acquire 
technologies that are not ideally suited to the conditions in which they 
will be used. Small firms also have to make technological effort after 
acquiring new technology because of resource constraints. Far more 
than in larger firms with easier access to cheaper capital,13 there is
13 See Chapter 6.
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considerable pressure to squeeze maximum performance out of given 
limited resources (Massaquoi 1991).
Many competitive pressures exist in the small-scale sector too. These 
pressures emanate from within the sector itself, but also from larger 
firms that operate with more modern, productive and efficient 
technologies and from imported products. Small firms that wish to grow 
and compete effectively thus need to adopt and master increasingly 
advanced technologies, even if these are not the latest available. I t  is 
indeed difficult to see how much a growth strategy could be followed 
successfully through mere passive assimilation. The adopted 
technologies may be old in the sense that they have been in use for 
several years or even decades, but they are still new to the firm that 
adopts them (Romijn 1999, 26-45).
Small firms, compared to larger firms, have advantages and/or 
disadvantages in the process of innovation (Galhardi 1994; Malecki 
1997; Rothwell and Dodgson 1994). Using the phases of the innovation 
process described by Wijnberg, those characteristics are presented here 
(Wijnberg 1990, 45-63):
1 -  The invention:
A more inventive ability is ascribed to the small enterprise,
notwithstanding the fact that the larger enterprise will have more
employees with specialised knowledge, sophisticated instruments and 
the ability to use them. In the small enterprise an atmosphere is said to 
prevail which is more beneficial to creative work. Lines of
communication are shorter within the enterprise and between its
potential inventors and potential customers. A smaller firm will be more 
aware that innovation can be a very important way to stay in business 
(Kanter 1984). The more flexible and integrated structure of the small 
enterprise will be more conducive to creativity than that of the large 
enterprise, which is often rigidly divisionalised. In a discussion regarding
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the size-related characteristics of Mexican firms, an entrepreneur 
involved with both large and small companies confirmed that 'micro and 
small entrepreneurs are more creative, while large firms behave in an 
elephantine manner'.14
2 -  The decision to bring the invention into development:
The decision to devote time and money to an idea to transform it into 
something that could be produced will be riskier to a small enterprise 
unable to spread the risk involved over many projects. On the other 
hand, the decision-making processes employed by small enterprises 
operate faster than those in large, bureaucratic organisations.
3 - Development:
The small enterprise has the advantages of better communication and 
motivation. Cost-consciousness is also often higher. On the other hand, 
the greater availability of specialised instruments and researchers may 
bring the large enterprise advantages in the careful development and 
fine-tuning of the project. The large enterprise is likely to have more 
experience with specific problems, and will be more able to profit from 
the knowledge gathered. Moreover, it will have better lines of 
communication with government and professional suppliers of 
information and will be more knowledgeable about relevant regulations 
and recent developments. Of great importance is the larger enterprise's 
greater capability to finance innovative projects.15 It  will be in a better 
position to internally finance innovative development, especially if it 
innovates on a continual basis. It will also find it easier to locate 
external financing since it is better able not only to spread the risk over 
a number of projects, but also to cover innovative and non-innovative 
activities.
4 -  The decision to produce or use in production:
14 Interview #  7.
15 See Chapter 6.
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An enterprise that is large enough to reach economies of scale while 
producing an existing product will be less inclined to switch to a new 
product. The faster decision-making process of small enterprises is 
advantageous in this respect, as the decision-makers can quickly 
convince themselves that a market for the innovation exists. On the 
other hand, large firms could guarantee themselves sufficient demand 
because of their market power with regard to the product it replaces 
(OECD 1982).
5 -  Production or the use in production:
As far as production is concerned, the reasons why a smaller enterprise 
will have more financing problems are less valid because the larger 
enterprises' possibilities of spreading risks have decreased relative to 
those in the phase of development. The security that the smaller 
enterprise can offer to its capital suppliers has increased. However, a 
larger company will normally be able to reap greater benefits by 
introducing a cost-decreasing innovation in its own production 
processes.
6 -  Marketing:
It  is supposed that the small enterprise has better communication with 
its customers because such communication is more informal and more 
often takes place with persons having decision-making power in the 
firm. However, this must be balanced against the market power and the 
skills of the larger enterprise. The large enterprise will also be better 
known and the value of its trademark or branding will be greater.
With regard to all phases, it appears that arguments can be presented 
both for and against the assumption of innovative capability of small 
enterprises. Table 5.2 shows a summary of the comparisons between 
small and large firms with regard to their capabilities to engage in a 
technology project.
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Table 5.2. Advantages/Disadvantages of small firms relative to large 
firms.
Advantages
• Rapid decision-making due to a lack of bureaucracy
• Ability to react quickly to changing market demands
• Better prepared to deal with risk
• Informal but efficient internal communication
• Fast learning capability
• Ability to dominate narrow market niches
• Flexibility to vary output volume
Disadvantages
• Inability to support formal R&D effort or to employ technical experts
• Lack of time and resources to identify and use external information 
sources
• Difficulty acquiring capital for growth
• Inability to spread the risk through diversification in several projects
• Formal management skills are often absent
• Inability to attain economies of scale
• Little bargaining power with suppliers and distributors
Source: Galhardi 1994; Malecki 1997; Rothwell and Dodgson 1994; Wijnberg 
1990.
Even if it is not possible to argue that small enterprises in general have 
a greater capability to innovate than large ones, it is possible to say 
that besides the majority of less innovative small enterprises, there are 
highly-innovative small enterprises which could merit extra attention 
and support. Furthermore, different results of empirical research deal 
with the relationship between innovation and size of firms, and they can 
serve as confirmation of the inventive potential of small firms (Jewkes, 
Sawers, and Stillerman 1969; Kamien and Schwartz 1982; Scherer 
1984; Schmookler 1972). In modern markets, small and large firms do 
not operate in isolation from each other, so they enjoy a variety of 
complementary relationships in their technological activities as well.
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Innovative capability in small firms can strongly differ from industry to 
industry (Rothwell and Dodgson 1994), but this work will not go into 
detailed sectoral analysis, 16 and, for the rest of the chapter, will 
concentrate on the small and medium-sized firms as a subgroup of 
Mexico's private sector.
5.2 -  MEXICO'S PRIVATE SECTOR
Evolution of Mexico's private sector
In contemporary Mexico, industrial development of the private sector 
has taken place in the shadow of the state. The most important 
economic groups were formed years ago under state auspices; many of 
them grew out of government contracts or most importantly, under 
trade protection (Cardenas Sanchez 1998, 19-35). Linked in an unusual 
symbiotic relationship, the private sector and the government, 
dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI (Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional), arrived in the middle of the 2tfh century at 
an understanding regarding their respective roles in society. According 
to Roett, the hallmarks of the relationship were favouritism, protection 
and obedience (Roett 1998, 223-230). The model succeeded for 
decades. Only recently have firms evolved to adjust to the new, more 
competitive globalised economy. Those firms unable to evolve and 
adjust have disappeared, or are in a vulnerable position.
The Mexican private sector has played an important role through the 
years in the development of the country's economy. It  participates in 
practically all areas of the economy, and has been relevant to 
production, employment creation and institution building. Since the 
1930s the industrial sector has played an important role in the country's
16 For literature dealing with specific industry innovative activity see for 
instance Corona T. 1997; Freeman 1982a; Mercado Garcia 1980; Unger 1985; 
Wijnberg 1989.
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growth (Cardenas Sanchez 1998). Nevertheless, the government's 
protectionist policies of earlier decades undoubtedly had a deep effect 
on the private sector. The protectionism that began as a means of 
controlling imports in order to protect the balance of payments in the 
late 1940s became a wider, more profound and complex policy as years 
passed (Villarreal 1976).
Domestic products were first protected from foreign competition. Then, 
as foreign firms entered the scene to supply the domestic market and 
take advantage themselves of the protective measures, national 
investors began to be protected against foreign investors doing 
business in Mexico. Thereafter, foreign investment was restricted, and 
areas of the economy that were previously open now became 
protected. Nonetheless, private investment did not react as expected, 
and the state stepped in (Cardenas Sanchez 1996). More and more 
government agencies and companies were created to fill the vacuum 
left by the private sector.
Since 1982, industry and the rest of the economy have undergone a 
major transformation that has touched every aspect of economic life in 
Mexico. Trade liberalisation, privatisation of public enterprises, 
deregulation and the openness of the financial markets are all shaping a 
new economic system. The debt crisis brought the realisation that such 
policies had to change, and that the economy should be opened to 
foreign competition to ensure better levels of competitiveness and 
productive capacity.
After the events of the early 1980s17 it was clear that the protection 
strategy and the government's involvement in the production of all 
sorts of goods had been taken too far and was no longer responsive to 
the country's needs (Solis 1981). Some other strategy had to be
17 For a more detailed review of the 1982 crisis, its causes and effects, see 
Lustig and Ros 1987; Martinez Hernandez 1989; Ramirez 1989.
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implemented. A realisation that the economy should be open to foreign 
competition led the new wave of policies (Ramirez 1989). Almost 
without noticing, and in the midst of a severe economic crisis, the 
industrial sector accepted the dismantling of trade barriers. Mexico's 
entry into the GATT in 1986 marked the beginning of a new era, one 
that eventually was reflected in the composition of the industrial sector 
as firms increasingly faced foreign competition. A senior public sector 
executive, involved for many years in support programmes for firms, 
assesses that 'protection influenced [the private sector] a lot, and what 
moved firms to start to get involved with technology was fear of 
GATT...though they did not believe it was going to start so soon and did 
not really do much to prepare themselves'.18
With the implementation of NAFTA in 1994 and the new economic crisis 
of 1995 the industrial sector transformed itself even further, as heavily 
indebted firms unconnected to the export sector suffered high interest 
rates and a drop in consumer consumption. Industries related to 
exports, either directly or indirectly, managed much better during the 
recession. Thus, the industrial sector was split between those firms and 
sectors that had been able to adapt to world competition and those that 
had not; those that depended on the domestic market alone and those 
that could export and supply foreign demand. This is a further example 
of how technology capabilities can play a vital role in these respects and 
make a difference when entering a global market.
The problem, as recently stated by a business association leader,19 is 
that Mexican firms 'were used to producing for their own market and 
the authorities now tell small businesses to produce thinking globally 
when there are no commercial structures to promote that...but there 
have been successful examples of sectors like textiles and furniture 




foreign markets...that's the only way'. The opposite case would be that 
of former 'manufacturing companies being converted into marketing 
agencies of foreign goods'.20
With this historical background in mind, the following subsection will 
aim at a better understanding of the composition of Mexico's private 
sector and its technology-related problematics.
Mexican firms and their capabilities to develop technology
At this point, it may be useful to restate the size categories for firms 
used in this thesis, to better understand the implications of the private 
sector structure in Mexico. The categories are based on the number of 
employees according to Mexico's National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Information definition (INEGI 1994):
Microfirm: up to 15 employees 
Small firm: between 16 and 100 employees 
Medium-sized firm: between 101 and 250 employees 
Large firm: more than 250 employees
Mexico's national industry comprises a dual structure. I t  is 
characterised by the coexistence of a small group of large companies, 
which are increasingly able to develop their own technology, and of the 
majority of firms, which span micro to medium-sized and which have 
neither the resources to develop technology nor the capability to absorb 
existing technologies. The latter group of firms do not have access to 
comprehensive information concerning the benefits of modernising their 
technology, and they are operating in an open economy with obsolete 




Technology development efforts are concentrated in large firms. As 
discussed in the previous section, this is common in the international 
context because technology projects involve high costs. Nevertheless, 
the low productivity and backwardness of small firms in Mexico requires 
urgent action. Former Vice-Minister of Industry Fernando Sanchez 
Ugarte acknowledged the existence of two kinds of enterprises, those 
'on track' and already developing their own technologies -  mainly the 
larger firms -  and the medium-sized and smaller firms which 'do not 
know that they are in need of technology...they do not have the 
resources, access to finance nor the links to those who can help them 
solve their vicious cycle'.21 The Director of Technology of one of the 
main business associations reflected the feelings of many Mexican firms 
when he said that it is a 'disgrace that there is no awareness that those 
who are saving the country are small and medium-sized firms which 
have less and less support'.22
During his intervention at the Inauguration Session of the National 
Coordinating Committee for Technological Modernisation 
(CONCERTEC),23 Santiago Clariond Reyes, one of Monterrey's most 
important businessmen and former leader of the State of Nuevo 
Leon's24 Chamber of the Transformation Industry, made some 
important remarks. According to him, and as speaker on behalf of the 
private sector, the tendency to get involved in technology development 
projects is still concentrated in larger-sized firms. Therefore, he pledged 
a concerted effort to promote technology modernisation as 'even if it is 
the direct responsibility of the industry to develop technology, the 




23 See Chapter 4.
24 Monterrey, Mexico's leading industrial pole, is the capital city of the State of 
Nuevo Leon.
176
The technology problems being experienced by today's small firms can 
be regarded as a consequence of the private sector's recent history. In 
the 1970s, regardless of Mexico's protection against imports and 
restrictions on FDI which naturally embody technology transfers, it was 
believed that Mexican firms did not face a technology problem. 
Technology was widely available to buy from abroad, mainly from the 
neighbouring superpower in the form of licenses. There were virtually 
no restrictions on buying foreign technologies; indeed it was easy to 
import technology (Wionczek, Bueno, and Navarrete 1974, 48-51). The 
limited availability of skilled technical labour, the lack of awareness 
among Mexican entrepreneurs of the importance of technology, the lack 
of autonomous technology research and the lack of restrictions on 
importation at the time increased the volume of these imports without 
any consideration of the economic and social consequences of the 
situation. High protection from foreign manufactures increased the 
intensity of these imports. Moreover, firms could afford to spend as 
they wished on technology imports, as they could transfer the costs to 
the final consumer via price increases.
Twenty five years ago firms' attitudes were completely different from 
the ones found in this research. The conclusions of an OECD study in 
1969 showed some of the first attempts to understand the Mexican 
entrepreneurs (Derossi 1970, 272). Only 7% of the firms' executives 
surveyed considered the lack of technology R&D as an obstacle to the 
country's development. The interviewees ranked the obstacles to 
development (from most to least important) as: the limited size of the 
market; the lack of highly skilled labour; the high costs of raw 
materials; and the interference of the State in business matters.25
25 This appears to be a normal consequence of the Import Substitution model 
prevailing at the time, see Love, 1994; and Lee and Swagel, 1997. Pre-1987
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Another survey highlighted the limited knowledge of the Mexican 
private sector regarding the advantages and implications of science and 
technology R&D (de Marfa y Campos 1968). Some of the executives 
surveyed indicated that they did engage in technology development 
activities, citing examples such as 'quality control procedures' and 
'market research'. The ones who admitted to having no technology R&D 
activities said that it was due to the lack of resources needed for these 
activities, the small size of the firms, the long-term projection of 
completion of these kinds of activities, the high risks involved and the 
slow and uncertain return of the investments. I t  seems as if, at that 
time, the private sector had not accepted its responsibility for the 
development of an autonomous technology capacity of the country. 
Have they changed their perception and attitude now that it faces 
different kinds of pressure?
In the Author's Survey, when asked to rate from 1 to 5 the 
responsibility (duty) of businessmen in the process of supporting, 
promoting and developing Mexico's technology, 80.6% of the 
respondents gave it a 5, meaning the highest responsibility, and only 
1.4% thought they were not responsible and gave it a 1 (See Figure 
5.B).
Two further important aspects to consider when discussing innovating 
firms in Mexico are the concept of 'entrepreneurship' and the creativity 
of Mexicans. Both can be of relevance in this matter. These subjects 
were raised during several of interviews conducted during the 
preparation of this thesis, and reflect the way in which entrepreneurs 
see creativity in Mexico. On the positive side, entrepreneurs consider 
Mexicans as being very creative, inventive and talented. They claim that 
the problem lies in the fact that the creativity does not convert into 
projects or enterprises because there is no entrepreneurial vision or
public vs. private sector tensions were a real drawback for industrial 
development (Cardenas Sanchez 1996).
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awareness of the importance of technology.26 Furthermore, in response 
to the question of how creative Mexican entrepreneurs are,27 almost 
70% of the respondents of the Author's Survey said 'Most creative' or 
'Very creative'. The lowest ranked answer, 'Not creative', was selected 
by only 4.2% of respondents. The potential therefore exists, and it is a 
matter of transforming that creativity into productive technological 
projects to strengthen the country's private sector.
According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Secofi, Mexico's private 
sector has strengthened its technological basis. But again, the Ministry 
bases its data on large firms. Large industrial consortia, mainly those 
involved in exports, have established their own R&D centres. Therefore, 
private expenditure on research and technology-related activities grew 
at an annual rate of 10.3 percent from 1984 to 1994. Large companies 
have helped to increase the private sector's share in the national total 
expenditure on R&D from 15% in 1984 to 23% in 1991 (Poder Ejecutivo 
Federal and Secofi 1995, 90).28
One viable way to help SMEs improve their position is to link larger with 
smaller firms to develop supplier networks for the large corporations. 
The latter then have a specific interest in helping the smaller firms solve 
their problems. Certain large firms depend on small ones as their 
suppliers and technological integration can occur as a result, filtering 
from the large to the small firm. This can be an efficient way to 
encourage technology attitudes among SMEs.29
26 Interviews #3, 5, 9 and 13.
27 Author's Survey: Question #9.
28 The data presented is based on the results of the survey "Encuesta Nacional 
de Empleo, Salarios, Tecnologfa y Capacitacion Laboral en el Sector 
Manufacturero", by INEGI, 1992.
29 Interviews #12 and #20; an example of a successful case of a supplier 
programme has been the 'Compite' programme with General Motors (Interview 
# 20).
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Figure 5.B. Respondents' answers to the question: How responsible are 
businessmen in the promotion and support of technology development 
in Mexico?










Not Responsible(l) Very Responsible
Responsible Most Responsible(5)
Levels of Responsibility 
Source: Author's Survey
Mexico's industry still faces a series of obstacles to the dynamism of 
local technology development (Mercado Garcia 1980, 21-30). Thus, 
unless there is a stronger local technological capacity, the royalties paid 
for foreign technology licenses will continue to be high, and the process 
to develop a stronger innovative position, a lengthy one.
When trying to understand the position in which Mexican firms, mainly 
SMEs, are today, some important questions arise regarding their 
collective action, namely: where have the business associations been 
during the past few decades, and what role have they played in 
defending their members interests? The next section describes how 
industry associations have been involved in the process of transforming 
the economy from a protected to an open one.
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5.3 -  BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Even if membership to business associations was historically 
compulsory in Mexico, there exist very few works describing the role of 
business and trade associations in helping industries achieve a high 
level of global competitiveness. The purpose of this section is to focus 
primarily on the role of associations in bringing about a higher level of 
competitiveness for Mexico's industries, and whether or not they have 
played this role in an adequate way. The role of an industry trade 
association is seldom clearly understood. Moreover, even when the role 
is understood, there are no guarantees that it is being implemented as 
well in Mexico as it may be the in other nations at a similar level of 
development.
In the competitiveness debate, associations have been considered by 
some observers to be essential to national interests, but they have also 
been designated by others as harmful to the general public. They have 
been deemed necessary for economic and political order, and yet they 
have been described as underutilised in their application to public 
policy matters (Procassini 1995). Sceptics may also argue that 
associational action may aggravate rent-seeking, political cartel-building 
activities, which usually favour large firms over small, and producers 
over consumers. In 1982, the OECD recognised that one of the 
obstacles to amalgamating technology was that chambers of commerce 
are usually not aware enough of their potential role and few have built 
up adequate technological promotion activity. Moreover, those agencies 
are usually either overloaded or underutilised because there is 
insufficient personal involvement and contact with entrepreneurs (OECD 
1982, 118-126).
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In 1990, George Lodge wrote:
'Industry associations are crucial to the organising of business 
leadership for new and more creative relationships with 
government...These associations manage cooperation, set visions and 
make strategy. Industry associations are the bridge between business 
specialists and politicians and government on the other. That bridge...is 
becoming increasingly crucial to competitiveness'(Lodge 1990, 209).
Germany and Japan offer interesting examples of effective action taken 
by business chambers:
• The relationship between German industry and government is 
cooperative, based on negotiation and consensus building. 
Furthermore, industry groups play a direct role in administering 
public programmes of industrial relevance. For example, government 
programme applications and state subsidies are sometimes 
administered by trade associations (U.S. General Accounting Office 
1993:105).
• In Japan, industrial associations have played a big role in 
aggregating individual company interests, building intra-industry 
consensus, and serving as a pipeline for communication between 
industry and government. Trade associations in Japan communicate 
overall industry interests and mobilise industry programmes. 
Moreover, they receive early information from the government on 
loans, projects, regulatory changes, industrial policy, and other 
matters (Okimoto 1989, 165).
In general, it can be said that it is a major task for trade associations to 
assimilate and accommodate the wishes of their members with respect 
to all public policy issues of vital interest. They play a key role in 
generating, analysing and sharing information which helps their
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members to better define their own interests and strategies. 
Information sharing with the government is also fundamental. With this 
in mind, and remembering the context in which the private sector has 
evolved in Mexico since the 1940s, let us now review the structure and 
role of business associations in Mexico.
Organised interest groups in Mexico generally have a unique position, 
because of the structural features of the Mexican political system. The 
first feature of note is that the government created most of the 
powerful interest organisations. As a result, demands to the state by 
interested industry parties are channelled through formally constituted 
interest groups, including business organisations (Camp 1989; Mujica 
Romo 1997).
The government intervention resulted in two types of private sector 
interest organisations: the first, government initiated, are semi-official, 
while the second, developed solely through private sector initiative, are 
autonomous of the state and called independent.
The semi-official organisations include:
• The Confederation of Industrial Chambers, CONCAMIN 
(Confederacion de Camaras Industriales)
• The National Chamber of Transformation Industry, CANACINTRA 
(Camara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformacion)
• The National Council of Chambers of Commerce, CONCANACO 
(Consejo Nacional de Camaras de Comercio)
The independent organisations include:
• The Employers' Confederation of Mexico, COPARMEX (Confederacion 
Patronal de la Republica Mexicana)
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• The Mexican Bankers Association, ABM (Asociacion Mexicana de 
Banqueros)
In 1976, the independent associations got together with the semi­
official organisations to form an umbrella organisation known as the 
Businessmen Coordinating Council, CCE (Consejo Coordinador 
Empresarial). I t  was formed after 18 months of negotiations in the 
private sector and exists to exchange information and unify criteria 
and points of view. It is not a substitute for the other associations.
The three most important semi-official organisations have common 
ground in that they were formed by the state, use a one-firm-one-vote 
principle, and that, until the Salinas administration ended it, 
membership in them was required by law.
Critics of the major confederations, including thousands of members, 
suggest that quantitatively the member firms are not fairly represented 
in confederation policy positions. They argue that the leaders are 
controlled by large capital and do not represent their members' 
interests (Camp 1989). This could explain why Mexican government 
agencies wanting to channel support schemes for firms encounter 
frustrating bottlenecks when dealing with the presidents of business 
chambers.30
According to Camp, many entrepreneurs believe that the leaders of 
federations do not represent the views of large firms either, because 
they are not themselves large-scale capitalists and are chosen by the 
more numerous medium-sized and smaller companies. However, 
owners of smaller firms argue that the chambers do what the largest 
member companies want. It is difficult to ascertain which view is
30 The former Director of Conacyt goes further and comments that negotiating 
with business associations' leaders 'is worthless... it has to be a bubble-up 
process, not a trickle-down one7 (Interview #10).
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correct, but it can be said that the leaders, and therefore the chambers, 
often do not effectively represent the whole membership (Camp 1989).
The CCE's major weakness, like the organisations themselves, lies in 
the fact that it is unrepresentative. For instance, the Mexican Council of 
Businessmen, CMHN (Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios), is 
controlled directly by approximately 30 major capitalist families, but is 
treated formally in the same way as CONCANACO, which has more than 
200,000 members.
Therefore, interest groups are still weak in their collective and 
representative action in dealing with the state. Mexican entrepreneurs 
have been affected by all the above-mentioned weaknesses in their 
representation.
The following list summarises the current and historical problems of 
Mexico's private sector chambers, as discussed with interviewees during 
fieldwork:31
• Highly politicised organisations.
• Closer to the government's interests than to those of the members.
• High rotation of chamber leaders (maximum term two years) and 
personnel.
• Lack of continuity of programmes and goals.
• Short-term vision.
• Uninformed of their members' real needs and problems.
• Lack of effective technology-related committees.
• Ignorance of the meaning of technology and its importance.
• Currently in crisis due to the new voluntary membership system.
• Poorly qualified personnel.
• Limited scope of action.
31 Interviews #1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9,10, 12 and 20.
185
With such a range of problems, it is easy to understand why, when 
asked about their feelings towards their representing associations, 
businessmen responded in the following negative ways:
'...the leaders are devoted to exploiting personal political interests 
to achieve economic benefits of their ow n../32
'...there is corruption and a lot of political interest...nothing 
productive comes out of the meetings, I lost too much time 
attending../33
'...once I was part of CANACINTRA's regional council. We were at 
the time discussing very hot issues for the industry...even if 85-90% of 
the delegates would agree on something, it would not prosper when the 
national president of the chamber had certain personal obligations with 
a government minister../ 34
Business organisations in Mexico have a long way to go before they 
convert themselves into real channels of representation for their 
members. I f  the government has short policy cycles as discussed in 
Chapter 4, private sector associations suffer from even greater short- 
termism in their programmes and goals which are reconsidered every 
two years. I f  technology cycies are medium- to long-term, the match 
with political and business chambers cycles causes severe problems for 
the coordination of firms and government agencies involved in 
technology development projects.
The questionnaire for the Author's Survey included three specific 





associations and their role in defending their interests, as well as their 
experience with them while developing their technology projects:
• First, when asked how they viewed the chambers' responsibility 
(meaning duty) in the support and promotion of technology 
development, 35 72.2% gave a mark of 5 (most responsible), 13.9% 
a 4, and the remaining 13.9% between 3 and 1 (not responsible at 
all). In comparison with their answers regarding the responsibility of 
individual businessmen, they had a more favourable view of the 
latter (See Figure 5.B).
• Second, when answering the question of how their associations 
defend members' interests, 36 only 14.1% gave the top mark of 5 
(very well defended), while more than 55% gave the lowest 1 and 2 
marks, meaning they feel they are not defended at all or defended 
poorly by their representing organisations (See Figure 5.C).
• And third, when talking about their technology projects,37 almost 
80% answered that they did not receive support from the 
associations they belong to in the process of developing their 
projects.
Entrepreneurs in Mexico do not seem to have a very high opinion of the 
associations that represent them, and do not view them as a channel 
through which they can access better information, resources and advice 
to engage in the technological modernisation of their firms.
How do the associations respond to the demands of their member 
firms? In regard to their involvement in direct technology support 
activities, business organisations have recently created private
35 Author's Survey: Question #11.
35 Author's Survey: Question #38.
37 Author's Survey: Question #37
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institutions oriented towards the promotion of a technology culture 
within firms, especially smaller ones. Technology support centres have 
been created for the textile, electronics, electric and plastics industries. 
CONCAMIN has established the Mexican Foundation for Innovation and 
Technology Transfer in Small and Medium-sized Firms, FUNTEC 
(Fundacion Mexicana para la Innovacion y Transferencia de Tecnologia 
en la Pequena y Mediana Empresa). In addition, CANACINTRA created 
the Technology Transfer Unit, UTT (Unidad de Transferencia 
Tecnologica), which provides advisory services to firms with technology- 
related projects (Poder Ejecutivo Federal and Secofi 1995). 
CANACINTRA's Director of Technology feels optimistic about the role 
the chamber is playing, and considers that it will facilitate the support 
for firms with the new service centres.38 FUNTEC's Executive Director 
talks highly of the achievements of the Foundation mainly in areas of 
articulation schemes.39
Opposing views consider FUNTEC as stagnant due to CONCAMIN's 
highly politicised organisation: 'resources have been wasted and not 
channelled to the final users...business politics are more political than 
politics...chambers are incapable of managing the foundation'.40 Thus, 
time will show whether these new centres are able to effectively 





Figure 5.C. Respondents' answers to the question: How well do
business chambers defend their members' interests?
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The next section deals with the private sector and its organisations in 
their interaction with the government in the different stages that the 
Mexican economy has gone through in the past few decades.
5.4 -  BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AND THE EFFECTS 
ON SMEs AND TECHNOLOGY
Historical background of the relationship
In this final section of the chapter, the aspects reviewed in the previous 
sections are reconsidered in the light of the relationship between 
government and firms in the recent events of the country's 
development, to analyse the effects on technology and innovation.
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An important feature of the Mexican polity's influence on interest group 
activity is the power of the presidency and the historical expansion of 
the executive branch's influence on interest group communications 
towards agency heads and the president. An analysis of private sector 
interest groups reveals the extent to which private-public relations 
have been institutionalised along formal lines, and the extent to which 
these organisations serve as useful channels in the decision-making 
process (Camp 1989).
One consequence of state-initiated interest organisations was that the 
government emphatically identified semi-official organisations or 
confederations (groups of chambers) as the channels through which 
businessmen should conduct their affairs. Frank Brandenburg wrote 
that the state wanted businessmen to act in concert in presenting their 
demands, rather than as individual entrepreneurs (Brandenburg 1958).
From the private sector's point of view, the formation of these 
organisations provided them with a logical vehicle through which they 
could make their perspectives known to the government. They acquired 
strength through numbers. Brandenburg even claims that these 
organisations are consulted by the government every time a bill 
affecting their interests is passed.
The dominating objective of political stability, and the incapacity to 
define long-term objectives for industrial and technological 
development, generated a vacuum where government officials were 
highly vulnerable to manipulative pressures from private interest 
groups. The latter were characterised by their strong inclination towards 
high profitability rates aimed at short-term recovery of investment. In 
addition, the long-term perspective required by the objectives of 
science and technology policies was lacking (Nadal Egea 1995, ISO- 
135)
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It can be assumed that the state acted out of self-interest in creating 
semi-official business organisations, not out of an unselfish desire to 
see the private sector strengthened. In doing that, the state not only 
legitimised semi-official organisations, but de-legitimised the 
development of independently supported interest groups modelled on 
those in the United States. It discouraged semi-official and voluntary 
types of business groups from taking an aggressive political posture 
(Camp 1984).
The following brief historical outline depicts the broadest strokes in the 
complex relationship between the private sector and state in Mexico. It 
starts with the protectionist and state-led era, as the background to a 
more detailed explanation of the period of economic liberalisation that 
led to the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Echeverrfa's government (1970-1976) began to contribute more than 
the private sector could to economic growth. By expanding the role of 
state investment, he sent a message to the private sector that his 
government supported a statist model of development. Echeverrfa's 
actions had many consequences for the private sector. According to 
many observers, the private sector became more unified in its 
opposition to government policy than at any time previously. It  could be 
argued that Echeverrfa's anti-entrepreneurial rhetoric encouraged 
entrepreneurs to strengthen their own organisations (Ortiz Pinchetti 
1982).
When Lopez Portillo was inaugurated in 1976, relations between the 
private sector and the state were at their worst since 1920. By 1977, 
this relationship had altered substantially. The state required the private 
sector's assistance to make its economic model perform effectively. The 
most critical decision Lopez Portillo made was to change the 
government's rhetoric, to seek out private sector cooperation in an 
outward, positive manner. Both public and private investment soared
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(Solis and Zedillo 1984). Lopez Portillo intended to take Mexico into 
GATT in 1979, but was dissuaded from doing so by opposition groups in 
the private sector. After 1981, the quality of the private sector-state 
relationship declined rapidly, finally breaking down entirely with the 
president's 1982 decision to nationalise the banks.41
When de la Madrid took office later in 1982, conditions in Mexico were 
once again worse than at any point in recent history. Just two months 
later, Emilio Goichochea Luna, president of CONCANACO, declared that 
'never before has the private sector had such difficulties communicating 
with the government' (Hispano Americano 1983).
Mexican businessmen's view of the state in the early 1980s can be 
summarised as mistrust. But even in the 1980s, most businessmen 
favoured a substantial government role in economic development 
(Camp 1989, 35-53).
The recent period of economic liberalisation
One of de la Madrid's best achievements was improved channels for 
communication, but it was not enough. His administration's message to 
the private sector had an overall philosophy of economic liberalisation, 
visibly symbolised by Mexico's policy reversal in 1985 when it decided 
to reopen negotiations to join GATT. If  anything, liberalisation 
heightened the debate within the private sector, between those who 
believed Mexico's international economic competitiveness to be 
essential to future economic expansion, and those who favoured 
continued state protection.
Most of the presidential term of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) 
comprised preaching business-government harmony and general
41 See Chapter 6.
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business support for the neo-liberal economic agenda (Johnson Ceva 
1998, 125-130). It is important to remember that during Salinas' 
presidency, and dating back to de la Madrid's, it was 'fashionable to 
have the support of the business class for everything...no politician nor 
director of a government institution could progress or have an 
important public image without the blessing of the oligarchy: 
CONCAMIN, CANACINTRA, CONCANACO, and the rest of those kind of 
bodies...which are nothing but structures created by the state itself to 
simulate the support of the business class...even for technology policy, 
the government had to give those organisations something to please 
them and pretend something was being done'.42
Nevertheless, a parallel voice of resentment, discontent, and even 
discord emanated from the business community from the start of the 
NAFTA negotiations in 1990 (Johnson Ceva 1998, 125-130). One 
common call was for the government to focus not only on 
macroeconomic issues but also on the microeconomy. Another was for 
the government to develop an adequate industrial policy, one that could 
help Mexican firms become more competitive in the context of trade 
liberalisation and regional integration. A small group of policy-makers 
within the Salinas administration was involved in the NAFTA 
negotiations, closely counselled by business leaders. On the one hand, 
the negotiations illustrated the close nature of the business- 
government collaboration that characterised the Salinas years. On the 
other, they also put in place a system of business representation that 
for the most part excluded small and medium-sized firms, and therefore 
did not adequately represent the growing diversity of business interests 
in a liberalised economy.
Large business groups, whose members were best positioned to 
compete within a free trade area, generally supported the government's
42 Interview #10.
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intention to negotiate NAFTA. But smaller firms and microenterprises, 
still primarily oriented toward production for the domestic market, 
remained marginalised from many avenues of business representation, 
and most knew very little about how the terms of the free trade 
agreement might affect them.
Smaller enterprises born and prospering under the policies of 
protectionism and import substitution, and commonly affiliated with 
CANACINTRA, had historically opposed unilateral trade liberalisation and 
Mexico's accession to GATT, which occurred in 1986. And since that 
time such smaller producers have suffered severely, particularly from 
Asian competition in clothing, shoes, leather products, metal products 
and toys (Alba 1994).
Vocal opposition to NAFTA by small and medium-sized firms was fairly 
marginal, however, for several reasons. First, President Salinas and his 
trade ministry officials put a tremendous effort into publicity to pre­
empt potential opposition, conducting meetings about NAFTA with 
hundreds of business groups before the formal negotiations began. 
Second, there was a lack of accurate information about free trade 
available at that time to small and medium-sized businesses.
Secofi encouraged the formation of a new business trade advisory 
group that would be organised by economic sector. Although a business 
sector may strongly support the formation of a trade advisory group, 
SMEs are unlikely to receive adequate representation within this 
structure. Despite their enormous importance, and the specific needs 
each may have, SMEs in such advisory groups are clustered together 
with large firms and treated as members of separate industry groups. 
In this institutional framework the needs of small and medium-sized 
firms as well as large firms are seen as similar and dependent on the 
characteristics of the particular sector of the economy to which each 
belongs (Del Castillo and Vega Canovas 1995).
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Thus the advisory group may foster greater sectoral identity and 
networking, particularly on issues of common interest to most firms in 
the sector, but in the context of trade liberalisation the needs of smaller 
firms will most likely differ from those of the larger ones in their sector. 
This is particularly true in developing countries such as Mexico, where 
economic activity is concentrated in a small number of very large 
business groups. In particular, the smaller firms are less likely to have 
access to credit for new investments and more likely to have a weaker 
technology platform and need additional support to face new 
competition. As a result, the lack of representation of the smaller firms 
may ultimately work against the express goals of the advisory group.
Between 1990 and 1993 Mexico's trade advisory group, the 
Coordinating Body of Foreign Trade Business Associations, COECE 
(Consejo de Organizaciones Empresariales para el Comercio Exterior), 
represented the Mexican business sector in the NAFTA negotiations and 
advised government officials negotiating the treaty. At first COECE, with 
its sectoral structure, appeared to be much more representative than 
the traditional business chambers represented in the CCE in organising 
the entire business community. Nevertheless, large firms still had the 
most influence over the sectoral studies that COECE undertook in 
preparation for the negotiations.
Most of the debates about the findings of the studies went on at the 
highest levels of the business-state coalition, with questionable input 
from smaller firms. Small and medium-sized producers openly 
complained that COECE never truly represented them at the negotiating 
table (Pastor and Wise 1994, 480-481).
As the prospect of increased competition grew imminent, many of the 
smaller firms became more keenly aware of the obstacles they faced in 
becoming competitive in an increasingly liberalised economy. Such 
obstacles included their lack of technology, low quality of product, and
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lack of access to credit and capital. Protests started against the lack of 
adequate financing for economic adjustment. Although most small and 
medium-sized firms did not oppose NAFTA per se, their grievances 
continued to focus on their lack of representation in COECE, the speed 
and timing of the reforms, and the lack of adequate support to help 
them to meet increasing competition.
An unexpected finding during fieldwork for this thesis was that the 
surveyed firms did not necessarily view the economic opening of the 
country as negative for them,43 even though the sample consisted of 
micro, small and medium-sized firms (See Table 5.3). Out of the 72 
firms, only 22 perceived it as a negative situation for them: 22 did not 
see any effects, and 30 saw it as positive mainly because of the new 
opportunities to export.
The state can ignore interest group arguments when small and 
medium-sized member firms are believed to hold a view different from 
the large capitalist members. Second, if the small and medium-sized 
firms believe themselves to be unrepresented by an organisation's 
position on important issues, their resentment divides the private sector 
on other concerns (Camp 1989). Thus, the problem of representation is 
to be addressed with caution.
The government's reply to businesses' criticism of economic policies, 
especially the lack of an industrial policy under Salinas, is best 
summarised in remarks by Jaime Serra Puche, minister of Secofi during 
the Salinas years: 'NAFTA is our industrial policy; we don't want the 
government to replace business initiative with an industrial policy. We 
already did our work, now you do yours' (Mercado 1995, 11).
43 Author's Survey: Question #8.
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Table 5.3 Respondents' answers to the question: How have the effects
of trade liberalisation been for your firm? (per firm size)
Effects of Economic Opening * Firm Size Crosstabulation
Firm Size Total
Micro Small&Med
Positive 9 21 30
Effects Negative 12 10 22
No Effects 14 6 20
Total Number of Firms 35 37 72
Source: Author's Survey
More specifically, the Mexican government claimed that an industrial 
policy, particularly in a vertical form, was not appropriate under the 
current neoliberal economic model. Because NAFTA itself offered no 
support for vulnerable business sectors, many business owners believed 
it was up to the Mexican government to develop support mechanisms 
within the parameters of the trade agreement (Becerril and Rodriguez 
1994, 31).
The Zedillo administration (1994-2000) modified policies toward small 
and medium-sized businesses. Zedillo maintained that the increased 
competitiveness of small and medium-sized firms was a top priority for 
his administration (Flores 1995). A new National Council on Micro, 
Small, and Medium Enterprise (Consejo Nacoinal para la Micro, Pequena 
y Mediana Empresa) was established in the first year of the Zedillo 
administration. Nevertheless, none of the respondents to the Author's 
Survey conducted in 1998 mentioned the new Council when talking 
about government's programmes to support them. And according to 
FUNTEC's Executive Director, the Council for SMEs 'was supposed to be 
the magnet to collect the needs of that sector...but it has not been like 
that, so the private sector does not have the mechanisms to express
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clearly its needs...there are no studies to understand the needs, and the 
chambers are not playing that role'.44
It seems as though there still remains a significant distrust among 
owners of various sized businesses in the government's ability to 
manage the economy properly. As it will be developed further in 
Chapter 7, SMEs still feel that the government's policies are neither 
effective nor long-term, and that their technology backwardness 
prevents them from freely competing in an open economy.
According to Carlos Bazdresch, Director General of Conacyt during 
President Zedillo's administration, the indifference of Mexican 
entrepreneurs -  mainly large firms -  does not contribute to general 
growth in the country. 'They prefer to maintain their monopolies', he 
said. During an interview with the newspaper El Universal, he pointed 
out that such indifference is caused by the fact that they are not 
worried about competition; their immediate strength prevents them 
from seeing into the future. Therefore he described the private sector 
as 'passive' when the country needs aggressive initiatives. 'A culture 
change is needed', he concluded (Diaz 1998).
Substantially changing a culture embedded in the country's recent 
history may be difficult, at least in the short run. The technology gap 
has to be closed, however, to prevent a substantial number of firms, 
mainly SMEs, from disappearing in the face of international competition. 
To quote Sanchez Ugarte in conclusion: 'There is a lack of leadership in 
regard to technology, someone is needed to head the promotion, do the 





In twenty-first century Mexico, several tasks remain to make the 
private sector regionally and globally competitive. This chapter has 
presented an account of the leading literature, mainly agreeing with the 
evolutionary approaches on technology capabilities for developing 
countries and SMEs. These approaches, also referred to as 
institutionalist, or structuralist, emphasise the importance of and need 
for technological change within the developing countries themselves. 
Along with the empirical evidence gathered for this research, some 
important conclusions can be made.
Firms of different sizes all have a contribution to make to the economic 
and technological development of LDCs. New opportunities for viable 
new forms of small-scale production emerge continuously in a growing 
economy. But in order to benefit from those opportunities, firms need 
to be able to produce in their own unique and innovative ways. An open 
trading regime, openness to foreign direct investment and technology 
licensing all allow the acquisition of knowledge from abroad. Agreed. 
But as has been thoroughly discussed in this chapter, technology 
produced in other countries has to be adapted to local conditions. The 
creation of a strong indigenous technology base is therefore needed to 
adapt and absorb adequately, reducing technology dependence and 
closing the international and domestic gaps. Thus, the ability to make 
independent technological choices, to adapt and improve techniques 
and products and eventually to innovate endogenously are essential 
aspects of the process of economic development
The discussion of the relative role played by small and large firms in 
innovation is a controversial and sometimes contradictory one. From 
the theoretical as well as from the empirical point of view, it can be 
argued that large, established corporations are the most powerful 
engine of technological change, and that the high cost of industrial R&D
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activities means that they can only be carried out by firms having the 
resources associated with considerable size. However, small firms are 
also an important vehicle of economic growth and can be more 
important for the creation of employment and income in developing 
countries. Furthermore, different results of empirical research 
presented in the chapter deal with the relationship between innovation 
and size of firms, which can serve as confirmation of the inventive 
potential of small firms. Therefore, a more realistic statement is that 
large and small firms are a necessary complement to each other, rather 
than alternatives. A viable way to help SMEs improve their position is to 
develop supplier networks for the large corporations.
Given the desirability of building technological capabilities in small firms, 
the process could be supported through appropriate policy 
interventions. There is a case for institutional support because 
capability building is a much-neglected area (Romijn 1999). In fostering 
the domestic creation of knowledge, governments have a special role in 
supporting potentially productive research, while establishing the 
necessary conditions for the private sector in response to market 
forces. Nevertheless, the government will not be able to design 
appropriate mechanisms if it has no specific knowledge of the needs of 
the private sector and SMEs in particular.
Business associations need to develop a more active and aggressive 
attitude to serve as an effective link between their associates and those 
institutions which can help them improve their technological platform. 
To date, few have built up adequate technological promotion activity. 
Global competitiveness and its elements (technology, 
internationalisation, and business-government partnerships) are 
affecting industry associations. Private sector interest groups, mainly 
SMEs, are still weak in their collective and representative action in 
dealing with the state, and have been affected by such weaknesses. 
Therefore, it is important that they start to respond by giving assistance
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to their associates or they may even be abandoned in favour of new 
organisations.
In Mexico, the government's protectionist policies of earlier decades 
undoubtedly had a deep effect on the private sector. Since the 
beginning of the opening of the economy in the mid 1980s, many large 
and medium-sized firms, as well as some small and micro ones, have 
been able to adapt to competition and the new global environment, and 
there is a new technology culture in the country, with a growing 
awareness of its importance amongst entrepreneurs. However, the 
challenge for the country today is to incorporate larger segments of 
society into this process. Many more firms need to produce more 
effectively to become competitive and serve both domestic and 
international markets. Incentives need to be increasingly made 
available for private firms to take on their own R&D, initially in 
adapting, understanding, and refining the technologies they are already 
using, but eventually moving into research in those areas where they 
are close to international best practice. Therefore, government policies 
have to be more effective, coordinated and long-term oriented
Chapters 2 through 5 have focused mainly on technology policy on the 
side of the government, and the development of technology on the side 
of the firm. The next two chapters consider another factor in the 
process of innovation: financing. Chapter 6 analyses the Mexican 
system for financing technology development, centring on the banks 
and firms. Chapter 7 provides a case study of government programmes 
for direct project financing which will put together all the different 
participants of the system.
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Chapter 6
THE ROLE OF BANKS AND FIRMS IN  THE FINANCING OF 
INNOVATION IN  MEXICO
'Financing has not received the 
attention of economists that it deserves 




Any serious definition of innovation involves both technical novelty and 
utility. Every business decision on innovation must therefore rely on a 
combination of technical feasibility and economic demand. But 'to 
consummate this combination there must be a third input: some 
commitment of funds' (Prakke 1988, 71).
In a broad sense, financing innovation can sometimes require small- 
scale, short-term investment, but more typically it involves quite 
substantial sums and a high level of uncertainty. Therefore, one of the 
most important institutional preconditions for starting the process of 
innovation is the ability to finance the project. Certain national 
institutional factors in financial systems are important to firms when 
they need to obtain finance for their investments in new technologies 
(Christensen 1992, 146-150).
This chapter relates precisely to those national institutional factors 
present in Mexico, and discusses why, even after a recent process of 
banking reforms, firms find it difficult to obtain funds for innovation. 
Mexico's national financial system for supporting technological 
investment is evaluated and used to illustrate the theoretical discussion.
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Section 1 establishes the theoretical concepts needed to understand a 
national system for financing innovation: its categories, components, 
functions and properties. The recent evolution and institutional aspects 
of the Mexican banking system are presented in Section 2, to show the 
dramatic shifts it has experienced. The latter serves as a context to 
analyse, in Section 3, the way in which banks see technology and 
innovation projects and small entrepreneurs as their potential clients.In 
Section 4, the demand for funding is assessed by investigating the 
situation of innovating firms in Mexico and the problems they face in 
their interaction with commercial banks.
Different elements throughout the chapter show where the deficiencies 
of the system lie, raising further questions on the role of government in 
their potential correction. That will be further discussed in the next 
chapter.
6.1 -  THEORY AND CONCEPTS INHERENT TO A SYSTEM FOR 
FINANCING INNOVATION
National financing systems
As discussed in previous chapters, technological change is a process 
that takes place over a period of time, from basic research to the 
development and marketing of a new product.1 In order to complete 
such a process, the commitment of capital resources is required, at 
various stages of the project (Goodacre and Tonks 1995, 298-315).
Financial resources are essential for those firms undertaking technology 
development projects. Some authors argue that the concept of a 
National Financial System has become less and less relevant due to 
internationalisation, deregulation and globalisation of financial markets
1 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
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in recent years (Christensen 1992, 146-150; Kluth and Andersen 1999, 
122-126). Opposing views state that liberalisation and integration of 
financial markets at the international level relate solely to the assets 
listed on those markets, while other forms of capital investment in 
industry are still primarily governed by country-specific economic 
circumstances, institutional arrangements2 and established practices. 
The configuration of forms of industrial investment and industrial risk 
appraisal, including government intervention, is peculiar to each 
country (OECD 1995, 51). Institutions are historically rooted and 
culturally embedded, and their properties exhibit an element of rigidity 
(Kluth and Andersen 1999, 122-126). Therefore, in spite of
globalisation trends, there are still local differences in financial systems 
which must be taken into account because they affect firms' Research 
and Development decisions.
This chapter deals with the way different entities interact in the process 
of financing innovation within Mexico. But before these interactions are 
developed more fully, it is important to understand the basic concepts 
of a financial system.
A financial system can be defined as the network of institutions 
connecting the owners of financial capital to that which ultimately gives 
them value. In other words, it is the mechanism for transforming 
savings or credit into investments and for advising firms (Christensen 
1992, 153-155; Tylecote 1994, 259-267). Financial systems operating 
in a market economy are characterised by a set of components, 
functions and properties inherent in them (see Table 6.1). Therefore, 
financial systems differ in the way they function, the way they are 
composed and characterised, and in the way they can be transformed, 
based on their institutional context. In all countries, the institutional 
context is the outcome of a process during which institutions,
2 For a more detailed discussion on institutions, see Chapter 4.
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procedures and mechanisms have taken shape, as a result of choices 
on how to meet their market challenges (OECD 1995, 56-62).
Table 6.1. Components, functions and properties of a financial system.
Components
Institutions providing external finance for investment (loans, shares and 
other securities).
Internal financing (self-funding). When retained earnings are allocated to 
different investment projects.
The contracts3 between owners and managers of investment funds, which 
define the terms for the use of operating surpluses for self-financing.
Functions
The provision of capital.
Supervision of the way capital is used.
Creation of resources.
Properties
Flexibility: ability to assume a range of industrial/technological risk 
portfolios.
Adaptability: ability to change its own structure to sustain the structural 
adjustment of industry.
Specific functionalism: aptitude for promoting certain types of industrial 
specialisation or adjustment processes more than others.
Resilience: capacity to adjust structures without losing its 'personality' 
under the waves of globalisation.
Source: Christensen (1992, 153-155); OECD (1995, 32-39); Tylecote (1994, 
259-267).
Various criteria are used to categorise a financial system. Christensen 
(1992, 153-155) groups them according to two aspects: the relative 
importance of financial markets and financial institutions in the 
transformation of savings to investments; and the role of government 
in this process and in the regulation of the financial markets. He then 
defines three distinct categories:
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1. A market- and competition-oriented system, where funds are 
allocated through a developed capital market and with little 
government influence. Institutions here are highly specialised and 
numerous. Firms are supplied with long-term capital, partly by the 
developed capital market. Banks are limited to the provision of 
short-term capital or to linking firms with potential funds. The US 
and the UK have both been said to be in this category.
2. A credit-based system, where financial institutions, mainly banks, 
transfer savings to investments under considerable government 
control and regulation. Long-term capital is provided mainly through 
loan markets where some prices are controlled by the government. 
Government influences the flow of capital to areas of high priority. 
The relative importance of the capital market is small. France and 
Japan in the 1980s are examples of this system4 (Sally 1995, 
Chapter 5).
3. A credit-based system dominated by financial institutions with little 
government intervention. Financial institutions influence prices 
independently of government. There are very strong ties between 
industry and finance. The firms are not only dependent on the 
banks; the banks often control a considerable share of the votes in 
the company. In the German financial system, for example, the 
banking system and bank-industry relations work quite freely and 
with little public regulation (Sally 1995, Chapter 5).
With regard to the financing of innovation, and based on the above- 
mentioned categories, it can be said that two components of the
3 Contracts are more or less explicit and define the terms under which the 
owner surrenders some prerogatives to corporate managers for the use of 
operating surpluses for self financing (OECD 1995).
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institutional context are of primary importance. These components 
determine both the sharing roles between the public and private sectors 
regarding the realisation and financing of R&D and the efficiency of the 
private financing system (OECD 1995, 56-62).
Tylecote (1994, 259-267) groups financial systems in a different way, 
and relates those categories to the funding of innovation:
a) Bank-based financial systems: only a small number of large firms 
are public companies quoted on the Stock Exchange. They and other 
private companies look to banks as their main source of external 
funding. Their relationship with banks is close, and lending is long­
term.
b) Stock exchange-based financial systems: firms look to the stock 
market as their main source of equity. Banks are not used as a 
major source of risk capital since their lending is transactional rather 
than relational, with each loan seen as a one-off operation.
The real differences between the two systems cannot be understood 
without taking into account the role of shareholders. In his further 
development of the differences between the two systems, Tylecote 
states that generally, a bank-based system is a good supporter of 
innovation, and that the stock exchange-based economies will suffer 
from a lack of perception due to the distant relationship between firms 
and the sources of finance, whether banks or stock markets. Moreover, 
state-dominated bank-based economies can provide strong support in 
areas targeted by the state but, like the stock exchange-based 
systems, tend to discriminate against innovation where visibility is poor. 
Private bank economies tend to discriminate against innovation in high
4 The French financial system used to feature an important role for the 
government, but banks more concerned with short-term financial profit criteria 
have made the system more Anglo-Saxon (Sally 1995, Chapter 5).
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risk and major start-up areas. Tylecote concludes that all bank 
economies are virtually immune to short-termism since they do not 
involve placing decision-making power in the hands of outsiders, who 
tend to give priority to profit but are unable to assess long-term 
prospects of innovation investments.
Short-termism is one of the possible ways in which a financial system 
can inhibit innovation; another is the toleration of managerial inability 
or unwillingness to force change that would be in the interest of 
shareholders, otherwise known as 'conservatism'. Moreover, a country 
without a deep venture capital market can lag behind those with one. 
On the side of the capital market, two further innovation constraints 
exist: high interest rates and high margins for financial intermediaries, 
as well as an effective cost of capital for innovation well above the 
general level of interest rates.
The risk issue
The problems or constraints on innovation described above all relate to 
the issue of risk. The simple term 'risk' can imply negative 
connotations: it relates to danger, to chance, to unknown results 
(Longman Group Ltd. 1978, 958). Investment in innovation usually 
implies more uncertainty than other investments. The large element of 
risk involved in R&D investment is obviously a major factor in 
determining the scale of investment in innovation in a business 
enterprise. This goes both for market uncertainty and technical 
uncertainty. In addition, learning processes in production and 
consumption are somewhat longer for a new product, and possibilities 
for security are less than for known products (Christensen 1992; 
Freeman, Poignant, and Svennilson 1963).
International evidence has shown that it is much more difficult to 
borrow money for an investment in R&D than for investment in fixed
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capital, and firms which for one reason or another cannot finance R&D 
from their own resources will find it much more difficult to engage in 
research than firms with better self-financing possibilities (Freeman, 
Poignant, and Svennilson 1963). Risky investments in innovation are 
often initially self-financed. This applies especially to large companies: 
small and medium-sized firms may have less opportunity for internal 
financing. Nevertheless, large companies also increasingly tend to use 
external finance. Higher R&D costs and shorter life cycles for most high 
technology products also make technology-based firms more dependent 
on external finance (Christensen 1992).
Back in 1962, Arrow identified the fundamental issues surrounding the 
R&D decision: if a firm is considering a project that is risky, and is 
unable to shift any of this risk, then the firm will be less likely to 
undertake the investment than if it was safe. One way of shifting the 
risks is to spread them across a wide number of suppliers of capital. 
Instead of a single entrepreneur bearing all the risks of an R&D project, 
he should sell equity claims in the project and thereby dissipate the 
risks among a wide range of investors. Capital markets allow firms to 
spread R&D risks and mitigate the under-investment problem.
External finance for R&D activities comes in two main streams: equity 
and debt. The difference between them from the point of view of an 
investor is that the income from equity is random and risky. The income 
stream from debt is fixed and in the event of a firm's insolvency the 
debt holders will have a primary claim on the firm's assets, making it a 
safer proposition. From the point of view of the firm, equity holders are 
entitled to a share of the profits, and in consequence bear some of the 
risk of the project. Debt, on the other hand, represents the 
commitment of a series of interest payments irrespective of the liquidity 
of the firm, and if the firm does not have sufficient income to meet 
these payments, the debt holders can force the firm into bankruptcy 
and receive the proceeds from the sale of the firm's assets. Since
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equity holders bear risk which debt holders do not, the expected return 
on holding equity will he higher than the returns on debt (Goodacre and 
Tonks 1995, 318-319).
Most large and medium-sized firms finance R&D from internal cash flow 
(Tassey 1997, 190-191). However, since this thesis is concerned with 
the innovation efforts of small and medium-sized enterprises, this 
chapter focuses on the relationship between them and the financial 
system, in the sense that they depend greatly on external sources of 
funding. Thus, even if the types of market failure that are intrinsic for 
the R&D process did not exist, substantial under-investment in R&D 
could occur because of imperfections in the financial infrastructure that 
supplies investment funds to these SME firms. Furthermore, Arrow 
develops his arguments to show that the risk sharing solution to under­
investment may still result in less than the optimum level of R&D, since 
the introduction of capital markets induces incentive and information 
difficulties (Arrow 1962). Arrow's demonstration that a market economy 
tends to under-invest in research and development gives rise, as 
previously stated, to the issue of State intervention. This problem of 
underinvestment can in essence be referred back to the concepts of 
information and risk aversion.
As rapid market changes make information hazy, there is a hazard in 
the sense that both industry and finance become more reluctant to 
forge long-term contracts, when they face problems to acquire 
adequate information. This situation tends to be self-perpetuating as 
the market itself is unable to solve the problem due to asymmetric 
information among participants. On the contrary, the number of poor 
risk takers increases, which again forces banks to claim a higher 
premium among those remaining courageous high-risk-taking firms to 
stay on the market (Svensson and Ulvenblad 1995; Williamson 1983).
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Venture capital
One further concept is that of 'venture capital'. Credit is the lifeblood of 
a developed economy (Kluth and Andersen 1999, 122-126). The 
relationship between finance and industry often appears problematic in 
times of rapid economic and technological change, due to increased 
uncertainty about future market development. By looking at the 
financing of enterprises which still depend on national credit institutions, 
it is possible to discern financial structures that vary from country to 
country due to historical traditions. These variations, as previously 
discussed, can lead to constraints in the financing of technology 
development efforts in private firms, specially SMEs.
Venture capital then, is a key source of long-term funds to SMEs with 
high growth potential, often referred to as new technology based firms 
(NTBF). Fast growing companies backed by venture capital produce 
many new well paid and highly skilled jobs, and are an important source 
of applied technological innovation. Consequently venture capital is 
considered an important instrument assisting in spurring economic 
growth and industrial renewal by the OECD countries (OECD 1996). The 
OECD uses a three-point classification system for venture capital funds:
• Independent funds: these are often privately held or publicly listed 
companies.
• Captives: These are venture capital subsidiaries of industrial 
corporations or financial institutions.
• Public sector: These are venture capital organisations which are 
principally funded from government sources (OECD 1996).
Each type can be found in most OECD countries. Conceptually, venture 
capital has been regarded by policy-makers all over the world as an 
outstanding method of ensuring funds and managerial skills are 
directed to particularly high technology entrepreneurs.
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Venture capital markets in the US are more developed and effective 
than in most industrialised nations, and the number of small firms that 
start up and prosper reflect this strength of the US financial 
infrastructure. However, Tassey (1997, 189-203) argues that venture 
capital markets have been characterised on numerous occasions as 
inadequate. He gives three reasons for his concern:
a) the supply of venture capital is too cyclical, resulting in deserving 
firms not having access to funds at crucial points in their growth;
b) the risk preferences and organisation of venture capital firms have 
shifted towards less-risky, later-stage developing companies with 
relatively shorter expected times to commercialisation;
c) the knowledge of venture capitalists tends to be concentrated in 
certain technologies, thus leaving other areas without the needed 
financial support.
Market failure
R&D policy should be concerned with the availability of adequate funds 
in some of the forms discussed in this section to ensure the continual 
supply of new technologies. As will be discussed thoroughly in the next 
chapter, most countries offer government-backed incentives to alleviate 
the market failure in the allocation of resources to technological 
projects (Stoneman and Vickers 1988). Incentives can take several 
forms: direct financing, subsidies and favourable tax treatments being 
the most common. However, even when it is accepted that some form 
of incentive is necessary, the decision concerning which method to 
adopt, which organisations should benefit and by how much is far from 
easy. To be in a position to make such a decision rationally requires 
knowledge of the likely impact and relative effectiveness of alternative 
forms of incentive. Public authorities in several countries use quite
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remarkable sums of money in subsidising product and process 
development in private firms.5
Using the concepts examined in this section, the Mexican system for 
financing innovation can now be analysed in the rest of this chapter. 
When reading this, keep in mind that innovation is not a specialised 
economic activity but one of the mainsprings of economic development: 
to innovate is to invest, and the content of innovation-related 
investment and its uncertainties create financial problems. These 
problems cannot usefully be analysed in isolation from more general 
problems of the reconciliation of financial and industrial logics. This 
reconciliation takes different forms in different countries. Deregulation 
and globalisation of financial markets facilitate the finance of some 
types of investment but tend to destabilise national financing systems 
and do not always steer them automatically towards the most urgent 
structural adjustment tasks. Market failure may create chronic 
insufficiency in innovation-related investment (OECD 1995).
The mere fact that an innovative project does not find funding is not in 
itself an indication of a failure of the financial system. The empirical 
evidence presented for the Mexican case will help to judge whether:
On the demand side:
• the innovator is able to formulate his project in a sound business 
plan;
• the innovator is ready to use the appropriate financial channel, 
including when it involves sharing of information and control 
associated with external equity funding.
5 Consequently the impact of these subsidies on R&D efforts has been the 
subject of several empirical studies. Results vary and can even be
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On the supply side:
• the innovator has proper access to a complete set of competing 
financial channels;
• the innovator can identify financial players who can fully assess the 
project, even a technologically complex one involving a high share 
or intangible investment; and
• the financial investor is offered appropriate exit facilities, to meet his 
liquidity requirements.
6.2 -  THE MEXICAN BANKING SYSTEM
National banking systems throughout the world have been subject to 
immense pressure due to the deregulation process and the prominence 
of the free capital movement discourse (Kluth and Andersen 1999). The 
case of Mexico is no exception. Changes in Mexican policy toward 
financial institutions have moved them to a more open and riskier 
environment.
Much has been discussed over the last two decades regarding the 
dramatic shifts that the Mexican financial sector has experienced. Such 
a complex interrelation of events is difficult to illustrate in detail, but the 
main events that have taken place will be highlighted here, with 
recommendations for further reading where necessary.
The Mexican financial system includes commercial banks, development 
banks, brokerage houses and securities markets, insurance firms, and 
other non-bank financial intermediaries including credit arrangements 
outside the formal banking system for the poor (Gruben and Welch 
1996, 63-75). This study concentrates mainly on the banks, both 
private and government owned, because of their relative importance
contradictory depending on the particular case and methodology employed. 
See Kauko (1996).
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compared to the rest of the financial institutions in the financing of 
innovation.
There have been striking changes in commercial banking in the last 
twenty years. Changes in government policy towards financial 
institutions are a major indication of the changing relationship between 
the state and the economy, and in Mexico there have been many such 
changes. The major ones are described below.
In 1982, the Lopez Portillo administration nationalised the banks in a 
panicky response to the dual economic shock of weakening oil prices 
and rising real rates of interest (Barnes 1992, 1-21). As the then 
President wanted to make sure they stayed nationalised, he 
incorporated the nationalisation into the constitution (Gruben and Welch 
1996, 63-75). During nationalisation the banking sector was
consolidated into fewer units and was prevented from engaging in risky 
and speculative ventures. By 1990, of the 58 banks originally 
nationalised only 18 remained (Banco de Mexico 1992; Barnes 1992; 
Gruben and Welch 1996).
In 1984, the de la Madrid administration began to privatise brokerage 
houses, insurance firms and other bank property. Non-bank financial 
institutions' assets increased from 9.1% to 32.1% of financial system 
assets (Banco de Mexico 1992). This started a trend continued later in 
1990 by Salinas' government to liberalise the financial system by 
eliminating the controls over banks and move towards universal 
banking.
In 1988, Mexico deregulated interest rates by eliminating controls of 
rates and maturities on all traditional bank instruments. Restrictions on 
loans to the private sector were also eliminated and lending at below 
market interest to the public sector was discontinued.
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In December 1989, to further strengthen banks and other institutions 
involved in credit and stock market operations, the Mexican Congress 
approved wide-ranging institutional reforms. These measures were
intended to increase competition and reduce enforced market
segmentation by expanding the scope of permissible activities for 
different types of institutions (Barnes 1992, 1-21).
In 1990, the Mexican Congress amended the constitution again to
permit the sale of the nationalised banks, although only to Mexican
investors. On May 2nd, President Salinas submitted a bill to Congress to 
amend articles 28 and 123 of the Constitution, permitting full private 
ownership of commercial banks. The Credit Institutions Law, enacted in 
July 1990, allows commercial banks to be majority owned and 
controlled by the private sector (Barnes 1992, 1-21).
The government sold its 18 banks in 14 months, from June 1991 
through July 1992, at the extraordinarily high average price-to-book 
value ratio of 3.49. Having paid this inflated price, buyers expected 
competition to be kept amongst only a limited number of banks. 
However, in 1993, Mexico began to expand its banking markets to new 
domestic entrants. It has been said that Mexican banks at that time 
were roughly two-thirds as efficient as US banks (Gruben and Welch 
1996, 63-75); this can be explained by the protection of Mexican 
banking and competition resolved the problem. In 1993, the number of 
Mexican banks almost doubled. In 1994, as a result of NAFTA, foreign 
banks were allowed to operate in Mexico, subject to size restriction. 
Foreign banks as a whole were limited to up to eight percent of total 
Mexican bank capital. Some 53 financial institutions were licensed to 
operate in Mexico.
In the wake of the privatisations and faced with increased competition, 
banks began to expand consumer credit, despite limited information on
216
the creditworthiness of the borrowers (Gruben and Welch 1996, 63-75) 
-  offering credit to customers about whom little was known.6
The Mexican financial system was severely affected by the financial 
crisis that erupted in late December 1994. The crisis created serious 
liquidity and solvency problems for a wide range of financial institutions, 
exposing their weak capital base and widespread portfolio problems. 
The government intervened in the operations of ten banks, including 
some later investigated for fraud by their owners,7 and put in place 
several bank and debtor support programmes involving high fiscal 
costs. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff estimates, 
the total cost to the government of these programmes could amount to 
almost ten percent of GDP (IMF 1997, 8).
The UDI8 loan structuring scheme was introduced in April 1995, 
allowing the conversion of outstanding floating interest rate loans into 
long-term loans, denominated in UDIs that carry a fixed real interest 
rate (IMF 1997, 8). That same year, to rescue Mexico's unsound banks, 
foreign banks were allowed to purchase any other than the three 
largest Mexican banks. New rules allowed up to 25 percent of a bank's 
capital to be foreign-owned.9
After the December 1994 exchange rate crisis,10 devaluation triggered 
capital outflows and high inflation. As a result, interest rates rose so
6 As a private sector association leader said '...after the reprivatisation, banks 
just inundated the country with credit cards and that is one of the main causes 
of the current financial crisis' (Interview #4).
7 In retrospect, a first level government official says '...bankers were not 
interested in 10 years maturity projects, their perspective was one year, and 
then run away to Europe' (Interview #  20).
8 A UDI (Unidades de Inversion) is a reference unit of account with constant 
real value as indexed to the consumer price index.
9 The restriction no longer applies and subsidiaries of foreign banks can 
operate in Mexico and banks can be owned by foreign capital.
10 For literature related to the 1994 financial crisis see Cardenas Sanchez 
1998; Gavito Mohar, Silva Nava, and Zamarripa Escamilla 1998; Giron and 
Correa 1997; Johnson Ceva 1998; UNAM-Facultad de Economia 1995.
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high that they put both borrowers and lenders at risk, as major 
increases in interest rates pushed up loan default rates. Some banks 
were reported to have suspended all mortgage, auto and consumer 
loans until further notice and to have cancelled loans to farmers. To 
address the mounting problems of undercapitalisation among the 
increasing number of troubled banks, the government designed a 
special recapitalisation programme through the nation's deposit 
insurance authority, known as FOBAPROA11 (Gruben and Welch 1996, 
63-75).
In general, financial crises lead to diminished levels of financial 
intermediation and hence to less capital accumulation and lowered 
economic growth, and therefore are costly for nations. Moreover, they 
produce a deficient allocation of real resources and may threaten the 
functioning of the payments system, thus engendering social costs well 
beyond the banking business and even the financial market as a whole 
(Gavito Mohar, Silva Nava, and Zamarripa Escamilla 1998, 88-105).
The origins and consequences of Mexico's 1994 crisis have been much 
debated. In preceding years, market-oriented reforms had not delivered 
the anticipated level of economic success, yet there had been no 
consensus that the strategy should be changed. Up to 1994, observed 
results from these reform policies seemed in general satisfactory, but 
by the end of that year the Mexican economy was in a vulnerable 
condition. Economic growth and real interest rates had not evolved as 
expected, and the government's liquid reserves were too low to deal 
with short-term liabilities. Firms and households were also seriously 
over-indebted (Gavito Mohar, Siiva Nava, and Zamarripa Escamilla 
1998, 88-105).
11 FOBAPROA (Fondo Bancario para la Proteccion al Ahorro) is the Fund for the 
Protection of Bank Savings. The government, through FOBAPROA, purchased
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These conditions had been brewing for several years. Between 1982 
and 1988 the level of private sector debt decreased due to various 
adverse conditions, including contractions of domestic aggregate 
demand, high and volatile interest rates, foreign exchange uncertainty 
and low availability of loanable funds. This trend reversed in 1988, 
however, when the macroeconomic setting became more favourable.
The deep structural change that took place in Mexico during the 
following years delivered a leaner public sector with healthier finances, 
stable macroeconomic indicators and financial liberalisation. In addition, 
new policies to deregulate economic activities and speed up the trade- 
opening process stimulated the business sector to restructure, to 
become more competitive in a free-trade environment (Gavito Mohar, 
Silva Nava, and Zamarripa Escamilla 1998). Nevertheless, in the 
context of the transition from the Salinas to the Zedillo administrations, 
unsustainable macroeconomic policies, together with the defective 
regulation of the banking system, seem to have ultimately conspired to 
produce the eventual collapse of the Mexican financial system, leaving 
the banks' soundness to rank 57th out of 58 in the most recent Global 
Competitiveness Report. Moreover, the report ranks Mexico 51st in 
respect to the possibility to obtain a loan with a good business plan and 
no collateral, and ranks the country 52nd when assessing whether in the 
past year credit has become easier to obtain (World Economic Forum 
and Harvard-CID 2000). The implications for financing of innovation are 
quite obvious.
6.3 - BANKS AND THE FINANCING OF TECHNOLOGY AND 
INNOVATION
In the rest of this section, a series of qualitative and quantitative data 
collected during field research is presented to suggest how the above­
subordinated debt instruments issued by commercial banks to alleviate the 
effects of the 1995 financial crisis.
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mentioned events affected the way in which innovating firms obtain 
financial resources for their projects. The views of the three main 
players -  firms, government and banks -  will be seen to reflect the 
attitude that commercial banks have towards financing technology 
projects.
President Salinas referred to Mexican banks as 'thrown to the ground'12 
and when discussing the subject was unsurprised to hear of the 
passivity of banks in the financing of technology, because, as he said, 
they are 'being passive in giving credit in general to firms'.13 Although it 
can be agreed that the privatisation of the Mexican banking system was 
designed to bring positive results, it needed to be complemented with a 
general structural transformation oriented to improve efficiency and 
productivity. The financial sector reforms had to be consistent with the 
general structural trend of the economy (Barnes 1992, 1-21).
On this topic, one interviewed businessman said: '...the last good 
experience I had with a bank, Banamex, was before the nationalisation, 
when bankers were real bankers...during the period of nationalised 
banks things were bad, but now after the reprivatisation they got 
worse, and there is absolutely no support for technology development 
in the country...'. 14 And when a Nafin manager talked about his 
experience with the newly reprivatised banks, he recalled '...they 
wanted to reduce their costs and would not consider technology 
projects even if they were relatively few in their overall portfolio...they 
don't consider the fact that these kind of projects can be good 






During a workshop organised by the OECD, aimed at identifying those 
obstacles to amalgamating technology and finance, the participants 
agreed that those obstacles were (OECD 1982, 118-126):
a) Assessment of projects:
Most banks and many other institutional investors do not understand 
innovation because they do not have staff able to evaluate technical 
risk. Moreover there is a fundamental issue of objectivity and filtering. 
Who is a qualified and legitimate expert to judge the innovative project 
rigorously? Nobody; ultimately the market is the judge. Thus, in order 
to get to the market, the project needs to be developed.
The problem in Mexico is that banks rarely understand that a 
technology development is unique and implies long-term investment, 
different to normal credit where banks recuperate in a short period and 
have guarantees.16 This is a vicious cycle: small innovation firms 
generally do not have guarantees, and without guarantees and a totally 
defined commercialisation plan, private banks and even development 
banks will not authorise credit. Credit evaluators often lack 
understanding of what technology means and are reluctant to take 
risks, being concerned with the provision of guarantees.17 A credit 
applicant at Bancomer stated: 'they didn't even understand what we 
were talking about, they couldn't evaluate a project like ours...'.18
b) Mutual understanding and confidence:
Many SMEs do not understand the needs and requirements of bankers. 
Essentially they are very difficult clients requiring much time and 
attention from bankers in relation to the volume of business they
16 The term 'guarantee' refers to the surety or collateral needed to obtain a 
loan.
17 Interviews #1, 4, 12, 13, 18, 22 and 23.
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provide. Moreover, innovators have a tendency to be secretive about 
the technical characteristics of their projects.
Mexican bank executives agree that currently their internal operation 
costs are high and therefore they seek a good margin when giving 
credit. Thus, due to the greater administration costs related to the 
nature of technology credits presented by SMEs, they do not match 
their client profile.19 One of the interviewed executives said: 'if  they 
apply for credit to finance technology development, they are out of the 
question...we just can't take them../.20
The situation in Mexico is worrying when, on the other side of the 
confidence and understanding problem, businessmen perceive banks as 
not being open to technology projects. Moreover, they find the available 
banks' credit lines to be designed for products already in the market.21 
An entrepreneur responded: '...the mere thought of getting bank credit 
for technology projects terrifies me...'.22
The problem of confidence might be interpreted as a communication 
gap between the SMEs and the banks. The scenario does not look very 
promising when the Executive Director of FUNTEC23 perceives that the 
positions of bankers and entrepreneurs 'have been divorcing more and 
more...they don't trust each other...the distance between them is bigger 
and bigger...the chances of reconciliation or linkage are less and less as 
time goes by...'.24 This gap can only be closed by daily mutual 
involvement (OECD 1982).
18 Interview #1
19 Interviews #22, 23, 24 and 25.
20 Interview #23
21 Interviews #2  ,5, 7, and 9.
22 Interview #9
23 FUNTEC is the Mexican Foundation for Innovation and Technology Transfer in 
Small and Medium-sized Firms, (Fundacion Mexicana para la Innovacion y 




c) Lack of comprehensive local services:
There is a great need for local services to bridge the gap between 
investors and innovators, helping both to prepare the basis for 
assessments and to build confidence. Chambers of commerce are 
usually not aware enough of their potential role and only a few have 
built up adequate technological activity.25 Regional agencies are either 
overloaded or underutilised because there is insufficient personal 
involvement and contact with entrepreneurs.
The main agent of this analysis of the financial system is the banking 
system which, under normal circumstances, channels funds to industry 
through operations in various financial markets (Sally 1995). Therefore, 
if the financial system in which it operates is ineffective, a new element 
of market failure in the process of financing innovation is present. Could 
it be argued that this is the case in Mexico? Certainly the levels of 
operation are low: in the first six months of 1998, Bancomer had not 
requested a single guarantee of Nafin's scheme for technology projects. 
Banamex had requested four guarantees to Nafin, though not under the 
technology programme.26
When asked about the way they perceive banks' attitude towards 
technology projects,27 none of the micro-sized firms surveyed 
responded that they had a 'positive attitude'. Only one firm in the whole 
survey considered it as positive. As it can be observed in Figure 6.A, 
most of the respondents favoured the 'negative' and 'bad' attitude 
responses.
25 This topic has been discussed previously and more fully in Chapter 5.
26 Interviews #  22 and 23.
27 Author's Survey: Question #42.
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Figure 6.A Respondents' answers to the question: How do you perceive
the financial institutions' attitude towards technology projects?
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In 1984, Araoz argued that in Mexico, industrial financing is given on 
the basis of the expected investment returns from the firms. Large 
firms absorb most of the internal available credit and the financial 
sector has not operated according to industrial sector priorities (Araoz 
1984, 1182-1189). Although more than 15 years have gone by since 
this was written, and major events have developed, the situation has 
not changed much for SMEs. Currently large banks only lend to large 
companies and, since the reprivatisation, many owners of large firms 
are also owners of the banks. These owners, therefore, can self-finance 
their businesses using the savings deposited in the banks.28
According to Araoz, it would not be fair to blame the situation fully on 
the banks. The problem they face is not a matter of principle but rather 
a technical issue. Even if they would like to consider externalities, long-
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term effects, technological development etc., they would still have 
problems in quantifying these aspects and introducing them to their 
evaluation methods. For instance, a credit executive at Bancomer 
recalled: '...I have seen a case of a project that can give 5 to 1 
guarantees because the family is well off, and nevertheless, because of 
the fact that it involves an innovation, we have been evaluating it for 
ten months already with no answer yet../.29
Risk may influence the conservative behaviour of banks. Risk aversion 
and security attitudes limit solutions to the problem at every stage of a 
project, mainly at the pre-investment phase. Maybe now is the time for 
smaller, more aggressive private banks to start changing their attitude 
towards technology financing. A good signal may be that in the first six 
months of 1998, one of these smaller banks had requested almost 900 
guarantees from Nafin.30
The main players, both private banks and the public sector in its role as 
investor, have not yet understood that in order to learn they have to 
take risks, and that taking risks is fundamental for the generation of 
technical knowledge. And again, the perception of risk from the point of 
view of the banks may be significantly different than that of the 
developers of the project, who believe in its results,31 as can be 
observed in Figure 6.B.
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, uncertainty and profit 
vs. risk sharing assessments can be an obstacle to innovation projects if 
financial institutions are risk-averse (Christensen 1992). Moreover, if 
Mexico ranks 50th out of 59 in respect to entrepreneurs with innovative
28 Interviews #3, 4, 5.
29 Interview #23.
30 In his statement, this executive of a small bank was referring to small and 
medium-sized firms' credits in general, and not specifically to technology 
credits (Interview #24).
31 Author's Survey: Question #25.
225
but risky projects being able to find venture capital32, then a venture 
capital market has to be fostered in parallel to the traditional financial 
system. At the moment, '...if you can't give guarantees to a bank you 
can't access a credit for technology innovation...';33 and there are 
indeed '...some venture capital structures but they have several 
barriers...',34. However, a solution does not lie 'in the creation of little 
schemes of technology financing, the true solution is the creation of a 
real venture capital mechanism to finance risk...it should operate in the 
same way as they do in countries with high innovation activities, but we 
are still far away from achieving that../.35. As these entrepreneurs have 
clearly stated, further work needs to be done in this area.
Figure 6.B Respondents' answers to the question: How risky is your 
firm's technology project?





32 As stated in the Global Competitiveness Report 2000 (World Economic 
Forum and Harvard-CID 2000).




Moreover, the time horizon in financing investments is perhaps more 
important than interest rates to innovation projects. The duration 
required to develop the project is highly uncertain, as is the 
introduction to the market. If lenders are expecting a return in the 
short-term, this may pose problems for innovation. The experience in 
Mexico has been that current schemes of technology credits are 
calendarised as any other regular credit from the beginning, without 
consideration of the different stages of development. Private and 
development banks do not take into account the fact that technology 
projects do not necessarily have a concluding date, that due to their 
own nature delays can occur, technical obstacles may have to be 
solved, or that new discoveries can even shift the direction of a project. 
Therefore it is important that banks are ready to react timely to 
restructure the credits.36 Otherwise, the consequence for technology 
financing is a pressure on projects to show results in a period of time 
that may be impossible for innovation. Indeed firms need to employ 
different payback periods depending on the expectations of the 
development of competing technologies and the cost of capital.
The risky nature of a firm's R&D and the heavy initial investment before 
the project pays any returns both create difficulties in assessing the 
potential of an R&D project and obtaining finance. This section has 
stated this problem from the point of view of the supply of finance: the 
commercial banking system. The following section will deal with such 
issues from the side of the demand for funds: innovating SMEs.
6.4 -  FIRMS: THE DEMAND FOR FINANCING TECHNOLOGY AND 
INNOVATION
Schumpeter was one of the first authors to discuss the importance of 
credit in the process of innovation. According to him, the entrepreneur
36 Interviews #2, 5, 7 and 18.
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is the driving force in the process of innovation, but he must be able to 
convince the banks to provide him with credit to finance the innovation 
(Schumpeter 1934). The simplest way to approach this relationship is 
from the point of view that any good business project, implying some 
kind of commercially viable innovation, will eventually convince 
someone to lend the money to develop it. But as discussed in the 
previous section, things can be more complex than that when the 
financial system is in crisis, risk aversion prevails and confidence and 
communication between banks and firms is lacking.
This appreciation becomes even more critical when talking about 
financing newly established, innovative SMEs in early technology 
development projects. According to the OECD (1995), innovations 
applying cutting-edge technologies may not always be the prime victims 
of financial market malfunction. They can access instruments designed 
especially for such projects, or can be the first to benefit from the 
fallout from public science and technology investment. The kind of 
innovation most likely to suffer from under-financing is that with a 
medium-high technology content. Such innovations combine three 
drawbacks: they are too risky for banks, promise returns that are too 
slim for venture backers, and are too dull to attract government aid.
Early stages of project life cycle
The sources of finance which are available to a firm depend to a large 
extent on the stage of development of the organisation. At the 'seed' or 
idea stage, in which financing is needed for research and product 
development, risk finance is typically provided by the founders and their 
friends or relations (Goodacre and Tonks 1995, 322-328). The 
experience of interviewed entrepreneurs confirms this:
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'...in the beginning of the project, when we developed the prototype of 
our idea, we used our own personal resources and a personal credit line 
from the bank...';37
'...for the initial research I had no external funds, I used my savings, 
nobody believed in the project then but me...with the first successful 
results I started the second phase and established the micro-firm. It 
was not until then that I managed to get external credit...'.38
To continue with Goodacre and Tonks' (1995) argument, it can be said 
that loan capital may also be available from banks, but will usually 
require significant personal collateral39 and will often bear comparatively 
high interest charges -  as was thoroughly discussed in the previous 
section and is here supported by the following complementary 
statements from an entrepreneur and a bank executive:
'...as a small firm in Mexico you need guarantees from 3 or 4 to 1 with 
real estate properties to back up a technology research project...'.40
'...the majority of the projects applying for credit are good technology 
projects. The problem is when you ask the entrepreneur to mortgage 
his house to guarantee the credit, it is very unlikely that he will risk his 
family's patrimony, we are talking of small new firms with hardly any 
other guarantees...'.41
At the early stage of development, the technological feasibility of an 
innovation is questionable, and the market feasibility is often unknown. 
The unusually high risk associated with this situation, and the unproven 
capabilities of the entrepreneur to manage such a project make seed-
37 Interview #2
38 Interview #8.
39 For a more detailed discussion on the role of collateral in determining 
productive investment in Mexico since 1989 see IMF (1999).
40 Interview #4.
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stage investment an unattractive proposition for many providers of 
capital. This has resulted in what has been described as a 'finance gap' 
for small firms (Goodacre and Tonks 1995, 322-328). In Mexico's case, 
and particularly with such small firms, we find that they consider 
themselves weak and limited in financial and managerial aspects.42
According to the OECD (1982, 118-126), the finance or venture capital 
gap in the R&D phase has important consequences such as:
• Significant projects cannot be properly developed to the point where 
they can attract interest from possible lenders; so there are likely to 
be a large number of 'high potential' projects stopped in their 
embryonic phase.
• Small firms tend to move to innovations with shorter time periods 
between ideas and production, just as bankers have moved from 
more risky to less risky ventures; this can easily relate to Mexico's 
situation as discussed in the previous section.
• Firms encountering problems in obtaining funds before they can 
demonstrate a market-ready prototype tend to neglect important 
market research, which in turn leads to sales/distribution and cash 
flow difficulties once production begins;
• The innovator is led to assemble a package of money, which can be 
a multiple-form venture capital. It  may be equity, long-term debt 
and short-term loans, overdrafts, business establishment funds, 
funds convertible into equity, innovation project grants, even trade 
credits and similar money. This subjective and rather vague concept 
of venture capital contrasts with the bankers' more specific concept.
The innovator frequently does not distinguish fixed capital from 
working capital, and ignores the simple relationships between equity 
and debt which can lead to over-borrowing and inherently unstable 
financial structures.
41 Interview #25.
42 Interviews #2, 3 and 8.
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Firms' characteristics: Newly vs. long-established and small vs. 
large
Another important aspect in the study of firms seeking funds for 
technology projects is the length of time they have been established. 
Experience shows that new technologies are often promoted by new 
firms, which face technical and marketing problems and cost more to 
finance than conventional start-ups as the financing risk is thought to 
be higher (OECD 1982). Figure 6.C shows how long surveyed firms 
have been established.43 All surveyed firms attempted to obtain 
financial support for a technology project. It  is interesting to observe 
that more than half of them were established between 1989 and 1995. 
The recent creation of a high percentage of firms applying for funding 
can be an example of the relation between new firms being established 
to develop a technology project at the time.44
The suggestion that entrepreneurs find it very difficult to obtain small 
amounts of capital, whether to initiate a new business or to expand a 
young one, was made as early as 1931 by the Macmillan Committee in 
London (Macmillan Committee 1931). Similar arguments in the US with 
particular reference to technological innovation are reviewed in Bean, 
Schiffel, and Mogee (1975).
43 Author's Survey: General Information Question. Firms were asked the year 
in which they were established, and the responses were grouped by 
presidential terms.
44 The periods are divided into presidential terms for the convenience of 
analysis of a series of variables of the model. The main argument for this 
section is the correlation between the long vs. short establishment of firms and 
their will to develop technology.
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Figure 6.C. Presidential periods (post-1970) during which surveyed 
firms were established.















For brand new firms undertaking R&D, the future cash flows are highly 
uncertain. A new firm would not want to issue debt to finance this 
investment since there is a strong chance that early in the life of the 
debt package the profits generated by the R&D project will be 
insufficient to cover the interest payments, forcing the firm into 
liquidation (Long and Malitz 1985). When talking about such issues, a 
technologist involved in an agro-industrial project in the south of Mexico 
said:
'...as innovators turned entrepreneurs we have an ignorance problem in 
financial matters...we can easily get involved with a credit that is not 
suited for an innovation project and eventually be bound to bust../.45
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Similarly, potential debt holders may be unwilling to purchase a new 
firm's debt since they realise the inherent risk and perhaps more 
importantly are unable to secure their loan against any fixed assets, 
since by its nature some R&D investment will have a low resale value. 
This would explain why most of the empirical evidence for this study 
shows that banks request up to four to one guarantees in order to 
finance a technology project. These arguments suggest that new firms 
are unlikely to finance their R&D investment by issuing debt, rather 
they are more likely to use equity or venture capital as a source of 
finance (Goodacre and Tonks 1995, 319-321). Unfortunately, as has 
been seen throughout the chapter, venture capital is still in a premature 
phase in Mexico.
When analysing Latin American firms, Nolff determined a series of 
obstacles they have to face regarding competitiveness, technological 
innovation, and external collaboration (Nolff C. 1974, 175-181). To him, 
some of the main obstacles are the difficult access to financial sources, 
lack of capital markets and backwardness of the banking system. A 
more recent study carried out at UNAM amongst 100 innovating 
Mexican firms asked them to identify and prioritise the main obstacles 
encountered in the process of innovation. They replied as follows.
For micro and small firms, the main problems are specific to the 
project, but the obstacles to obtaining financial resources and 
investment capital run a close second. They also list the high risks of 
getting credit, the bureaucratic and long procedures, lack of fiscal 
incentives, and high taxes, which directly or indirectly refer to financial 
issues of the project.
Medium-sized firms find investment capital the main obstacle for 
innovation, and secondly the knowledge about technology. The latter is
45 Interview #8.
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the first problem mentioned by large firms. It can therefore be assumed 
that the larger the firm, the more important the problems related with 
technology knowledge become. On the other hand, the larger the firm, 
the less of a problem to obtain financial assistance to develop 
technology (Corona T. 1997, 47-56). In the words of an interviewed 
small-size firm owner:
'...large firms can access foreign credits that are cheaper than domestic 
ones or they can even have access to venture capital, they are listed in 
the stock exchange. None of that applies to medium or smaller 
firms../.46
Similar tendencies were found in the Author's Survey. Figure 6.D shows 
that micro, small and medium-sized firms consider it most important to 
have internal financial strength,47 as they encounter severe constraints 
to access external funding.
Once a firm has worked through the R&D stage and can demonstrate, 
within a more formal business plan, the potential to generate large 
returns, venture capital financing becomes a possibility. Venture 
capitalists have traditionally been willing to accept a reasonably high 
level of risk in the expectation of a commensurately high return. 
However, even if there was a real venture market in Mexico, recent 
trends in the provision of venture capital (in the UK and the US) seem 
to suggest a change of attitude. Less finance has been available for 
early stage companies with more for later stage companies. The 
attraction of such investments is fairly obvious. They offer prospects of 
an earlier return, and often less risk both in terms of the market for the 
product and the already part-proven ability of the management team. 
There is a concern within the industry that short-termism is emerging 
via pressures on institutional fund managers to maximise immediate
46 Interview #5.
47 Author's Survey: Question #7
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performance; this conflicts with the long-term outlook required of 
venture capitalists (Pratt 1990).
Figure 6.D. Respondents' answers to the question: Is an internal 
financial strength essential for a firm's technological capacity?
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Another market failure in the financing of the development of small, 
technology based firms is alleged to occur at the commercialisation and 
post-commercialisation stages of project development. Here, a small, 
high-tech firm has developed a new product or process and needs 
substantial capital to 'scale up' for production and market penetration. 
This stage is typically much more capital intensive than the R&D stage 
and consequently requires substantially larger amounts of financing 
(Tassey 1997, 195-197).48
48 According to their own experiences, interviewed entrepreneurs agreed with 
this discussion (Interviews #2, 5 and 8). One of them elaborated: '...for the 
commercial stage we've had to use whatever self-funding we can manage, and 
it has become a very slow process therefore...nevertheless, when I started to 
sell my new products I had quite a good market response, and even with the 
crisis and the devaluation I was going to be able to pay my previous credit. I t  
was the credit institution that didn't respect the initial payments calendar and 
claimed back the loan earlier than in itially agreed...' (Interview #8).
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I f  a market failure were proven to exist here, government programmes 
providing equity financing would be a continuing option. However, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter, debt financing would also be an 
option in this situation for three reasons:
a) technical risk has been greatly reduced and commercial risk has at 
least been lowered; thus overall risk is low enough for lenders to 
rationalise loans with their relatively constrained rates of return;
b) small firms can handle debt financing at this point because they 
are beginning or are about to begin to generate a cash flow;
c) entrepreneurs who own small firms do not want to give up any 
more of their firm's ownership (equity) than they have already 
yielded to venture capitalists during equity financing in the R&D 
stage.
So far, the cases presented have centred on firms with projects at early 
and later stages and newly-established firms. There is, however, one 
more variant: the long-established firm. Their situation is somewhat 
different since they can cross-finance their activities; for example, a 
firm that has diversified into a stable industry with a regular profit 
stream could use these profits to pay the interest payments on debt 
raised to finance R&D in another subsidiary. An existing firm could also 
use existing assets as security against loans raised. We might therefore 
expect that large diversified firms are as likely to use debt as equity to 
finance R&D, whereas smaller undiversified firms are more likely to 
finance R&D by issuing equity (Goodacre and Tonks 1995, 319-321).
Summing up, the financial burden of research is often the most 
important obstacle to innovation, particularly in the case of smaller 
firms, and also for projects which require a good deal of development 
work. Thus, the case for government participation in the financing of 
firms' R&D activities cases can be justified (Freeman, Poignant, and 
Svennilson 1963). The next chapter is concerned with the specific
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instruments which Mexican public institutions have used to directly 
finance R&D activities in private firms.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has presented the theoretical concepts of a National 
System for Financing Innovation, arguing that, in spite of globalisation 
trends, there are crucial local characteristics in financial systems to take 
into account because they affect national firms' R&D decisions. 
Following this, the dynamics and consequences of the interrelations 
within Mexico of two of the system's main players -  banks and firms -  
have been analysed.
It has been found that a financial system does make a difference when 
comparing possibilities for financing innovations. The financial obstacles 
in the way of innovation are potentially greater for SMEs than for large 
corporations. This appreciation becomes even more critical when talking 
about financing newly-established, innovative SMEs in early technology 
development projects. Such innovation can be inhibited by banks and 
their short-termist attitude, amongst other things.
At the beginning of the chapter it was questioned whether the failure of 
an innovative project to find funding is in itself an indication of a failure 
of the financial system. The empirical evidence presented for the 
Mexican case shows that the problem lies on both sides:
On the demand side, innovating firms, mainly small and newly 
established ones:
• are not always able to formulate their project in a sound business 
plan for the banks
• do not have the collateral or guarantees required by commercial 
banks
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• are not ready to share information, thus Imiting their options to use
the appropriate financial channels.
On the supply side, the financial institutions:
• have not yet developed a set of competing financial channels, 
appropriate to technology projects
• do not have the capacity to fully assess the projects, which are
usually technologically complex and involving a high share of
intangible investment
• require appropriate exit facilities, to meet their liquidity
requirements, thus affecting the natural calendar of projects of this 
nature.
It  is rather a matter of understanding how, and at what price, two 
approaches can be reconciled: maximisation of the financial return on 
invested capital and the creation of wealth through innovation. In 
reality, these worlds cannot move apart since they are structurally 
interconnected. The reasons for any clash must be found within the web 
of interconnections itself. One way to provide confidence is by repetitive 
contracts between a borrower and a lender, accumulating knowledge 
through interactive learning. Credit rationing could be reduced through 
closer relationships between them. Thus, it must be remembered that 
for each successful R&D project there may be several unsuccessful 
ones.
Perhaps the current situation in Mexico is a temporary result of the 
rapid, drastic and quite traumatic changes that the banking system has 
undergone in less than two decades. The system has not been able to 
achieve the typical properties of market-oriented financial systems: 
flexibility, adaptability, functionalism and resilence.49 Furthermore, as it
49 As presented in Figure 6.A: Components, functions and properties of a 
financial system (Section 1).
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is still in the process of adjusting to the effects of the recent crisis, it is 
not possible yet to fit the Mexican system into one of the categories 
presented by either Christensen or Tylecote.50 Time may help calm the 
waters and bring the system to a level of stability which leads to more 
harmonious relations between the two worlds, that of finance and that 
of innovation.
The handicaps presented in this chapter affect enterprises that are 
required to respond in a competitive way in the face of globalisation, 
but are deprived of the financing facilities that globalisation provides. 
Therefore, as Gruben and Welch have argued, the favourable outlook 
for the recovering Mexican economy should bring with it an 
improvement of its financial sector, which is not yet competitive and 
efficient by developed country standards (Gruben and Welch 1996). The 
reprivatised banks have failed to lend more actively the resources 
needed for technology. Furthermore, recent events surrounding the 
rescue of Mexico's banking system can be discouraging. The increase in 
volume in the supply of venture capital is not enough in a country 
where such mechanisms are still in a very early stage. Further 
institutional development of venture capital mechanisms is needed and 
remains a long-term goal.
Different institutional setups of financial systems will support or limit 
the development of relations between the lender and the borrower. A 
culture must be fostered in which the relationship and communication 
between technologists and financiers can improve. This indicates that 
the connection between the development of the financial system and 
industrial and technical change has to be improved. One possible way to 
deal with this problem is to foster the development of more specialised 
financial institutions adequate to the needs of innovating firms. In the 
words of Colin Mayer:
50 See Section 1.
239
'The distinctive feature of successful financial systems is their close 
involvement in industry. A primary characteristic of a market-based 
system is an arm's length relation between investor and firm...The 
fundamental challenge that faces any institution or government that 
can affect the practice of finance is to encourage the emergence of 
closer relationships...(Mayer 1988, 1183)'.
The next chapter focuses on the role of the government in the financing 
of innovation and its bridging function between banks and firms through 
its programmes of direct project funding.
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Chapter 7
MEXICO'S GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES FOR DIRECT PROJECT 
FINANCING: A TECHNOLOGY POLICY CASE STUDY
'The possibility of market 
shortcomings on R&D financing, and 
the subsequent need for public funding 
have long been acknowledged 
...government intervention is so 
strongly and universally endorsed that 
it came through the wave of economic 
liberalism of the 1980s unscathed/
OECD, 1995
INTRODUCTION
This analysis of an individual policy case study aims to provide a clearer 
picture of the interaction between the various players within Mexico's 
technology system. This chapter brings together the roles of the 
system's participants in the light of the theoretical aspects, historical 
background, and Mexico's economic, political and social evolution 
previously presented in this thesis.
Chapter 6 developed a series of arguments regarding the interaction 
between firms and commercial banks in a national system of financing 
innovation. At various stages, the participation of a third, and equally 
important player was outlined. That third player is the government.
The events that have shaped Mexico's financial system in the last two 
decades (described in Chapter 6) have caused there to be a lack of 
effective schemes available for firms to fund technology projects. 
Private banks are in crisis and do not seem to be a reliable source for
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technology projects, at least in the short-term.1 The discussion of the 
justification of government intervention is of optimum relevance in a 
situation like this, when the market is not providing the necessary 
funding. Therefore, development banks and government agencies in 
Mexico can supply important instruments for long-term funding of 
technology investment projects, mainly of SMEs.
The policies of Mexico's government agencies featuring the most 
striking changes in the orientation of their programmes are those 
related to direct financial support, mainly in Conacyt. Although some 
important adjustments are also clear in those policies regarding the 
building up of R&D infrastructure, information and linkage between the 
academic and private sectors, this part of the thesis concentrates on 
the specific case of direct project financing.
Not much has been written about these specific programmes in Mexico. 
This chapter reconstructs the events surrounding the design and 
implementation of this particular set of policy tools, based primarily on 
the information given by participants' experiences when interviewed 
and surveyed by the author. Conacyt's financing instruments are the 
core of the chapter, but some other institutions' programmes are also 
reviewed.
This specific policy tool is a significant case study not only for its 
intrinsic importance. I t  is a comprehensive example that reflects 
Mexico's recent history in the light of macroeconomic policy changes: it 
involves different government institutions and policy outcomes; it 
involves private firms as the users of the policies and programmes; it 
involves the financial institutions as intermediaries. Moreover, it 
generates positive and negative experiences in the country's ability to 
develop indigenous technology.
1 See Chapter 6.
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Section 1 introduces the general concepts related to the role of 
government in financing innovation, both directly and indirectly. Section 
2 presents two programmes: the National Trust for Industrial 
Equipment, FONEI - from the Central Bank, BdeM (Banco de Mexico) 
and the Technology Development Programme of the National 
Development Bank, Nafin (Nacional Financiera). Both played a role in 
the funding of technology projects over different periods in recent 
decades. Section 3 analyses the three stages of Conacyt's evolution of 
its financial programmes. The Shared Risk scheme, RCM (Riesgo 
Compartido Multimodal) is the focus of this section as it was the first 
real attempt to offer funding to private firms for technology projects. 
The rest of the programmes are presented as a context of the policy 
directions of each stage. Section 4 is dedicated to the financial 
programme designed by Conacyt at the time of Mexico's fundamental 
changes in opening and deregulating its economy and markets. The 
Research and Development fund for Technological Modernisation 
(FIDETEC) is a credit programme mainly oriented to the support of 
SMEs. The internal and external influences for the performance of this 
instrument are analysed. Section 5 presents the experiences and views 
of the users of the programmes -  banks and firms -  and shows the 
positive and negative effects of the instruments discussed in the 
previous sections.
7.1 -  THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Governments in general play the role of regulator of financial systems 
(Sally 1995). According to the definitions that Dodgson and Bessant use 
in their work on the new approach to effective innovation policy, a 
series of public policies exist for innovation support, ranging from 
financial support -  both direct (grants, subsidies, loans, etc.) and 
indirect (venture capital) -  to the existence of scientific and technical 
infrastructure (Dodgson and Bessant 1996). Moreover, government 
intervention can take other forms such as tax policy, subsidies,
243
monetary policy and control of interest rates, as well as allocation of 
funds differentially to sectors and firms. An interventionist versus a 
liberal mode of economic environment will inevitably lead to a different 
setup of financial systems (Rybzinsky 1984). This chapter concentrates 
mainly on the way in which government acts as regulator of the 
system, and on its direct funding programmes for private innovation 
projects.
The innovation process includes a number of factors unknown even to 
the industrialist involved -  not the sort of risk that the financial market 
knows how to assess.2 Under-investment would be the inevitable 
consequence if the government did not intervene in the areas of 
greatest uncertainty. Those areas are upstream in the innovation 
process, and basic and pre-competitive research (OECD 1995, 56-62). 
The problem remains in setting the parameters to distinguish the 
borders between pre-competitive and competitive stages3, and the 
institutionalised ways to determine the stages for specific projects.
The linear model of innovation (basic research, experimental 
development, commercialisation) is embedded in government notions 
about its role In supporting technology finance. This linear model is 
usually linked to the classical justification for government intervention, 
in terms of market failure (Freeman, Poignant, and Svennilson 1963). 
Governments therefore have a 'green light' to support pre-competitive 
R&D but this light turns to amber and red as one moves downstream in 
the innovation process (OECD 1995, 101-103).
Governments have the potential to explore new, promising 
technological trajectories without the same dramatic financial 
consequences faced by the private firm or investor, who may be using a 
large share of their capital on a project which eventually fails. Many 
projects are too risky for an individual, but in government funding the
2 See Chapter 6.
3 See Chapter 2.
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risk is spread. This is one reason why government programmes often 
target innovation projects in the early stages, where failure rates are 
high (Christensen 1992,152).
Government R&D spending in industry can affect the supply of industrial 
innovation through three channels (Mowery 1995, 524-525):
1. Complementing private R&D spending, increasing total industrially- 
directed R&D investment
2. Serving as a catalyst for inter-firm collaboration, thereby (possibly) 
increasing the efficiency of private and public R&D investments 
under the management of industry
3. Targeting specific technologies for support under industrial 
management.
According to Budworth, government financial support for innovation can 
take two forms (Budworth 1996, 165-168):
• Direct support. The justification for support schemes is the concern 
of economists that the amount of R&D performed will be sub-optimal 
from the national point of view if its financing is left entirely to the 
private sector.4
• Indirect support. R&D expenditure has been a popular object of 
favourable tax treatment, and several countries have introduced 
permanent or temporary schemes to encourage an increase in such 
spending. The argument for giving favourable tax treatment to R&D 
is that companies cannot afford to spend as much as they would like 
to, or should do, in the interests of the national economy, given the 
other pressures on them. The credits are usually offset against tax, 
but in some schemes are directly refundable, amounting in effect to
4 The corresponding danger that government support might lead to wasteful 
expenditure has been less well appreciated, although some cases, such as 
Concorde, brought it to light (Budworth 1996, 165-168).
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a subsidy (Freeman, Poignant, and Svennilson 1963). Some 
countries are introducing new schemes and others are abandoning 
or modifying them as there have been instances of abuse.
The nature of the policy instrument required is very different in each 
case. Tax policies are more effective for addressing general 
underinvestment in R&D, while direct funding mechanisms are more 
efficient for specific market failures affecting a particular phase of R&D 
or a specific category of technology. In either case, once the general 
policy response is selected, based on initial market failure identification, 
considerably more analysis is required to design and implement a 
specific mechanism that targets the market failure without including 
investment in areas not affected by the barrier (Tassey 1997, 107- 
130).
In many developing countries, only 'official' banks give long-term 
financing for investment projects. Development banks have become a 
very important instrument for economic growth, and they constitute the 
main, if not the only, source of long-term funding in this type of 
countries (Araoz 1984, 1182-1189). Kim discusses the extensive use in 
South Korea of low-interest debt to finance corporate R&D 
expenditures, and notes that in 1987 more than 94% of industrially- 
funded R&D was derived from low-interest R&D loans from state- 
controlled banks and other sources of public funds (Kim 1993).
Governments that rely on broader tax incentives and subsidies to 
support private R&D investment have little or no stipulation as to the 
technologies to which the investment should be directed (Bell 1988). 
Such policies also relieve public policy-makers of a need to make 
decisions on technologies or markets. Some of these policies do not 
appear in budget documents as outlays of public funds, and therefore 
may be preferred because of their lower political visibility. The role of 
fiscal measures in policies to support technology development has not
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yet been fully analysed. All OECD member countries allow fiscal 
deductions for current R&D expenditure, although the treatment varies 
greatly from country to country (OECD 1995). The acknowledgment of 
the crucial problems encountered in financing the R&D phase has led to 
the development of government aids to SMEs and small inventors. This 
move has been witnessed in all the OECD countries, including those like 
the United States or Switzerland that have been traditionally reluctant 
to develop direct aids (OECD 1982).
Another type of R&D subsidy, used by a number of European 
governments, provides grants to firms for R&D in selected areas. Many 
of these grants are directed at small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Little is known about the effectiveness of these programmes, although 
Vickery's survey provides a favourable summary verdict, implying that 
the grants did not substitute for expenditure by firms of their own funds 
and that they did extend and alter the R&D agenda of these firms 
(Vickery 1988). The economic justification for such subsidies must be 
based on the uncertainties and limited information faced by innovators, 
as well as imperfections in the capital markets available to small firms. 
I f  a new technology is characterised by important externalities, 
subsidies may be justified (Katz and Shapiro 1986).
Despite all the benefits that government intervention may bring, there 
are some drawbacks. Some general points of consensus on the scope of 
instruments used to support innovation (OECD 1982, 118-126) are as 
follows:
• Government support measures can be too centralised and overall 
awareness of government programmes is often low. There is a 
crucial lack of information at local level for all those involved in 
innovation financing, thus increasing the difficulty and time required 
to generate an acceptable project and business plan.
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• Informative promotional material tends to be too lengthy and 
complex, and is often written in official language that is not clear for 
SMEs.
• Most public support measures involve bureaucracy and, however 
qualified, this has inherent deficiencies: the filtering of ideas in 
passing approval stages; the delays in decision-making, especially 
critical for technological projects; and the risk aversion of the 
administrators, who tend to give support to projects proposed by 
larger and long-established firms.
• There has been a tendency towards 50-50 funding. This means that 
although the government may fund up to 50% of a project, the 
innovator still has to find the remaining 50% of required funds from 
private sources.
• Information diffusion on sources/funds takes time, even in small 
countries. I t  can take three to four years before a new programme 
or a new agency gets into its stride.
I f  the case can be made for a financial market failure in early-stage 
funding, some governments may respond with loan subsidy 
programmes; but loans are not a viable mechanism for financing start­
up or early-stage firms for several reasons (Goodacre and Tonks 1995; 
Tassey 1997, 195-197):
• Debt is an inferior mechanism for funding high-risk research with 
long time horizons, because the potential rates of return on debt are 
too low to compensate for both high risk and substantial 
discounting, and the borrower must repay the loan although the 
project generates no cash flow for some time.
• The lack of information or inability to analyse available information 
seems to cause lenders to ration credit rather than increase risk 
premiums.
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• Debt has other onerous characteristics, such as making firms more 
susceptible to takeovers by increasing leverage of their financial 
structures. This is a particular concern for small firms.
Ironically, in recent years Mexico's government has mainly fostered 
loan schemes for early stage technology projects. Policy-makers are 
faced with important dilemmas regarding the public sector's role in 
financing innovation. The remaining sections of the chapter present 
some important results of Mexico's government programmes, so that 
the case of direct technology financing policy can be assessed.
7.2 -  BANCO DE MEXICO AND NAFIN
When assessing the government's efforts to directly finance technology 
projects, the focus has to be on the three institutions which have, since 
the 1970s, established the most important programmes. These are the 
National Council for Science and Technology (Conacyt), the Central 
Bank (BdeM), and the National Development Bank (Nafin). It can be 
argued that the most important institution is Conacyt as it is the Federal 
Government's arm for science and technology policy, although 
financially the other two have played an important role. This section 
deals with these two parallel institutions' programmes. Conacyt's 
schemes are analysed in Sections 7.3 and 7.4.
Banco de Mexico's FONEI
The World Bank's Industrial Recovery Loan (IRL) was the fifth in a 
series of loans to Mexico's National Trust Fund for Industrial Equipment, 
FONEI (Fondo Nacional para el Equipamiento Industrial) in the mid 
1980s. FONEI, established in 1971, was operated by BdeM. Its main 
objective was to help the long-term financial needs of large and 
medium-sized industrial enterprises (Nadal Egea 1977, 264-278). It is 
important to remember that at the time Mexico's economy remained
249
practically protected, with the commercial banks run by the public 
sector. This section looks at FONEI from the time of IRL because of the 
latter's new components to more aggressively support technology 
projects.
FONEI was the executing agency charged with allocating resources 
offered by both the Mexican Government and the World Bank. With 
FONEI resources, commercial banks could finance their clients' 
investments for industrial equipment (Marquez 1982, 74-77). In order 
to access FONEI's resources, the firms had to present a project that 
included one of the following investment components: feasibility 
studies, productivity improvement, pollution controls, or technology 
development (FONEI-Banco de Mexico 1987b).
The Technology Development subcomponent of FONEI could finance a 
full range of technology-related activities. The programme supported 
R&D, adaptation of production means, as well as the design, 
construction and testing of capital goods including prototypes and pilot 
plants (FONEI-Banco de Mexico 1987a). FONEI could give up to 80% of 
the total funds required by the project, and depending on the 
technological merit of the investment, a maximum of 30% of the 
budget could be in the form of a grant. Interest rates were 3 points 
lower than those of the average percentage of banks' capture costs, 
CPP (Costo Porcentual Promedio), and the loan could be repaid over 13 
years, with a three-year period of grace.
FONEI offered an additional scheme of guarantees to protect the 
commercial banks for up to 90% of the total credit. It  did not cover the 
total as it seemed important to involve the bank in the control of the 
credit by sharing some of the risk. Also, by giving them an interest in 
the projects, it was hoped the commercial banks would be less fearful 
of these kinds of industrial investments -  especially the technology- 
related ones -  so it was seen as 'an educational process for the
250
commercial banks'.5 In the case of technical failure FONEI could absorb 
70% of the total losses implied by the project.
According to the completion report of IRL, its task of contributing to 
financial market transformation and innovations was not achieved. The 
total cost of the 262 sub-projects approved under IRL amounted to the 
equivalent of US$307 million. 98% of the projects were presented by 
existing firms looking to expand, and 89% of the total credit went to 
large enterprises. The expected demand for such instruments by 
smaller enterprises and their banks never materialised (Nacional 
Financiera and World Bank 1992, 10). Results were modest but based 
on a sample of 41 sub-projects, it is estimated that about 10,000 new 
jobs were generated.
The programme was carried out in a rapidly changing economic 
environment. Thus, it is important to bear in mind the macroeconomic 
context and the transformation of the Mexican economy and its 
financial institutions at the time. The World Bank recognised that a 
deeper knowledge of the country's financial sector would have helped to 
formulate appropriate conditionality to provide more incentives for a 
better operation of the programme at the time (Nacional Financiera and 
World Bank 1992).
In the rapidly changing environment of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the consolidation of a number of trust funds in Mexico became a matter 
of discussion. As FONEI was a relatively small institution, the probability 
of it being absorbed by a larger entity was high, as was the probability 
that its programmes would be dismantled. By 1988, new economic 
policy brought a new financing policy, forcing the development banks to 
reorient themselves. Nafin had to integrate all of its trust funds in one, 
including the absorption of FONEI.6
5 Interview #  21.
6 Interview #18.
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In June 1989 FONEI was transferred to Nafin, and shortly thereafter it 
was fully absorbed into the bank's operations. The change in the role of 
FONEI, and related financial reforms that were taking place in the 
country7 led to uncertainty among the staff of the two agencies as well 
as their clients. This explains some of the difficulties in realising the 
innovative components of the scheme (Nacional Financiera and World 
Bank 1992).8
One of the most important assets that FONEI accumulated over its 
period of operation was the competence of its staff, who acquired high 
quality evaluation skills and supervision methods. After a continuous 
operation of 13 years, with only one Director and a close link with the 
banks, 'a group of evaluators who knew how to analyse a technology 
project was formed...[yet] it has been lost in time...and it is difficult to 
rebuild it under the new structures'.9 With the transfer to Nafin, a 
significant part of FONEI's human capital was lost (Nacional Financiera 
and World Bank 1992).
Some of the problems and effects of the transfer of FONEI to Nafin 
were highlighted by former FONEI executives, who currently work at 
Nafin.10 In summary they assess that:
• At the beginning efforts were duplicated and resources wasted. For 
instance, the computer systems used by the two agencies were 
incompatible.
• By converting it into a common credit scheme in 1990, much of 
FONEI's advantages, designed within a technology policy operating 
in synchrony with the macroeconomic environment before GATT,
7 See Chapter 6.
8 A Nafin executive described the situation as 'a 'terrible salad of approximately 
34 different funds' (Interview #18).
9 Interview #18.
10 Interviews #18 and 21.
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were lost. This included the benefits of the 30% grant component of 
the programme, and the failure costs assumption when projects 
were not successful.
• As a result of the transfer, FONEI became massive. Only the banks 
were clients, and FONEI favoured them instead of the firms it had 
been set up to help.
• Commercial banks tried to fit all kinds of credits into the new 
technology programme.
Nafin's Technology Development Programme
Since the 1920s, Mexico has maintained a system of publicly-owned 
development banks and trusts that focus specifically on specialised 
categories of finance in which market failure has been perceived. From 
the 1970s through the mid-1980s, the development banks' primary role 
was financing the government, public sector enterprises, and the large 
private sector corporations. The development banks' importance in the 
financial sector ebbed through most of the 1980s as the publicly-owned 
enterprises to which they lent were sold to the private sector. They 
regained importance in the 1990s, though the form of development 
bank lending shifted from direct loans (first-tier operations) to 
rediscounting paper from banks (second-tier operations). Flows of 
finance to the private sector from the development banks as a share of 
total flows in the banking system rose from 10% in 1989 to 30% in 
1993 and edged further upward to 30.4% in 1994 (Werner 1995). As of 
December 1996, the development banks and trust funds accounted for 
about a third of the total assets of the consolidated banking system and 
about a quarter of the total loans granted by the banking system 
(Gruben and Welch 1996, 63-75; IMF 1997, 15-20).
Nafin, Mexico's largest development bank, was created in 1934 and 
since then has engaged in a multitude of activities, ranging from equity 
investment in public and private enterprises to acting as fiduciary for
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the federal government. Nafin has adapted its role according to the 
prevailing economic and political environment of the country over the 
years (Ramirez 1986). This section deals mainly with Nafin in the 
context of the transition from a state-owned banking system to a re­
privatised one in the process of economic liberalisation.
After Nafin condensed its trust funds and assimilated those of other 
institutions (including FONEI) at the end of the 1980s, it was left with a 
set of six basic programmes including the Technology Development 
Programme. As will be seen later in this discussion, this latter 
programme became the counterpart of Conacyt in 1992. The important 
aspect here is to mention how Nafin's programmes currently operate in 
general terms.
Nafin's main clients are the banks. The current programmes for 
industrial modernisation are under the umbrella of the Single 
Programme for the Financing of Industrial Modernisation, PROMIN 
(Programa Unico de Financiamiento a la Modernization Industrial). 
According to its promotional leaflets, its resources can be aimed at six 
main areas of investment: modernisation, technology development, 
industrial infrastructure, environmental improvement, passive 
restructuring or capital participation.
Nafin has its own interest rate and firms get this plus the intermediation 
points that the commercial banks charge. Loans can be repaid over 
periods of up to 20 years. For the sub-programme of technology 
development, guarantees can be up to 80% for micro or small firms, 
but interest rates are the same. No extra incentives are given to 
entrepreneurs with high-risk projects.11
11 Everything is seen 'through the same lens...it can be the construction of a 
sophisticated industrial plant or the opening of a restaurant, it is all the sam e' 
(Interview #18).
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By 1993, the small grant formerly included in FONEI had disappeared, 
together with interest rates benefits, high coverage guarantees and risk 
sharing. All were deleted from the programme. An important reason for 
these policies was to facilitate Mexico's access to the OECD; the 
Ministry of Finance (SHCP), required from Nafin a series of documents 
to demonstrate that there were no internal or external subsidies of any 
kind.12
From the creation of the new programme until 1995 Nafin financed 
approximately 500 firms. Nevertheless, estimates for 1992 show that 
Nafin was able to provide financing to only 4% of the approximately 1.5 
million small and medium-sized businesses in Mexico, and that even to 
these, interest rates up to 22% were charged (Castanares Priego 
1992). The programme peaked between 1992 and 1994 (Johnson Ceva 
1998, 133-138), reflecting the general boom in Mexico of credit of all 
kinds. Nevertheless, just as in all other cases, the financial crisis of 
1995 brought it to a halt.
Since the crisis of 1995 and with the current state of the banking 
system in Mexico, very few new Nafin credits have been granted, not 
only for technology projects but for any of the rest of the sub- 
programmes. It seems as if Nafin has 'stopped being a development 
bank'.13 The situation does not seem to have a clear resolution since 
the SHCP is not open to discussion on alternative ways to provide funds 
to smaller firms with technology projects.14
On the other hand, commercial banks do not take Nafin's guarantees as 
real ones.15 Moreover, private banks' credit evaluators are not suitable 
technology project evaluators, as there are big differences between the
12 Interviews #18 and 21.
13 Interview #18.
14 Inteviews #18 and 21.
15 Interview #4.
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two.16 When talking about his experience as an evaluator for Nafin's 
projects, a scientist and entrepreneur points out that he was 'surprised 
by the viability of most of the technology projects evaluated...the 
problem is that Naifn's guarantees are not enough for the banks and 
small entrepreneurs have to give their houses as collateral...it is hard to 
risk their family patrimony'.17
The new design of Nafin's Technology Development Programme has 
made it more orthodox, less promotional, more bureaucratic, and more 
distanced from the final clients. I t  has so far fallen well short of its goal 
to have an increase of 20% of firms supported per year.18
Having now reviewed the programmes of BdeM and Nafin, it is time to 
shift attention to Conacyt and the evolution of its financial instruments 
since its creation in 1970.
7.3 -  THE EVOLUTION OF CONACYT'S FINANCIAL PROGRAMMES
Some of the most important efforts made by Concayt in the promotion 
of technology and innovation are concentrated in the financing of 
technological projects. Since its creation in 1970, Conacyt has featured 
an array of different programmes to finance technology projects: some 
in the form of grants and more recently in the form of credit. I t  could 
be said that there have been three stages in the evolution of the 
programmes, going from mere grant schemes to aggressive credit 
schemes (Conacyt 1978; Conacyt 1986; Conacyt 1989; Conacyt 1992; 
Conacyt 1993a; Conacyt 1993b; Conacyt 1994c; Conacyt 1994d; 
Conacyt 1996a; Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1984; SPP and Conacyt 1990). 
These three stages are analysed below.
16 Interviews #18, 21 and 23.
17 Interview #1.
18 Interviews #12, 18 and 21.
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First stage (1971 -  early 1980s)
This stage is characterised by a lack of awareness of the importance of 
the private sector in the process of technology development. The main 
effort was that of deciding which areas and sectors were to be 
considered industrially strategic (INIC 1970). This brought with it an 
isolation from industry's real needs and the projects were basically 
academic, with no real intention of linking them to the problems 
experienced by private firms. In this context, grants were the way of 
financing projects. It  was a very similar operation to the scientific and 
basic research programmes (Comite Asesor de las Naciones Unidas 
sobre la Aplicacion de la Ciencia y la Tecnologfa al Desarrollo 1973).
The first mechanism to assign funds to the technological area was 
through the Indicative Programmes of Science and Technology in 1971. 
These were sectoral tools to plan, promote and fund specific activities. 
They were meant to link scientific and technological actions with a 
strategy to solve national development problems, with a hierarchy set 
according to governmental macroeconomic goals (Conacyt 1978; Nadal 
Egea 1977). Funding could be used for training or infrastructure. Areas 
were determined by sectoral studies also financed by Conacyt.
It  was not until 1980 that technological projects were differentiated 
from the scientific ones (Marquez 1982).19 In 1984 the National 
Programme of Technology and Science Development (PRONDETYC) was 
designed, and it defined the priorities for support of technology 
development activities. Priorities were determined by an annual national 
convocation. So, based on the previous Indicative Programmes, the 
new Programme for Technology Projects was created. I t  gave grants to 
studies in the defined priority areas, with funding given to researchers
19 See Chapter 2 for the definition of the concepts of science and technology.
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in order to produce generic knowledge rather than to benefit individual 
firms.
The problem with this programme, just as with its predecesor, was the 
poor or non-existent link with the needs of firms. It continued to be an 
academic programme and recipients were concerned with building up 
their own R&D infrastructure rather than helping to improve industrial 
performance. The benefits of the scheme were concentrated in the 
improved equipment of the country's R&D centres. The programme 
ended together with PRONDETYC, but its limited results showed the 
need to design future linkage schemes with the private sector (Conacyt 
1996a).
Second stage (early 1980s -  1991)
The previous experiences made evident the need to consider the 
importance of bringing together R&D institutions and industry. 
Nevertheless, to include firms as subjects of public support meant 
resolving the dilemma of how and when subsidies were justified.
One way around this dilemma was to make the private companies 
jointly responsible for the projects. In 1979, Conacyt created the 
Shared Risk scheme (RCM)20 which was a basic kind of venture capital 
programme. Under RCM, Conacyt would invest 50% of the total cost of 
a project as a credit repayable when results were proven successful. I f  
technological objectives were not accomplished then it would be 
declared a technological failure and the debt written off. In such cases 
companies would lose the rights over the commercial use of the
20 RCM and FONEI were designed at the same time (end of 1978), 'when the 
Directors of the Central Bank and Conacyt were going to an international 
reunion in Vienna where they had to show how countries support technology 
efforts...so, in both institutions we took our pens and wrote the programmes' 
(Interview #18).
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research findings, with the property being transferred to Conacyt 
(Conacyt 1986; Conacyt 1989).
This first experience with the private sector had some positive 
technological outcomes. Certain important projects paid back their 
credits, including some related to optical material and fruit drying 
processes.21 But it also faced a few problems:
• Although it was the first formal attempt to support firms' projects, 
the experience of one user was that 'the rules were more oriented to 
researchers or inventors, rather than to entrepreneurs...they made
me restructure my application to make it look more like a laboratory
than a company'.22
• There was no proper project evaluation beforehand.
• Credit recovery activities were not strong enough to follow up on the
success or failure of projects. Once the programme was closed it
became even more difficult to recover the investments.23
• In legal terms, with a contract clause giving Conacyt the rights to 
the project results it is not surprising that companies declared failure 
even if it was not the case. This way they could avoid the obligation 
to repay the loan, and still benefit from the research.
• The follow-up and control were weak.24
RCM was the longest running programme of the Council, continuing 
until major policy shifts took place, and a new administration ended it in 
1991. The new Director of Conacyt at the time saw it as a scheme that
21 Interview #13.
22 Interview #6.
23 An entrepreneur recalls that they wanted to pay but 'Conacyt would not 
make any efforts to recover the loan...they charged us the first instalment, but 
with the change of administration it took until 1994 to come to an 
agreement...they said they had lost the files' (Interview #4).
24 According to users of RCM: 'There was no systemic control of projects in 
what was supposed to be a shared risk...as entrepreneurs we saw it more as 
lost money for Conacyt' (Interview #9). 'They never sent evaluators, never 
asked for reports' (Interview #4).
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did not actually share the risk and was mainly an 'assumed risk 
programme'.25 To him it was an instrument for indiscriminate subsidies 
paid by Conacyt, as it did not have any real tools to recover the credits. 
By not motivating entrepreneurs to conclude their projects, it was a 
way to 'give away free money', he concluded.
In 1990, the concept of a National System of Science and Technology 
was included for the first time under the framework of the National 
Programme for Scientific and Technology Modernisation - PRONACYMT 
(Nadal Egea 1995; SPP and Conacyt 1990). The system was meant to 
articulate under the same objectives all public agencies involved in the 
process of technology development, from the generation of knowledge 
to its incorporation into productive activities.
The Programme of Industrial Production Technology, TIPP (Tecnologia 
Industrial para la Produccion), was designed with the aim of 
coordinating technology development actions between government and 
the private sector. I t  was launched when Conacyt signed an agreement 
with the former Ministry of Budget and Planning (SPP), the 
Businessmen Coordinating Council (CCE), and the Confederation of 
Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN). The private counterparts were 
responsible for promoting the programme amongst their members.
TIPP operated by the constitution of a trust fund in which each 
participant would give -simultaneously and in cash -  a minimum of 500 
million pesos (1990 pesos). For each peso that a firm invested, the 
government (via Conacyt) would invest two pesos in the form of a 
grant: one of those two pesos should be used to solve specific problems 
of the company, and the other used in projects of generic use to the 
technology community. In practice, this second peso was never given
25 Interview #10.
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and in 1993 it was agreed that SPP would allocate that money directly 
to Conacyt's budget (Conacyt 1996a).
In 1991 the programme was no longer open to new participants, but 
ongoing projects kept operating until their conclusion in 1994. The 
minimum investment condition restricted the participation of small-sized 
firms, so TIPP mainly supported medium-sized and large firms with 
better financial situations and a more aggressive attitude towards 
innovation.
Third stage (1991 onwards)
This last group of programmes shows the shift from giving grants to 
giving credits. With a change of administration in Conacyt at the end of 
1991, and according to the new economic policies set by the Salinas 
administration, FIDETEC and FORCCYTEC were created. FIDETEC will be 
analysed in a more extensive way in the following section. For now, let 
us look at FORCCYTEC.
The presidential fund, called the Fund for the Strengthening of Firms' 
Scientific and Technological Capacities, FORCCYTEC (Fondo para el 
Fortalecimiento de las Capacidades Cientificas y Tecnologicas 
Estrategicas) was established to promote the creation of private R&D 
centres to serve specific industrial sectors. Unlike FIDETEC, this 
programme operates with softer financial conditions as the benefit goes 
to a group of firms rather than one firm. Credits are repayable in ten 
years with no interest (Conacyt 1994d). It seems a good deal. 
Nevertheless, demand for FORCCYTEC has never been high. I t  is 
difficult to start R&D centres from scratch and particularly so if there 
has to be a group of firms willing to coordinate the project. In 1995, 
public R&D centres and individual firms willing to open an R&D area 
expressed their will to be potential subjects of FORCCYTEC funding, but 
the rules were rigid and hard to change (Conacyt 1996a).
261
7.4 -  CONACYT'S FIDETEC: THE CREDIT PROGRAMME FOR SMEs' 
TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS
At the beginning of President Salinas' administration (1988-1994), a 
completely new culture arose regarding the financing of private sector 
activities with public funds. Grants were no longer justified unless a 
clear public benefit was involved: if there was a private and exclusive 
benefit, the specific private firm should pay for it. With this 'crowding 
out' attitude from the government, companies should become more 
proactive. As technology R&D activities are always risky, and as banks 
had just been reprivatised, credit from them was rarely available. A 
market failure was evident but, even if government intervention was 
justified, at this stage projects subject to support had to prove 
profitability. The new schemes were aimed towards recycling the funds 
when firms paid back (Chavero Gonzalez 1993, 107-114; Conacyt 
1993b). Conacyt joined forces with other institutions like Nafin and 
Secofi.
With the arrival in 1991 of Fausto Alzati as Director of Conacyt, grant 
schemes virtually disappeared and, with the resources liberated from 
the former programmes, FIDETEC was created under a joint 
programme with Nafin.
Alzati says that FIDETEC was created in recognition of the financing 
problem, and that it was aimed at eventually becoming a 'small 
technology bank'.26 Due to the initial budget limitations, he recalls that 
it had to be mainly focused on the early stages of technology 
development, from the idea to the prototype. The best way to 
incorporate a comprehensive support programme was to join up with 
Nafin's Technology Development Programme.27
26 Interview #10.
27 See Section 2.
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Through the joint programme with Nafin, FIDETEC would support the 
pre-commercial stages of a project, and then Nafin would scale it up to 
industrial production. FIDETEC would detect and support these kinds of 
projects with softer28 credit, and when they grew stronger Nafin would 
continue the support. Another new player, private banks, had to be 
involved in the operation of the fund, as deregulation of the financial 
market was taking place and public agencies should not disturb the 
market by operating directly with the clients/final users.
FIDETEC was also meant to give special attention to micro and small­
sized firms which by nature do not have the financial or technical 
capacities to engage in R&D. FIDETEC is a fully financial-oriented 
mechanism, giving credit similar to that of private banks: in fact, the 
credit scheme function is similar to that of Nafin giving credit via banks 
(using Nafin as its fiduciary).
Interest rates are either the CPP 29, Nafin's or UDIs 30 rates, plus some 
fixed points that the banks could charge to the credit holder. 
Guarantees could be complementary to those of Nafin so that micro and 
small firms with high technology merit projects could have 100% 
coverage. In cases of technological failure, FIDETEC can absorb part of 
the losses, being a risk partner with the entrepreneur, as it gives the 
guarantees in favour of the firms. FIDETEC, in comparison with former 
instruments, became a more transparent mechanism for the allocation 
of resources.31
Moreover, FIDETEC has a Technical Committee to approve all proposals 
applying for funds. Before the sessions, FIDETEC and Nafin personnel 
carry out financial and economic evaluations. The technical evaluations
28 For instance giving credit with preferential interest rates or long repayment 
periods.
29 CPP (Costo Porcentual Promedio) is the rate calculated by the average 
percentage of banks' capture costs.
30 UDIs (Unidades de Inversion) are units of account with constant real value.
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are carried out by Conacyt's registered Technology Consultants, and 
then the IMPI searches for patent duplicity. The Technical Committee is 
formed by representatives of Conacyt, Nafin, IMPI, SHCP, Secofi, and 
two representatives from the private sector associations CONCAMIN 
and CANACINTRA. Alfredo Philips, former Deputy Director for 
Technology Modernisation in Conacyt, considered the participation of 
the private sector associations as highly important 'including the 
regional branches to direct support to their local needs' (Phillips Greene 
1994).
Operation and some results
The very first clients for FIDETEC funds were those formerly with 
RCM.32 New obstacles had to be set to filter the real technology projects 
with industrial business orientation; the main one being that credits had 
to be operated via commercial banks. Nevertheless, working through 
the private banks caused a series of severe problems, with long delays 
in the operation of credit and sometimes causing the private firms to 
lose the technological opportunity. Those firms that are out of the 
financial system are in a difficult position because they lack the 
guarantees required by commercial banks to evaluate their credits and 
access the development banks' resources (Sanchez Ugarte 1994, 127- 
128).
Regardless of the commercial banks' handling obstacles, there was the 
need to support firms willing to develop technology projects to compete 
and survive in the newly opened economy. Efforts were made in 
different directions to try to make the programme work. On the 
demand side, an aggressive national marketing campaign was launched 
in 1993 (Conacyt 1994b). As a result, 115 new applications were
31 Interview #14.
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received and 71 projects were approved. By the end of 1994, approved 
projects peaked at a total of 94 (Conacyt 1993a; Conacyt 1994c). 
Nevertheless, the problem of operating the credits persisted. Only 19 
had been processed through commercial banks and 11 had already 
been operated directly with the permission of SHCP under the new 
exception clause. The rest continued their negotiations with the 
intermediaries.
In parallel, and in order to try to facilitate the scheme with private 
banks, agreements were signed with some of the largest banks to 
commit them to operate FIDETEC. During the second session of the 
National Coordinating Committee for Technology Modernisation 
(CONCERTEC),33 Bancomer and Banco Union signed agreements 
(Conacyt 1993a). But they did not prove effective in practice.34
Before the end of the Salinas administration, it seemed important to 
make a thorough evaluation of the results of the programme based on 
the experiences of the different participants. The purpose was to leave 
a basis for the new administration to work on to implement the changes 
needed for FIDETEC to become a programme of broader impact 
(Conacyt 1993a). A two-day event took place in Veracruz involving 
entrepreneurs, bankers, government executives, technology 
consultants and the members of FIDETEC's Technical Committee 
(Conacyt 1994a). The design, operation, roles of participants, problems 
and potential solutions were discussed and left in a document for the 
new administration. As discussed in Chapter 4, the programme was a 
victim of the government's tradition of not implementing plans or 
instruments from previous administrations and to substitute them as 
soon as possible. Thus, when the new administration took office at the
32 According to the Director of Conacyt at the time: 'as with all institutional 
reforms there is a historical clientele that you have to face...in this case these 
clients were used to getting subsidy all their life' (Interview #10).
33 See Chapter 4.
34 Interview #23.
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end of 1994, the proceedings from the event in Veracruz were simply 
filed.35
Due to the mechanism's own problems and to the new crisis of 1994- 
1995, demand collapsed. Since 1994, SHCP had authorised that in 
exceptional cases, FIDETEC could give resources directly to firms when 
it was proven that no bank would operate a successful FIDETEC 
application. A new redesign of FIDETEC took place in 1995 allowing it to 
operate the credits directly with the firms as long as they could provide 
the guarantees, and interest rates were fixed by inflation rates (UDIs). 
These reforms have not yet attracted important demand and FIDETEC 
is practically paralysed.36
Assessment of the operation and evolution of FIDETEC and the 
Joint Programme
Many of the participants of the original Technical Committee (most of 
whom have remained members) were interviewed for this thesis. 
Together with the views and experiences of FIDETEC's personnel, an 
account has been compiled of the main obstacles and problematic 
situations that have tampered with the operation of the programme. 
This is shown below, classified by broad subjects.
a) On the design o f FIDETEC:
• Most of the credit conditions are not adequate for SMEs' 
precompetitive technology projects. Interest rates, grace periods, 
repayment conditions, and the lack of a grant component are 
obstacles for demand of funds.37
35 Interviews #3, 4, 5, 11, 15, 16 and 17.
36 Interviews #11, 13, 15, 16 and 17.
37 Interviews #3, 4, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17 and 18. Nevertheless, according to 
Conacyt's Director at the time:' the credit conditions were not too benevolent
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• The guarantees given by FIDETEC and Nafin are not good enough 
for the banks, which in turn require additional collateral of up to 
three times the value of the credit.38
• When the programme was designed, a supposed advantage was 
having banks complete the credit evaluation before giving out the 
funds. In retrospect, the operation via commercial banks did not 
work. Banks have no incentive and no idea how to evaluate a 
technology-related project.39
• FIDETEC, like many programmes and policies in Mexico, was 
designed without knowing the clients and the system in which they 
have to operate. For instance, small entrepreneurs, researchers 
starting a new business or SMEs in general have neither the 
experience nor the personnel to present and defend a credit 
application for a technology project. They need thorough training 
and help to build their financial statements or commercial 
projections. The instrument does not provide for the support of 
these pre-stages of the project.40
b) On the operation o f FIDETEC and the Joint Programme with Nafin:
• The procedures are too long and by the time a credit is approved the 
technological opportunity is lost. This happens whether application is 
made via a bank or via direct credit; the requirements for both 
options are too complicated.41
• Conacyt and Nafin have deep-rooted institutional differences, 
making them incompatible in their perception of the operation of the 
programmes. They act like competitors rather than allies.42
but were the correct ones, especially after the experiences with the previous 
programmes like RCM' (Interview #10).
38 Interviews #13 , 15, 16 and 17.
39 Interviews #4, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20.
40 Interviews #12, 15, 16 and 17.
41 Interviews #4, 11, 15, 16 and 17.
42 Interviews #3, 10, 13, 15, 16 and 17.
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• The interface with Nafin never worked. The integral scheme does not 
flow. Firms do not have an automatic entry to Nafin when they finish 
their precompetitive phase with FIDETEC. They have to start from 
scratch, losing time and opportunity.43
• Neither Conacyt nor Nafin have the personnel or infrastructure to act 
like a commercial bank and properly evaluate credit. Conacyt has 
the capacity to carry the technical evaluation but not the financial
44one.
c) On the politics and policies surrounding FIDETEC:
The Ministry of Finance, SHCP, does not want to have state funds 
operating directly parallel to the private banks. Under the policies 
operating since the early 1990s, SHCP and BdeM are against subsidies, 
softer credits or any mechanisms that can disrupt the market. In the 
case of technology credits, it was a long time before SHCP would 
authorise the direct operation of FIDETEC in those cases where banks 
did not respond promptly.45 Alzati remembers that the subject was 
'taboo', and that in an attempt to discuss it with the Minister of 
Education, Ernesto Zedillo46, he had 'an absolute negative response, 
and without his support I could not even try to talk about it with Aspe,47 
thus the initial idea of the technology bank never prospered'.48
Sanchez Ugarte, Vice Minister of Industry during Salinas' administration 
claims that the explicit instructions to channel all financial programmes 
through the private commercial banks was like 'religious dogma'.49 
Former President Salinas confirmed that an exception regarding credits
43 Interviews #10, 11, 13, 16.
44 Interviews #3, 15, 16, 17 and 20.
45 Interviews #3, 4, 10, 16, 18, 20 and 21.
46 Ernesto Zedillo became Mexico's President at the end of 1994.




for technology or innovation projects was not viable at the time 
according to the macroeconomic policies coordinated by Aspe.50
d) On FIDETEC after 1994:
• With the change of Presidential administration, and followed by the 
country's financial crisis, FIDETEC stopped giving credits and the 
ones already given were stopped.
• There were policy shifts with the change of President and Conacyt's 
Director General, but internal personnel changes also affected the 
programme. The high rotation of personnel, mainly from Conacyt's 
deputy director level and FIDETEC's director and sub-directors, 
brought new operation procedures, new programme orientation, 
new information literature and forms, even a new logo for the 
programme. It was confusing for the clients and slowed down the 
whole mechanism.51
• As described before, many entrepreneurs, bankers, Technical 
Committee members and technology evaluators participated in the 
FIDETEC congress in Veracruz at the end of the presidential 
administration in 1994. But their recommendations were never given 
attention by the new administration. The feedback gathered from 
the experiences of the first years of operation of the programme was 
lost in the realm of the institutional changes and the financial 
crisis.52
• As a consequence of the financial crisis, a stronger emphasis has 
been placed on the financial strength of the projects to ensure the 
repayment of funds and protect FIDETEC's patrimony, thus 
relegating the technology importance of the projects, which should 
be the driving force behind the programme, to a lesser importance.
50 Inteview #19.
51 Interviews #3, 4, 11, 13, 15 and 16. On the other hand, interviewees agreed 
that Nafin has a more stable and institutionalised civil service which develops a 
longer learning process within the programmes
52 Interviews #4, 9, 11, 13, 15 and 16.
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I f  there are any new credits, they go to large firms with solid 
finances to guarantee repayment. SMEs have no alternative way to 
fund their technology projects, since no other mechanism has been 
designed to replace what FIDETEC used to do.53
• As the original objective of the programme seems to be fading 
away, members of the Technical Committee of FIDETEC have lost 
interest. They have stopped attending the reunions or send lower 
level representatives.54 CANACINTRA's delegate stopped going as he 
finds the reunions to be 'useless'.55 The Director General of IMPI 
regrets that the Institute is no longer consulted before the reunions 
to check the patents, and sees a diminished role of the Committee 
members in FIDETEC.56
To conclude this section, it is relevant to quote ex-President Salinas' 
comments when asked about the role of financial programmes like 
those of Nafin and Conacyt to support SMEs and their technology 
projects:
'Development banks like Nafin and agencies like Conacyt play a very 
important role and their programmes should be more 
continuous...technology is vital for Mexican firms competing 
internationally...there can be a market failure in the supply of funds for 
technology projects where government intervention could be justified, 
but during my administration that was not recognised, we tried to 
downsize the government's role, and we thought the new model of 
market deregulation would cover it'.57
53 Interviews #4, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 20.





7.5 -  THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PROGRAMMES: THE 'CLIENTS' 
AND THEIR EXPERIENCES
Banks
As seen in Chapter 6, private banks are reluctant to finance innovation 
and technology development projects. They are even more reluctant if 
they are dealing with SMEs. Therefore a case for government 
participation to provide the funds for these activities can be defended. 
This chapter has shown the evolution of Mexico's instruments to finance 
these activities via the government.
One of the most important aspects of their recent redesign to operate 
via private banks has proven a bottleneck. The commercial banking 
system in Mexico has not met the expectations of being the main 
operator of governmental funds for technology. The initial idea was for 
the government to provide the funding while giving the recently 
privatised banks a 'learning by doing' opportunity about the benefits of 
financing innovating firms. This has clearly not happened. As discussed 
in the previous sections, the government and private firms blame the 
private banks for the stagnant situation in the financing of technology 
projects. Apart from the deficiencies attributable to banks and their 
current situation since the 1995 crisis, some other issues seem to affect 
their negative attitude towards these kinds of programmes. Therefore, 
it is also important to consider the opinions and experiences of the 
private banks when analysing the operation of funds like FIDETEC and 
the Joint Programme with Nafin.
When asked about the way in which they see those instruments, the 
credit evaluators interviewed seemed to agree on the following views:58
58 Interview s # 2 2 , 23, 24 and 25.
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• The agreements of the government and banks to operate the funds 
are political ones and never really work. They are signed by top level 
politicians and banks' presidents or chairmen.
• They are designed from the politicians' desks and they do not match 
the ways in which banks operate.
• An inter-bank committee has been established to discuss different 
issues. One of the subjects on which all participants agree is that the 
government keeps designing instruments that are not good business 
for banks. The margins are too small for the work and investment 
needed to manage them.
• The guarantees are only for contingencies and they imply a cost to 
the bank. The banks are responsible for the recovery of the credit 
once the guarantee has covered them.
• Technology projects are too risky and complex to evaluate and 
manage. It should be up to the government to support them with 
types of instruments other than credit.
• The banks have established general conditions that their credit- 
holders must meet. The profile of firms applying for governmental 
funds rarely complies with the banks' profile of creditworthy clients.
• Banks do not trust the government because it changes its policies 
frequently. Experience shows that programmes open and close 
down too fast. Banks do not want to get involved and be left with a 
problem when new administrations in the government decide to 
create a new instrument and forget the old ones.
This shows that there are always at least two sides to a story and aptly 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of communication between the 
participants in this supposedly integrated system for financing 
innovation in Mexico.
Even if the majority of banks are not willing to operate funds like 
FIDETEC, some potential lies in medium-sized banks like Banorte which 
seem open to exploring and operating technology schemes. Moreover,
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Bital, a rapidly expanding bank, has redesigned its operation to give 
more importance to technology for environmental projects.59
Firms
This story has a third side: the perspective of the final users of the 
instruments analysed in this chapter, that is, firms with technology 
projects financed by a government programme.
Out of the 77 firms surveyed during fieldwork, 59 actually applied for 
funding from one of the programmes described (RCM, FIDETEC or 
Nafin's Technology Programme) between 1981 and 1996. 60 The other 
18 were either unable to fulfil the requirements or were disappointed 
with the long and bureaucratic procedures involved. Of the 59 
applicants, 45 claim to have received support even if the process was 
long.61 The experiences of those 45 firms reflect how innovating SMEs 
in Mexico engage in their projects with government agencies as an ally.
As the survey sample was generated from directories of the main 
financing programmes of Conacyt and Nafin the results presented here 
do not differentiate between specific programmes (unless a result is 
directly linked to a programme), as the purpose is to give a general 
idea of the way in which firms and government interact in the process 
of funding technology developments.
According to the respondents, 93% of them feel that their applications 
were approved due to the technical merits of the project.62 Almost half 
of the projects mentioned by the entrepreneurs relate to pre- 
competitive stages, and the other half to industrial-scaling stages.63
^Interviews #23 and 24.
60 Author's Survey: Questions #30 and 46.
61 Author's Survey: Question #21.
62 Author's Survey: Question #53.
63 Author's Survey: Question #24.
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Nevertheless, none of the firms that used FIDETEC for initial financing 
of a pre-competitive project found an easy way to 'jump' to Nafin's 
programme.64
Technology projects have two important timing aspects. On one hand, 
they must catch their opportunity while they are still innovative; thus 
the start and completion must be prompt. On the other hand, the 
complex nature of an innovation and the uncertainty of the results can 
make for a long process, so long-term funding and flexible financial 
schemes must be available to adjust to the situations as they arise. This 
duality requires financial institutions and programmes (either private or 
government ones) to be willing to respond quickly to their applications, 
and then to commit to them with adequate terms according to the 
nature of the projects. The example of Gonzalez Camarena, the 
famous Mexican who invented colour TV, is a typical case of the 
absence of support to develop an innovative project. He had to sell his 
project to the Americans when he could not find the funding to develop 
it further (Sanchez Osio 2001).
Figure 7.A shows how lengthy the financial programmes of Conacyt and 
Nafin can be. The operation rules state that applicants should have a 
response within three months from the submission of the forms. Only 
13.3% of the survey sample received an answer within three months; 
22.2% waited up to six months and almost 65% had processes that 
took from six months to more than two years.65
Once approved, credits' funds still had to find a way to be channeled to 
the firms. The process of negotiation with banks could bring further 
delays. I f  no bank would operate the credit, an application to give the 
funds directly (in the case of FIDETEC) was started. Alongside the 
development of the project, firms needed to adjust to a certain degree
64 Interviews #13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.
65 Author's Survey: Question #52.
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their completion times, budget, costs, etc. New procedures to 
restructure the credits are constantly started.66
Figure 7.A. Respondents' answers to the question: How long did it take 
you to get a response from the programme you were applying to?
Response Time From Programmes
Less than 3 Months





According to the survey, these latter situations can be just as difficult 
for the conclusion of the project (See Table 7.1). Out of the 53.8% of 
firms whose projects did not end in the time planned, almost 50% 
attributed it to funding or financial problems.67 Moreover, fewer firms 
started their projects late, but of those who had delays, 70% said the 
cause was related to the funding.68 Most of them explained that they 
used their own resources first while waiting for the government funds.
66 Interviews #2, 5, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16 and 17.
67 Author's Survey: Question #32.
68 Author's Survey: Question #31. I t  is important to mention that those who 
started on time did not by definition mean that they did not experience no 
difficulties with the funding from the programmes.
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Table 7.1. Respondents' answers to the questions: Did your project
start and end as planned? Why?
Yes % No % If No. was the cause funding 
or financial delays?
Yes %
Project started as planned? 68.3 31.7 70.0
Project ended as planned? 44.2 53.8 48.3
Source: Author's Survey
As discussed earlier, the problematic situation of private banks, which 
are expected to operate as the managers of the credits approved by the 
government's programmes, makes it difficult for firms to access the 
funds via a commercial bank. RCM could operate directly, but FIDETEC 
and Nafin were not designed that way. They should only operate via 
banks. Nevertheless, with the SHCP authorisation to operate FIDETEC 
directly in exceptional cases at the beginning of 1994, a group of 
projects that were previously stuck in the process were given their 
resources through Conacyt. Figure 7.B. shows how important the direct 
operation has been in financing the approved projects.69
Apart from the importance of giving funds to technology projects, the 
government programmes are implemented with the intention of being a 
catalyst for the market to start operating by itself. Government 
participation should gradually reduce, leaving the system to work on its 
own. For instance, FIDETEC was conceived as a temporary corrective 
scheme to cover the deficiencies of the financial markets of the 
country.70
69 Author's Survey: Question #48. The responses do not include Nafin as it 
does not operate directly.
70 Interview #10.
276
Figure 7.B. Respondents' answers to the question: How were the
resources given to your firm?
Channel of Funds to the Firms
Direct Government Through a Bank Credit Unions 
Channel
Source: Author's Survey
This explains the importance of having the banks involved and making 
them understand the needs of innovating firms. Furthermore, firms 
need to learn how to deal with credits. It is, at least in the conception, a 
learning process for both, fostered by the government while the 
dynamics mature. The fact that FIDETEC and the Joint Programme with 
Nafin require firms to invest part of the total, and that they want banks 
to operate the credits and absorb part of the risk by not giving them full 
guarantee coverage, are examples of this intention. Firms have started 
being responsible for their share of the investment as, in the end, they 
are the beneficiaries of the project. Figure 7.C shows how almost 30% 
of the firms surveyed have had to finance their projects completely 
when the state or the banks did not give them positive or rapid 
responses.71 Those who funded their projects between the government 
and the firm, either with one part investing a larger percentage or with
71 Author's Survey: Question #43.
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50-50 funding, accounted for 46% of the survey sample. There were no 
instances in which banks participated with 100% of funds: they did 
participate as the main contributor of funds in 8% of the cases, and 
involved their own resources in some way in almost 20% of the cases. 
There is a long way to go before the system can be regarded as 
mature, and government participation will be playing a vital role, at 
least in the short-term.
Figure 7.C. Respondents' answers to the question: How was the project 
financed?




As has been discussed throughout this thesis, changes of President, 
Institution Directors, and rotation of personnel at all levels imply shifts 
of policies and orientation of specific instruments. Sometimes those 
shifts have been drastic. Entrepreneurs negotiating with government 
agencies have to learn how to deal with these situations, especially 
when lengthy response times and consequential delays to the
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development of their projects force them to confront different faces and 
different rules en route.
Table 7.2 summarises the number of personnel changes that surveyed 
firms witnessed during the development of their project, from the 
application for funds to the conclusion of the project itself.72 Only 3% 
have not experienced a change of Director of the Institution or changes 
to the specific Programme. The most striking aspect here is that the 
longest term for such a project can be 15 years, but almost 60% of 
these firms were established between 1989 and 1998 73, reducing the 
time to nine years for more than half of the cases. 40% of those 
surveyed have experienced two changes in programme director, and 
24% three or more changes.
Table 7.2. Respondents' answers to the questions: How many changes 
of personnel took place during the development of your project? At 
which levels?
Rotation of personnel at different levels (%)




Never 3.03 3.03 15.15 33.33
Once 57.57 33.33 33.33 45.45
Twice 30.31 39.39 33.33 15.15
More often 9.09 24.24 18.18 6.06
Source:
Author's Survey
According to a FIDETEC mid-level executive, 'changes in the 
programme director are the ones with the highest effect, because that 
person is the one that puts together the main institutional policies, 
inter-institutional negotiations, problems with the banks, and the needs 
of the firms...at that level there is an important political weight plus a 
capacity to operate and orient the programme according to more
72 Author's Survey: Questions #60 and 61.
73 See Figure 6.C in Chapter 6.
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personal styles'.74 This In turn impacts on the way firms interact with 
the institution. Those impacts range from redesign of main policies to 
the attitude with which the bureaucrats treat the entrepreneurs; the 
latter being the most important as it is at this level that the 
entrepreneur has more contact with the institution. 76% of the 
respondents feel that these changes affected their projects (see Table 
7.3).75 The effects can be in the form of: new and inexperienced 
personnel; less interest in the programme by the new executives; and 
all aspects related with the lack of a civil service and therefore 
continuity of former schemes.
Table 7.3. Respondents' answers to the questions: Did changes of 
personnel affect your project? In which ways?
Effects of changes Yes % No %
Policy and programme changes; 
Destroy the former; No continuity
50 50
Internal institutional disorganisation; 
Less follow-up; Slow procedures; Bad 
service
65.4 34.6
Lack of civil service; Change of 




Regardless of what seems like a difficult experience for firms dealing 
with government agencies, when rating the average quality of the 
service provided the respondents were not that critical.76 Just over 10% 
gave the lowest marks to bad or poor service. 31% gave the service the 
top mark (5), and the remaining 58% considered it to be either 
adequate or good enough. All in all, 88.7% of the surveyed
74 Interview #16.
75 Author's Survey: Questions #62 and 63.
76 Author's Survey: Question #51.
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entrepreneurs would recommend other firms to seek government 
support.77
As discussed in the previous sections, one of the main criticisms of the 
different government programmes was the lack of effective control, 
supervision and follow-up evaluations of the projects. It  seems as if this 
historical handicap is being corrected. 86.7% of the firms with 
governmental funding for their projects say that they were visited by 
evaluators to assess the viability of their project and 82.2% confirmed 
that they had follow-up evaluations.78
When interviewed, some of the entrepreneurs expressed regret that 
FIDETEC does not give funds for the industrial scaling of the projects, 
as they lose continuity and in most cases become stuck with 
prototypes. They do not see strong support for technology in the 
country. They see FIDETEC as a small programme with plenty of 
limitations.79
Evidence shows that all is not necessarily negative in the way firms 
perceive their relationship with the government, but there is plenty of 
room for improvement if there is to be an effective technology 
development market in Mexico, especially one where SMEs play an 
important role. There are small firms with substantial projects, some of 
them already implementing new technologies into their processes, 
some even exporting their innovations. The government programmes 
have already been involved with projects like these. As shown in 
Appendix 2, they come from a range including such technologies as a 
new process for gold and silver extraction, safety clips for courier 
packaging, a revolutionary bactericide and new filter jars to catch cow's 
embryos, as well as locally important projects like a maize mill to
77 Author's Survey: Question #70.
78 Author's Survey: Questions #54 and 55.
79 Interviews #2, 3, 4 and 5.
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produce enriched tortillas, a process for stuffing and preserving 
jalapeho peppers, or the adaptation of maracuya (passion fruit) to suit 
the climate conditions in Mexico, where it had never been grown.80 As 
the Director of the IMPI argued when talking about the importance of 
supporting and financing indigenous innovations in the country: 'I f  one 
in ten supported projects succeeds, it will cover for the nine failed ones 
and more'.81
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presented the case of a specific technology policy tool: 
direct project financing. The discussion of the justification for 
government participation showed that there are situations in which the 
government may act to support firms in their efforts to develop 
technology. Such cases are mainly the financing of pre-competitive R&D 
activities, highly innovative proposals involving long-term development 
and high risk, and those projects being developed by small firms with 
limited access to commercial bank funding.
It seems as if in Mexico, direct project financing schemes have not yet 
found a way to operate that allows the government to channel 
resources effectively to innovating SMEs. Based on the findings 
presented throughout this chapter, a series of vicious circles can be 
detected. On the one hand, the government designs programmes 
aimed at supporting private firms' technology projects without really 
understanding them as their clients. Those programmes have not been 
fitted to the real needs and nature of technology projects. Moreover, 
the changes in government policies often affect the way in which 
specific schemes operate. Thus, information diffusion and the learning
80 See Appendix 2 for examples of specific technology successes in Mexico and 
their experience with the government programmes.
81 Interview #11.
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process for the clients to understand the way in which a government 
programme works are affected by those constant shifts.
After experiencing difficulties in achieving successful results, the 
government changed its former soft-credit and grants programmes to 
credit-oriented ones by the end of the 1980s. Considering itself not 
qualified to evaluate credit, the government delegated that function to 
the recently privatised banks. But again, the programmes were 
designed without knowing either the capacities, needs or problems of 
the immediate clients: the banks. At the time the new schemes were 
implemented, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank had the 
confidence that the banks would know better who was a good credit 
holder. I t  did not happen that way. Now it is well known that they did 
not know how to measure the risks. Even worse, bankers and their 
credit evaluators have neither knowledge of nor interest in technology 
projects; especially if the applicants are small firms. The whole 
mechanism of operation through banks collapsed and there is no 
alternative effective model to substitute it with. The direct operation 
may be a way out in the short run but care should be taken not to fall 
back into the previous programmes' vices.
In summary, banks are not playing their role as intermediaries. 
Government agencies' programmes and development banks are stuck 
with their trust-funds not operating. When none of the parts involved 
understands each other, chaos is likely to arise, leaving the final users 
-  small private firms -  without the necessary support to develop their 
technology projects.
Government intervention is not a popular policy nowadays, so not only 
the effort to justify it is wasted, but so are the allocated resources for 
these purposes if the government does not understand the financial 
system's current situation, as well as the peculiar characteristics of 
technology projects. The public sector must continue to adjust its
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national financial policy and in doing so, it should aim at being an 
instrument for technological and industrial development; being an 
effective regulator of the financial system; creating an internal capital to 
finance long-term projects and strengthening the development banks to 
intervene when needed. Its role as a regulator of the system is crucial. 
I f  the government decides to continue its support for technology and 
innovation developments within firms, it should do so in an articulated 
way with its clients and intermediaries. Oniy then will it render positive 
effects in the development of indigenous technology capacities which, 
as discussed throughout the different parts of this thesis, have a 
potential worth exploiting.82
82 For examples of recent successful technology projects carried out by small 




This thesis began with the hypothesis that the poor performance of the 
innovative system in Mexico can be explained not by headline policy 
shifts, such as stabilisation and liberalisation, but rather by political 
economy deficits -notably conflicting interests - within the national 
innovation system.
Successive chapters have sought to elaborate this argument and to 
provide evidence to justify the key questions raised. Having developed 
a theoretical framework in Chapter 2, which explained the link between 
economic performance and investment in innovation, Chapter 3 
demonstrated that Mexico exhibits a poor national system of innovation 
in comparison with not only those countries at a similar level of 
development, but also its key competitors and those advanced 
economies with evolved systems of innovation support.
The subsequent three chapters disaggregated the national system of 
innovation into three interrelated components, and examined the 
nature of each and the processes connecting them. In the case of 
government policy, Chapter 4 demonstrated that there is no coherent 
approach, either within any one administration, or over the 30-year 
period in question. This lack of coherence was shown to impact 
particularly strongly upon SMEs. Chapter 5 showed that despite strong 
demand from SMEs for assistance in realising technological investment, 
the inefficiencies of the system, compounded by the poor 
representation by business organisations, inhibits the potential of these 
companies to innovate. Chapter 6 revealed that the banking system is 
similarly failing to foster investment in technology by its reluctance to 
fund activities perceived as risky and slow to offer returns.
The detailed case study presented in Chapter 7 centred around the
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government's mechanisms for direct project financing, demonstrating 
the need for the government to actively participate in conjunction with 
the market. However, the evidence presented proves that these 
particular initiatives have been unsuccessful as a consequence of their 
inappropriate design in the Mexican context.
This evidence supports some concluding remarks. As a starting point it 
can be said that technology has an effect on economic growth. As 
discussed throughout the thesis, it should be borne in mind that both 
theorists and empirical studies argue that technology has a direct link to 
economic growth. Thus, nations, whether developed or developing, 
have an interest in the strengthening of their technology capabilities, 
though keeping in mind their context of differing national endowments 
and capacities. That is, not viewing the strengthening of technological 
capabilities as a one-size-fits-all package. The same can be said about 
firms and organisations within nations, whether large or small; all have 
to be concerned with their technology capacity in order to compete both 
domestically and internationally, again, bearing in mind their own 
particular context. The case of Mexico and its SMEs is no exception. 
Recent research has demonstrated the intimate relationship between 
entrepreneurship and regional and local development. An ability to 
innovate developed within local inter-firm networks both supports 
existing firms and presents opportunities for entrepreneurs to start new 
businesses in order to serve newly identified markets.
It  is difficult for any solution from one place to work as effectively when 
transplanted directly into another environment, with its unique culture, 
capabilities and networks. Policies work best when they are tailored to 
local conditions. The same applies to domestically-developed 
technologies incorporated into local firms that provide services 
according to the conditions of the national market.
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The Mexican system of innovation has the same main actors as any 
national system of innovation. There are providers of technology 
services to the industry; firms in need of technology; institutions and 
public agencies involved in the promotion of technology development; 
intermediaries and bridging institutions; and finally a legal framework to 
protect industrial property rights at international standards. Moreover, 
there are indeed firms that have achieved industrial application of their 
new technologies, and some that are even exporting it. The problems, 
therefore, do not lie in the existence of players and infrastructure. 
Rather, they are related to the interactions, coordination, 
communication and lack of unified goals among them. Principally, the 
short-termism of almost all actors in the system clashes with the 
lengthy innovation processes and long-term nature of technology 
development. For instance, the nature of Mexico's political system has 
encouraged a reinvention of policy every six years and this has resulted 
in a lack of stable institutions and continuous policies aimed at the 
strengthening of long-term capabilities.
These problems are reinforced by the absence of effective pressure 
mechanisms to negotiate with the government, as the formerly 
overprotected private sector has suffocated business associations which 
have been more an ally of the government than of the SMEs. Therefore, 
technology policy has been designed from the desks of top politicians 
without consideration and understanding of the real needs of the end- 
users. Moreover, they have been implemented by a weak bureaucracy 
that has responded solely to the interests of politicians or high level 
officials.
User firms have frequently been isolated in the middle of their projects 
when they are caught by policy shifts inspired by a new presidential 
term or even by changes in those officials responsible for agencies and 
programmes. The specific policies may be in accord with, and directly 
related to, the macro-economic policies operating at any one time, but
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the problem is that those macro-economic policies have themselves 
shifted drastically over short periods, either because of new conceptions 
of the role of government, or in response to the recurrent economic 
crises of the past three decades. Thus, those shifts in public policy in 
such short periods of time tend to disorient the private sector, which is 
already facing fierce international competition with a considerable 
technological gap. This not only has negative technological and 
economic effects, but leads to a mistrust of government -  firms no 
longer want to get involved with government programmes due to the 
uncertainty of their continuity.
The apparent contradiction between a strong state which cannot effect 
long-term, coherent policies may be explained by the structural 
differences between such authoritarian states. Not all authoritarian 
states have the same goals and modus operandi. Since the 1920s, the 
state goals in Mexico have been dominated by the priority of 
maintaining political stability. This dominant goal has been transformed 
into a short-term objective of maintaining the state party officials in 
power by all means. This has had a negative impact on the realm of 
technology and industrial policies (Evans 1995; Nadal Egea 1995). 
Moreover, a weak rule of law coupled with a lack of both accountability 
and a democratic political system undermine the possibility of designing 
and implementing a strong and robust science and technology (S&T) 
policy which is not subject to manipulation. Without political 
accountability and effective representation it is difficult for firms to 
demand the continuity required for innovation and technology projects.
In spite of this, some theorists opposing state intervention say that the 
private sector has sole responsibility for technology, and that the 
market is to be left alone to provide the necessary resources. Some 
even argue against any state participation on the grounds that the 
market is better placed to assess its own requirements, and state 
intervention is bound to fail. Nevertheless, the arguments presented in
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this thesis provide justification for the government to intervene and 
channel funds to develop the country's technology capabilities. 
Nevertheless, the most important aspect of such intervention is the 
kind of role the government should have, being the provider of the 
appropriate framework for innovative performance in combination with 
justified cases of selective participation. Other countries, like Hong 
Kong, have opted for an exclusively framework technology policy 
participation, whereas others, like Singapore, use a combination of 
framework and selective intervention. This thesis argues for Mexico's 
government important participation in both lines of policies, at least 
while the economic environment of the country improves, and 
companies are in a better position to engage in technology-related 
activities.
This is most critical for SMEs which do not have their own financial 
capacity to bear the costs associated with innovation and technology 
developments. Furthermore, the recently reprivatised banking system 
has been too concerned with the recovery of what it paid to buy the 
banks and with the effects of the 1995 economic crisis. Its attitude has 
been to finance short-run/high-return projects rather than investing in 
high-risk/long-term technology projects. The public sector, in 
consequence, needs to review its national financial policy and in doing 
so, aim it towards being an instrument for technological and industrial 
development; being an effective regulator of the financial system; 
creating internal capital to finance long-term projects; and 
strengthening development banking to intervene when needed. Its role 
as a regulator of the system is crucial.
The conclusions that Wionczek (1981) presents in his work, following 
his ten-year period of analysis, could be extrapolated to the whole 
period of this study. In particular, his hypothesis that the formation of 
any long-term and coherent policy in this field is not viable in Mexico 
can be defended by analysing Conacyt's activities during recent years.
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Another interesting parallel is that he underlines the fact that, with the 
economic/financial crisis of Fall 1976, many of the science and 
technology promotion activities were suspended, significantly reduced, 
or allowed to stagnate (Wionczek 1981). The country has since faced 
three more crises, in 1982, 1987 and 1995, which have rendered 
similar negative impacts on the strategic field of science and 
technology, proving once more the lack of memory within Mexico's 
policy-making system.
Without learning from these past experiences, Mexico runs the risk of 
becoming marginalised in a continuing cycle of unsustainable growth. 
As Lee and Swagel rightly argue, developing countries undergoing trade 
liberalisation and structural adjustment programmes, unaccompanied 
by requisite technological change may get locked in a 'development 
trap' as they concentrate in low technology and resource intensive 
industries (Lee and Swagel 1997). This thesis has demonstrated the 
reality of this fear and in so doing has reaffirmed the importance of the 
relationship between economic performance, technology and 
innovation. Novelty being so important as many can follow up a thing 
when found, 'but to find it first is the gift of the few' (Gracian 1637).
Policy recommendations
By approaching this subject from an original perspective, this thesis 
suggests new directions for state technology policies which can only 
work as intended in a climate of macroeconomic stability, external 
openness, and market-based competition at home. Moreover, state 
power should be directed towards enhancing private productive 
capacities through responsible public management. Without state 
reform -in particular the setting up of a politically neutral and highly 
specialised 'S&T bureaucracy' in charge of innovation and technology 
policy- no single instrument or programme will bring long-term results. 
A predictable environment of political operation and decision-making is
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a prerequisite for long-term investment. This section presents a series 
of specific policy recommendations which can only be feasible if the 
economic and political stability premises are understood.
Focusing on the problems encountered by SMEs, standing at the 
intersection between innovative development and national economic 
growth, this work helps to re-centre concerns away from the funding of 
R&D per se towards its realisation in the productive sector. Therefore, 
new policies should focus on facilitating the long-term investment in 
technology and innovation by SMEs. Macroeconomic policy stability and 
permanence as well as its repercussions for industrial and technology 
policies form the basis for a company's adequate long-term planning 
and decision making.
Based on the general conclusions of this study, and following Evans' 
(1995) main argument that state involvement is a given and that the 
appropriate question regarding intervention is not 'how much' but 'what 
kind', a number of specific policy recommendations can be made under 
five categories:
1-Institutional strengthening, stability and permanence
• Conacyt must develop a 'S&T civil service' composed of officials and 
engineers capable of designing, setting up, implementing, controlling 
and evaluating those programmes directed towards the 
encouragement and financing of innovation activities within private 
firms. Such a bureaucracy would acquire enough knowledge to make 
sure the rest of the policy recommendations presented in this 
section are pragmatic and efficiently managed within Conacyt and in 
coordination with the rest of the public agencies involved in related 
policies such as the building up of R&D infrastructures, education 
and training.
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• Public agencies participating in the National System of Innovation, 
with Conacyt at the core, have to work on a more coordinated and 
integrated agenda. Every organisation should develop well 
established career civil services, with a clear division of 
responsibilities to avoid duplicity of functions and optimise 
resources. They need to prevent drastic policy shifts and high 
personnel rotation which inhibit long term-stability of institutions and 
confuse their'clients', namely private firms.
• It is important to continue strengthening the legal framework to 
protect innovation and industrial property rights to match 
international standards. As SMEs have difficulties in following the 
advances of technology developed outside the country's borders, the 
government needs to support firms through technology forecasting 
and through establishing international rules for the sharing and 
protection of intellectual property rights.
2-Coordination among public and private institutions and investments.
• I t  is important to encourage the interactive learning between
producers and users by establishing close cooperation programmes 
with both suppliers and consumers. Also, it is important to ensure 
good communication between universities and schools on the one 
hand, and firms, on the other. Moreover, it is crucial that the 
knowledge created in one firm is used to stimulate innovation in 
other firms. Seminars, conferences, technology-related fairs are 
important means for firms to interact with each other.
• In order to understand the real needs of the private sector, the
government has to find alternative ways to dealing mainly with
formal business chambers and associations. Meetings between
government officials and entrepreneurs should be established for 
both sides to exchange points of view, experiences and feedback.
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• By supporting education and training systems, the government can 
help to lower the costs and facilitate the creation of capabilities in 
firms. Likewise, by supporting public research, the universities and 
basic scientific research, the government indirectly encourages firms 
to invest in their own R&D to be able to tap into a more extensive 
external network of research. Thus, public research acts as a 
catalyst for the widening of private research.
• The fiscal policy related to incentives for R&D expenditures has to be 
revised for it to constitute a real benefit for the firms taking risks by 
investing in innovation projects. Deductions and tax credits have to 
be increased to match those policies existent in countries such as 
OECD members or Mexico's main trading partners.
3-Availability o f funding for innovation projects in SMEs
• Alternatives to commercial banks' credit have to be designed for the 
funding of technology projects, mainly those emanating from SMEs. 
The government can provide programmes tailored to the specifics of 
such projects, providing a grant component, a long-term recovery 
plan, below-market interest rates, and that accept the technology 
development itself as collateral. A professional and specialised team 
of evaluators, advisors and controllers of such financial schemes is 
required if they are to succeed.
• The government should participate temporarily while the financial 
system recovers from the recent crises and learns to communicate 
with the productive sector and to understand the importance of 
upgrading its technology apparatus. Therefore, it is necessary to 
promote close finance-industry relations based on mutual sense of 
purpose. These relations in turn have to stretch over a long time 
span due to the nature of innovation processes.
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• One way of providing funds to SMEs with high growth potential is 
through venture capital which in general is a key source of long­
term funds to smaller firms. An important benefit of venture capital 
is that the investors usually work closely with the entrepreneurs who 
have created the business. The government can create venture- 
capital style schemes to generate an initial market for the financial 
sector and potential private investors to understand the benefits of 
participating in innovation projects. It can eventually withdraw its 
seed investment and leave the venture capital market to work on its 
own.
4-Public and private R&D infrastructure for technology and innovation
• The government can promote benchmark studies to compare the 
national system of innovation as a whole with those operating in 
other countries, to highlight missing linkages and promote closer 
cooperation among the participants.
• I t  is important to evaluate whether specific regions in the country 
have potential innovative capacities in any given area of R&D. In this 
respect, the institutional arrangements, local industry and 
technology specialisations of regional systems of innovations should 
be supported in conjunction with local government agencies.
5-Technology policy in an open economy
• One last set of policy recommendations is based on the fact that 
Mexico is an open economy exposed to globalisation trends. 
Therefore, the government has to be aware of the impacts of 
globalisation in the field of technology and innovation, and how it 
can play a role for the country to take advantage of the fact that 
knowledge is easily transferred across countries. Thus, public
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policies and instruments have to be targeted to exploit 
internationally the innovations generated domestically. For instance, 
it can support national firms to appropriate their innovations by 
preserving and developing competitive advantages in technology- 
based industries. I t  can do so by organising conferences and 
workshops where entrepreneurs are informed about exports 
opportunities, processes to secure property rights, aspects of fair 
competition, and the importance for firms to reinvest profits in new 
innovative projects of international scope.
• Even if this thesis has emphasised the importance of indigenous 
innovation, it has also highlighted the importance of technology 
transfer and adaptation of imported technologies. Thus, international 
cooperation is another important aspect for the public institutions. 
Scientific exchange programmes should be organised, resources and 
incentives must be destined for international scientific projects, and 
infrastructure for technology collaboration should be developed. 
Moreover, foreign direct investment has to continue being an 
important aspect of technology transfer into the country. Therefore, 
the government must provide real incentives for the location of new 
innovative activities with foreign capital, and should promote the 
collaboration between national firms and foreign leading firms that 
operate in the country.
The policy recommendations presented above need to be included as 
part of an integral vision of the country's development, which should 
seek to maximise the utilisation of domestic technologies that will allow 
the accomplishment of short-, medium- and long-term objectives. In 
other words, Mexico's technological development can only occur 
effectively when the government appreciates the need for a holistic 
approach, including the development of a strong and specialised 
bureaucratic apparatus and overall policy coherence. It must take the 
lead to coordinate the participants of the innovation system under
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common goals, which must seek to be coherent, consistent, flexible, 
complementary and realistic.
Future research
The exhaustive quantitative analysis in relation to the experience of 
Mexican SMEs engaged in technology activities provides strong 
evidence to support the majority of the arguments presented above. 
Nonetheless, the impact of bureaucratic fragmentation was assessed 
through a limited study of the application of one policy by a group of 
government institutions. Although one has to be circumspect in 
generalising from this restricted evidence, it seems that this is an 
important factor in the inhibition of technological innovation. Certainly, 
it was an issue persistently raised in interviews with managers of SMEs. 
Future research may seek to qualify this relationship by examining 
other policies and instruments designed and implemented by other 
agencies.
Furthermore, future approaches may revisit prior concerns with the 
performance of the R&D sector, to examine how it has changed in the 
new era of liberalisation. This may then open opportunities for a union 
between this current research and a renewed interest in the R&D 
sector, here treated as a given. It may be appropriate to broaden this 
research to include larger firms, as well as industrial and regional 
differences. First, to question the assumed invulnerability of large 
enterprises to the dramatic instability of recent Mexican economic 
history; second, to explore sectors more likely to engage in innovation 
activities; and third, to evaluate whether regional systems of innovation 
influence the overall performance of the national environment, taking 
into account that technology processes may be conditioned by space, 
as knowledge and capacities tend to cluster. Finally it is relevant to 
extend and apply this model to examine the experience of other 
countries threatened by a similar technological development trap.
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Appendix 1 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH TOOLS
Methodology framework
Given the different natures of the actors and interactions to be 
examined in the research project, a cross-examination of several 
sources of data (primary and secondary/qualitative and quantitative) 
was needed. To be able to analyse the economic, political, and cultural 
factors involved in the design, implementation, use and effects of 
technology policy in the Mexican context, a multi-method research was 
designed, based on the study of related quantitative and qualitative 
research literature.1 The following sources, methods, and tools were 
used to collect the data for the thesis:
Sources of data, methods and tools
Documents
BdeM /  FONEI: Programme operation rules, guides and performance 
reports.
Conacyt: Access to archival historic information from Conacyt since its 
foundation in 1970, including statistics, publications, policy outlines, 
internal documents, programme operation guides, and both official and 
internal material concerning the results of the main programmes under 
analysis.
1 Including Archibugi and Pianta 1996; Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight 1996; 
Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1996; Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Healey 1996; Hoel 
and Jessen 1977; Meyer-Krahmer 1990; Moser and Graham 1971; Oppenheim 
1992; Phillips and Pugh 1994.
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Nafin: Information regarding the technology programme is not 
thoroughly documented and the information gathered mainly comprises 
reports and operation rules.
Secof /  IMPI: National industrial policy plans, which include important 
technology policy references. From IMPI internal statistics and reports, 
both official and internal were collected. Documents regarding the 
previous and current law for industrial and intellectual property 
protection were also used.
SHCP: The fiscal incentives laws for investment in technology and R&D, 
including the newest changes at the beginning of this year. Economic 
indicator publications.
Semi-structured /  in-depth interviews2
The impact of government programmes and policies on technology 
efforts has been subject of several empirical studies. One of the study 
methods most frequently used is the interview study (Kauko 1996). For 
this work, a total of 25 interviews3 were conducted to collect qualitative 
data from the government/policy-makers and implementers (officials of 
different levels at the agencies involved in the policy network); the 
private sector (leaders of business associations and entrepreneurs of 
specific importance); and the banks (credit executives).4 The topics 
covered derived from the research questions presented above and were 
differentiated depending on whether the interviewee belongs to the 
public, private or financial sector.5
2 Apart from bank executives, all interviews were conducted as attributable and 
were tape recorded. From the recordings, transcripts were made for each 
interview.
3 See Appendix 3.
4 For the reference numbers and details of interviewees see Appendix 3.
5 See Appendix 4 for a summary of the topic guides used during the interviews.
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Analytical survey6
A national survey was conducted to collect data from users: private 
firms which need technology to conduct their business and are the 
eventual beneficiaries (or not) of technology policy.
Population: Private firms which have applied for government funding for 
their technology projects via Conacyt and/or Nafin and/or Banco de 
Mexico in the period 1980-1998. The period starts in 1980 because it 
was the first year of the Shared Risk Programme (Conacyt), the first 
industrial-oriented programme. The most recent cases give evidence of 
the problems faced with the 1995 crisis. During this period the 
transition from a closed to an open economy and the shifts from grants 
to credits are covered. The population was defined based on the 
assumption that in no country do public authorities give R&D subsidies 
to randomly chosen companies; instead, subsidies are distributed 
between applicants (Gannicott 1984); thus applications for financial 
support filed by a firm are certainly highly dependent on its intentions 
to invest in R&D, and those are the companies useful in a study of this 
nature. The main difficulty in this research laid in obtaining and 
updating lists and directories of the users of the Conacyt, Nafin and 
Banco de Mexico programmes. The total population was about 700 
firms.
Sample: A sample of 10 per cent of the population was the goal to be 
able to obtain statistically satisfactory results. I t  was met as 74 
entrepreneurs responded to the survey.7 A simple random sampling
6 For a detailed description of the uses, advantages and limitations of analytical 
surveys see Oppenheim (1992).
7 There were some entrepreneurs that had dealt with more than one 
government programme or had more than one project. They responded 
individually for each experience, therefore the total database consists of 77 
observations.
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method was used,8 thus ensuring representation of small and medium­
sized firms, geographical location, types of programmes used, and 
results of the project (successes and failures). 40.3 per cent of the 
firms are located in Mexico City's metropolitan area and the rest are 
from locations in various parts of the country. 85.8 per cent of the 
respondents were either the owner or general manager of the firm, 
while the rest were technical directors or project directors. 46.8 per 
cent of the firms were micro-sized and 53.2 per cent small and 
medium-sized (classified under the same category). Only 9.1 per cent 
were partly owned by foreign capital.
Questionnaire: Because of the size of the sample, their geographical 
dispersion and the nature of the information, a 70-question 
questionnaire9 was designed in Spanish10 and was administered mainly 
by telephone. A pilot questionnaire was tested at the "V Technology 
Forum" in Mexico City to pre-test its effectiveness, clarity, 
comprehensibility and the time required to complete it.11 The final 
version incorporated improvements based on the experience with the 
pilot. Most of the questions were closed, but a few were open questions 
to allow for additional comments.12 It covered mainly the following 
topics: technology culture, the nature of the project, the funding for the 
project, the relationship and experience with the government, research 
institutions and banks, and the firm itself.
8 For a description of the random sampling method and its advantages see 
Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight 1996; Moser and Graham 1971.
9 See Appendix 6.
10 For the English translation of the questionnaire see Appendix 7.
11 On April 17, 1998, six entrepreneurs responded to the preliminary version of 
the questionnaire. By attending the Forum an interest on technology issues 
was assumed by the Author. Chosen randomly, they were considered similar 
respondents to those that were going to be surveyed.
12 For the interpretation and classification of the open questions' answers, a 
reliability exercise was made with two intercoders. 97 per cent of the Author's 
codes matched the intercoders', and for the mismatched ones a revision was 
made to give an agreed coding.
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Processing o f data: The statistical software SPSS version 8.0 was used 
to process the data from the survey. A database of 123 variables was 
built, where each answer possibility was given a different label and 
value. 108 of the variables corresponded to the questions related with 
the respondent's views and experiences. The rest are variables used to 
categorise and classify the firm (i.e. size, location, etc.). Using SPSS a 
series of statistical analyses was done, using mainly descriptive and 
inferential statistics,13 to support the arguments discussed throughout 
the thesis.
Specific firms' case studies
From the information gathered using the questionnaire and interviews, 
some particularly interesting cases were detected, and their validity 
relies on the concept of 'purposive sampling', which allows for hand- 
picking supposedly typical or interesting cases (Blaxter, Hughes, and 
Tight 1996, 79). Three cases were selected for deeper analysis. This 
involved a mixture of qualitative methods including visits to the firm for 
observation, talking to different people within the organisation, etc. A 
reconstruction of the events was possible and this helped to shed light 
on the problems that firms face when developing a technology project 
within the context of this analysis. A summary of the findings, is 
presented in Appendix 2.
Caveats
Documents: The different documents and official sources used for this 
work have their own institutional methodologies, particular interests 
and, therefore, limitations in their use for a different purpose to the one 
for which they were originally produced.
13 For a detailed explanation of these statistical concepts see Healey (1996).
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Interviews: although special care was taken with the selection of the 
interviewees, it is not possible to reconstruct with perfect accuracy all 
the networks, interactions, problems and results of the process of 
technology development in Mexico based on the roles played by 
particular participants. Their views must be taken as a result of their 
own experiences, which may be biased in different ways.
Survey: The measures of the effectiveness of technology policy are 
based on the perceptions of industrial managers, and this might be an 
insufficient guide to reality. There is, in fact, a general tendency for 
managers to overestimate the negative influences of governmental 
intervention and to understate its positive influences (Rothwell 1986). 




THREE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESSES OF MEXICAN SMALL FIRMS 
AND THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT
The examples below are provided to illustrate the nature of Mexican 
technology projects carried out by small firms, and the way in which the 
government and banks participated with them. The three firms were 
visited during fieldwork and in each case an in-depth group interview 
was conducted with one or more of the following project participants: 
Director/owner of the firm, Project Manager, Accountant/financial 
advisor and Researchers/technical personnel. For simplicity, only the 
Director/owner is named in the list of interviewees.1
1-Firm: Qufmica Agronomica de Mexico 2
a) Technology Project and Relevance of Innovation
A researcher at the local University in Chihuahua, Miguel Alvarado, 
started a micro-enterprise to develop his project, in which a 'gentamicin 
sulphate' (aminoglicosido) is used for the first time to combat bacteria 
that attack apple and pear crops. Proven effective, this revolutionary 
bactericide has won several awards. It has been patented in the US, 
Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador and Mexico, and 
at the time of the interview, was awaiting authorisation from 22 
additional countries. It is the first time the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in the US has evaluated a Mexican registration 
application.
1 See Appendixes 3 (for the List of Interviewees), and 5 (for the List of 
Surveyed Firms).
2 Interview #  1.
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b) Commercial Results/Potential
In 1996, the German transnational BASF signed an exclusive 
distribution agreement for the product. This allows Quimica Agronomica 
to expand its presence almost worldwide. BASF calculates sales of US$3 
million in the first three years of the contract, with a forecast of US$15 
million for the following ten years.
c) Financing of the project/experience with government's programmes
The first credit was given by Nafin via the state-owned Rural Bank, 
Banrural (Banco Rural). The initial investment was US$2 million. Having 
the approval of Banrural acting as the commercial bank the process was 
relatively easy. Banrural's role is to support agriculture-related projects. 
Conacyt's FIDETEC complemented the credit and guaranteed the 
remaining 20% needed by the firm. I t  was a case of a micro-firm with a 
high merit technology project that could have up to 100% coverage 
between both institutions. Once Nafin had authorised the main credit, 
Conacyt just carried out two technical evaluations to approve its part.
The project took two years to develop. With the first sales the firm 
managed to start generating the cash flow to repay the loan. The grace 
period is now over and the firm needs to restructure to be able to 
reinvest and continue growing. Compared to the initial authorisation, 
which was speedy, the restructuring is taking longer as there is no 
longer any coordination between Nafin and Banrural since an ordeal 
back in 1994 that led them to stop operations for six months. This was 
at the time of the devaluation of the peso and the Mexican financial 
crisis. The project was put at risk with the delays and the additional 
dollar-based debts of the firm. The initial sales saved it.
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d) Additional remarks
Regarding innovation projects in Mexico, Miguel Alvarado considers 
dealings with the government agencies and operation in an uncertain 
economy as a matter of'patience and resistance'. Nevertheless he finds 
that the support his firm has received from the government has been 
influential and feels he has been 'backed up.' Ideally, he believes 
programmes like Nafin's and Conacyt's should operate without the 
intermediation of the banks.
2-Firm: Compahfa Minera La Metalica 3
a) Technology Project and Relevance of Innovation
This project, developed as a partnership between a researcher and an 
entrepreneur, has been graded as a radical innovation or an 'assault 
technology' by technology raters. I t  is a development of worldwide 
impact as it revolutionises gold and silver extraction. The innovation lies 
on the cost-reducing improvement of the use of cyanide as a reactive. 
Less cyanide is needed per ton and less pollution is generated.
b) Commercial Results/Potential
Through association with some Canadian firms the project has 
continued, despite the difficulties it encountered, mainly with Conacyt. 
This is a new process technology that can be implemented in Mexico or 
in any other mining region of the world. Contacts have been made to 
license the technology to foreign counterparts. Conacyt's regional 
Delegate considers the project as a successful development, 'despite 




c) Financing of the project/experience with government's programmes
La Metalica presented the application for a FIDETEC credit, believing 
what the propaganda said: that there would be a response in maximum 
of three months. The technical evaluation alone took six months. The 
final approval of the credit came after more than a year and a half. Due 
to inflation, currency devaluation and adjustments to the project, the 
costs had changed while they waited. In their experience, the 
negotiation process with Conacyt was very complex. Conacyt's local 
branch has very limited faculties and mainly deals with basic 
administration, acting as a courier to the central offices. Changes of 
personnel in Mexico City delayed the whole process because it implied 
changes of norms and criteria. Almost in parallel the firm submitted the 
application with Nafin, Conacyt's countepart. As the banks were only 
recently privatised, they were not operating credits like this one. Being 
members of a local Credit Union, they managed to operate the credit 
that way. But together with most of the country's Credit Unions, this 
one closed down. The credit was transferred to another Union, which 
had no idea of how to manage the loan.
At the time of the interview the managers of La Metaiica could not tell 
exactly where their credit was. They claim to have been in that situation 
for more than a year and a half. No restructuring has been made, and 
long delays in the flow of the credit funds to the firm have resulted in 
the firm being unable to finish the final stage of the project. An 
extension of the initial credit was approved three days before the end of 
the 1994 devaluation (almost 100%). Those new funds came directly 
from Conacyt, leaving the firm with several institutions to deal with in 
the management of the loan. The resources shrank and were not 
enough to buy the imports needed. The programme does not cover 
currency fluctuations. The initial credit was of US$1.2 million and the 
extension of US$300 thousand. Together, they reached US$1.5 million, 
which was the maximum amount of a FIDETEC credit. The project was
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left halfway through with a funds shortage. I f  the owners had not been 
able to inject fresh capital the project would have gone bust, despite 
being a technology with high commercial potential.
d) Additional remarks
For Javier Felix, the experience with the government's agencies to 
finance the project has been a costly and painful one. When asked how 
they had managed to carry on with the project with all the adverse 
circumstances encountered, he pointed at a cartoon hanging on the wall 
above his desk and said 'we are the little frog who believes in the 
project and the big seagull is the government with its bureaucratic and 
ever-changing programmes'. At his request, a copy of the cartoon is 
shown below in Figure A.I.
Figure A .I. Cartoon illustrating a small firm-government relationship. 
The translation of the expression is: 'Never give up!'
• Jamas te ties 
pot- venciclo!
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3-Firm: Agroindustrias Carla 5
a) Technology Project and Relevance of Innovation
Ms. Natividad Reyes is an agricultural engineer devoted to the 
application of her research on the growth of new tropical species in the 
south of Mexico. Her main project concerns the adaptation of Maracuya 
(passion fruit) to the climactic conditions of Mexico, where it has 
previously never been grown. The project is an integration of a process 
from the cultivation of the fruit to its industrialisation to produce 
different products including liquor and preserves.
b) Commercial Results/Potential
The pilot crops were a success and the first pilot plant is already 
operating and generating the first sales of the Mexicanised passion fruit 
and its innovative subproducts. Consumption of Maracuya is growing 
worldwide, and historically it was grown only in Brazil, primarily because 
of the climate.
c) Financing of the project/experience with government's programmes
Being a new micro-firm, Agroindustrias Carla had no experience of 
financial negotiations. Conacyt gave it a FIDETEC credit based on the 
potential of the technology transfer and adaptation. After a lengthy and 
unsuccessful negotiation with several banks eventually a Credit Union 
accepted the project but under its own conditions, omitting the clauses 
of FIDETEC. When the project started, the costs had increased, but the 
extension needed to continue was not granted after the 1995 events. 
Nafin was supposed to give one third of the budget but it never 
happened. The commercial/industrial part of the project was stopped
5 Interview #8.
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and it is expected to gradually restart once the sales generate enough 
cash flow for reinvestment.
d) Additional remarks
Natividad Reyes is grateful to Conacyt and FIDETEC for the support 
given during the initial stage of the project, as without the loan, it 
would have not been possible to develop it. In her experience, the 
changes of administration in Conacyt brought a different attitude 
towards the projects in general: 'there was no commitment with 




REFERENCE NUMBERS OF INTERVIEWS AND DETAILS OF 
INTERVIEWEES (NAME, CURRENT7FORMER POSITIONS, 
DATE AND PLACE OF INTERVIEW)
Private Sector: Entrepreneurs and Business Associations'
Representatives
1. Miguel Alvarado: Entrepreneur. User of governmental technology 
programmes. 4-2-98, Chihuahua, Mexico.
2. Carlos Barcelo: Entrepreneur. User of governmental technology 
programmes. 23-4-98, Villahermosa, Mexico.
3. Antonio Castro: Entrepreneur and former Director of
CONCAMIN's Technology Commission. 30-4-98, Mexico City.
4. Andres Cohen: Entrepreneur and current Director of
CANACINTRA's Technology Commission. 11-5-98, Mexico City.
5. Javier Felix: Entrepreneur. User of governmental technology 
programmes. 24-1-98, Chihuahua, Mexico.
6. Guadalupe Munoz: Entrepreneur. User of governmental
technology programmes. 12-5-98, Mexico City.
7. Jose Represas: Entrepreneur. User of governmental technology 
programmes. 11-5-98, Mexico City.
8. Natividad Reyes: Entrepreneur. User of governmental
technology programmes. 23-4-98, Villahermosa, Mexico.
9. Raul Tovar: Entrepreneur and Technology Evaluator for Conacyt's 
Programmes. 11-5-98, Mexico City.
1 'Current' means the position held at the time of the interview.
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Public Sector: Politicians and Government Agencies' Officials
10. Fausto Alzati: Former Director General of Conacyt and former 
Minister of Education. 28-4-98, Mexico City.
11. Jorge Amigo: Former Secofi's Director General of Technology 
Development and current Director General of the Mexican Institute 
of Industrial Property (IMPI). 30-4-98, Mexico City.
12. Hector Arangua: Former Nafin's Deputy Director General and 
current Executive Director of FUNTEC (CONCAMIN). 7-5-98, 
Mexico City.
13. Ma. Jesus Calleros: Conacyt's Regional North-Centre Delegate.
4-2-98, Chihuahua, Mexico.
14. Martin Celaya: Conacyt's Regional Baja California Delegate. 11-
5-98, telephone interview, Mexico City-Ensenada.
15. Patricia Franco: Conacyt mid-level employee. 29-4-98, Mexico 
City.
16. Alonso Mercado: Former Credit Evaluator in Conacyt (FIDETEC), 
and current economics advisor at SHCP. 28-4-98, Mexico City.
17. Ma. Amparo Olivares: Conacyt employee, 29-4-98, Mexico City.
18. Juan A. Ramirez Bustos: Former Manager of Nafin's Technology 
Development Programme and Former employee of FONEI (BdeM- 
Central Bank). 30-4-98, Mexico City.
19. Carlos Salinas de Gortari: Former President of Mexico. 23-10- 
98, London.
20. Fernando Sanchez Ugarte: Former Vice-Minister of Industry and 
current President of the National Commission for Competition. 24-
4-98, Mexico City.
21. Jose Urquiza: Manager of Nafin's Technology Development 
Programme and Former employee of FONEI (BdeM-Central Bank). 
21-4-98, Mexico City.
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Financial Sector: Private Banks' Executives 
(non-attributable)
22. Banamex's Credit Evaluator. 8-5-98, Mexico City.
23. Bancomer's Credit Evaluator. 8-5-98, Mexico City.
24. Bital's Credit Evaluator. 11-5-98, Mexico City.
25. Banco Mexicano's Credit Evaluator. 12-5-98, Mexico City.
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Appendix 4
SUMMARY OF TOPICS FROM THE GUIDES FOR INTERVIEWS 
A -  Private Sector
a) Interviewees: Entrepreneurs and business associations' leaders or 
representatives before government technology committees.
b) Topics:
• What is their position regarding technology?
• How do they perceive the state's attitude and actions to promote 
technology?
• Have they presented specific requests and/or proposals to the public 
institutions in charge of it?
• How would they describe the technology culture of members of their 
business associations and their capacity to innovate, develop, or 
adapt technology?
• Do they think Mexican firms are capable of developing technology? 
Why?
• Do their associations have any programmes to support members in 
this sense? If  so, what is the response from them? Results?
• Whose responsibility is the financing of technology projects?
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B -  Public Sector
a) Interviewees: Politicians, public officials and bureaucrats.
b) Topics:
• Who are the main players in the policy network?
• What are their roles, strengths and resources?
• What is the decision-making process like?
• What have been the main events that have led to shifts in the
design of technology policy? Why? What have been the effects?
• Whose responsibility do they consider the financing of technology 
projects to be?
• With what importance is technology viewed within their institution?
Are there big contrasts between hierarchical levels within the
political and bureaucratic positions? And between them?
• What do they consider to be the role of the private banks in the 
financing of technology projects?
• Do they think Mexican firms are capable of developing technology? 
Why?
• Are there justifications for the state to intervene in the support of 
technology development? Why?
• How do they perceive the state's attitude and actions to promote 
technology?
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• Why, if it is generally agreed that technology is vital for economic 
development, has Mexico not developed a long-term policy to 
encourage it.
• Why, when the firms needed it the most to compete against the 
world, did liberalisation policies not include the need for strong state 
intervention in the case of technology?
• Are they aware that in Mexico there is not a support package for 
technology innovation and R&D similar to those in the countries 
against which Mexico is competing?
C -  Financial Sector
a) Interviewees: private banks' credit executives.
b) Topics:
• Do they have an explicit policy for technology projects? I f  so, is it in 
favour of or against them?
• Do they know of any technology projects to which their bank has 
given credit? How many? Do they see the bank giving credit to these 
activities in the near future?
• What has been the experience and results?
• Do they know of government funds they can access to give credits 
for those projects?
• Which ones do they know? Have they used them? I f  not, why not? I f  
yes, what was the experience like?
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Appendix 5
NAMES OF THE FIRMS WHOSE OWNER OR DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
RESPONDED TO THE SURVEY'S QUESTIONNAIRE
Survey conducted in Mexico by telephone: 24 April to 13 May, 1998.
NAME OF FIRM LOCATION 
(City and State)
1. Agroequipos Laufel Zapopan, Jalisco
2. Agroindustrias Carla Villahermosa, Tabasco
3. Alimentos Institucionales Guadalajara, Jalisco
4. Aluplastic Mexico, DF
5. Anticat Mexico, DF
6. Asesores en Biologfa Pesquera Ensenada, Baja California
7. Bexel Internacional Monterrey, Nuevo Leon
8. Biosfera Mexico, DF
9. Cajas de Carton Murgufa Iztapalapa, Edo.Mexico
10. Calipo Ensenada, Baja California
11. Cana Alcohol Cordoba, Veracruz
12. Cartonera Tap San Pedro, Edo.Mexico
13. Celsol Sta. Catarina, Nuevo Leon
14. Centro de Moldes y Troqueles Chihuahua, Chihuahua
15. Chibelt Mexico, DF
16. Cimbys Emresarial Lomas Verdes, Edo.Mexico
17. Cinetica Qufmica Monterrey, Nuevo Leon
18. Compama Transf. Geometalurgica Hermosillo, Sonora
19. Compania Minera la Metalica Chihuahua, Chihuahua
20. Consorcio de Desarrollo Tecnologico Tijuana, Baja California
21. Consorcio de Profesionales Petroleros Naucalpan, Edo.Mexico
22. Consultores en Ingenieria y Proyectos Mexico, DF
23. Contrataciones Conaro Mexico, DF
24. Craft Instrumentos Cientfficos Azcapotzalco, Edo. Mexico
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25. Diseno e Innovacion Tecnologica Azcapotzalco, Edo. Mexico
26. Dispositivos Nafi Mexico, DF
27. Don Pez Tesia Navojoa, Sonora
28. Envases Microonda Leon, Guanajuato
29. Fase de Morelos Cuernavaca, Morelos
30. Fermic. Iztapalapa Estado de Mexico.
31. Francisco Conabal Mexico, DF
32. Genetro Villahermosa, Tabasco
33. Hielera Juarez Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua
34. Holotec Ensenada, Baja California
35. Horacio Guerra Monclova, Coahuila
36. Industria Nacional de Tanques Monclova, Coahuila
37. Industrial Xalapa Ezequiel Montes,Queretaro
38. Industrias Plas Mexico, DF
39. Informatica Directiva Aplicada Mexico, DF
40. Informatica e Ingenierfa Integral Cuernavaca, Morelos
41. Ingredientes Funcionales de Mexico Mexico, DF
42. Innovaciones de Sistemas Mexicali, Baja California
43. Langostinos y Camarones de Oriente Veracruz, Veracruz
44. Losamex Mexico, DF
45. Maldonado Computadoras Colima, Colima
46. Moises Harari Mexico, DF
47. Mol-Ane Merida, Yucatan
48. New Products D'sign de Mexico Mexico, DF
49. Nixtasol Mexico, DF
50. Oficina Especializada de Servicios Chihuahua, Chihuahua
51. Onyx Servicios en Ingenierfa Mexicali, Baja California
52. Oxxo Mexico, DF
53. Pisis Grupo de Desarrollo Mexico, DF
54. Plasticos Industrializados Micle Leon, Guanajuato
55. Porcfcola Rio Lerma La Piedad, Michoacan
56. Procesadora de Fibras Textiles Puebla, Puebla
57. Procesadora y Envasadora Toluca, Estado de Mexico
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58. Productora de Colageno
59. Productos Qufmicos de Chihuahua
60. Proveedor Oriente de Equipos
61. Proyectos Integrates de Ingenierfa
62. Quality Exports de Mexico
63. Quim de Mexico
64. Qufmica Agronomica de Mexico
65. Raips
66. Resinas y Materiales
67. Soc. Cooperativa Productos Tecoxpa
68. Tecnologfa Sistemas y Aplicaciones
69. Tecnologico de Chihuahua





















ENCUESTA DE OPINION EMPRESARIAL SOBRE EL DESARROLLO TECNOLOGICO
DE MEXICO 
UNIVERSIDAD DE LONDRES
INTRODUCCION A LA ENCUESTA:
Buenas tardes. Mi nombre es  . Estoy apoyando un proyecto de investigacidn de la
Universidad de Londres, relacionado con un estudio internacional sobre el desarrollo 
tecnoldgico en diversos palses. Actualmente estamos realizando una encuesta a nivel 
nacional, entre aquellas empresas que han demostrado interns en desarrollar proyectos 
tecnoldgicos. El objetivo es evaluar las condiciones a las cu&les se enfrentaron para la 
viabllidad de sus proyectos. La encuesta es sencilla y dura aproximadamente 15 minutos. 
La informacidn proporcionada servir£ para detectar factores que influyen en la generacidn 
de un mercado tecnoldgico en Mexico. <j,Podrlamos contar con su opinidn?
1. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menos y 5 lo mds, ^qu6 tan importante es la
tecnologla para el desarrollo del pals ?
1 2 3 4 5
2. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menor y 5 lo mayor, ^qu6 tan importante es la
tecnologla para el crecimiento de su empresa ?
1 2 3 4 5
3. i,Considera que las empresas mexicanas pueden desarrollar tecnologla propia?
Si  No_____
4. £Cu&les de las siguientes categorlas empresariales pueden desarrollar tecnologla?
a) Micro
b) Pequefias y medianas
c) Grandes
d) Transnacionales
5. De las siguientes formas de invertir en tecnologla, seleccione las 2 que considere 
m£s importantes para el crecimiento de su empresa:
a) Adaptar
b) Innovar
c) Comprar tecnologla nacional
d) Importar
6. ^Considera que su empresa tiene capacidad innovadora ? SI  No_____
7. De los siguientes conceptos, mencione si considera que son esenciales para que una 








8. <f,Qud impacto ha tenido la apertura comercial en su empresa ?
9. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo 1 lo menos y 5 lo mds, ^qud tan creativos considera 
Ud. a los empresarios mexicanos ?
1 2 3 4 5
10. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menor y 5 lo mayor, ^qud tanto deben los 
empresarios apoyar y promover el desarrollo tecnoldgico ?
1 2 3 4 5
11. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menor y 5 lo mayor, ^qud tanto deben las 
asociaciones empresariales apoyar y promover el desarrollo tecnoldgico ?
1 2 3 4 5
12. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menor y 5 lo mayor, ^qud tanto deben las 
instituciones educativas apoyar y promover el desarrollo tecnoldgico ?
1 2 3 4 5
13. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menor y 5 lo mayor, ^qud tanto deben los 
centros de investigacidn y desarrollo apoyar y promover el desarrollo tecnoldgico ?
1 2 3 4 5
14. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menor y 5 lo mayor, ^qud tanto debe el 
gobierno federal apoyar y promover el desarrollo tecnoldgico ?
1 2 3 4 5
15. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menor y 5 lo mayor, ^qud tanto deben los 
gobiernos estatales apoyar y promover el desarrollo tecnoldgico ?
1 2 3 4 5
16. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menor y 5 lo mayor, ^qud tanto deben los 
organismos internacionales apoyar y promover el desarrollo tecnoldgico ?
1 2 3 4 5
17. <j,Ha llevado a cabo su empresa algun proyecto de desarrollo tecnoldgico? Si_____
Cudntos  No_____
Si la respuesta fue negativa, preguntar ;
^Por qud ?
Pasar al final de la encuesta y  tomar los datos.
18. ^Solicitd apoyo del gobierno para desarrollar su proyecto ? 
Si_____
No <»,Por qud?__________________________
Si la respuesta es negativa pasar a la pregunta 22.
19. ^Qud tipo de apoyo solicitd ?
 Financiero
 Orientacidn y asesoria
Otros__________________________________________
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20. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menos y 5 lo mOs, ^cOmo califica la atenciOn y 
el servicio del gobierno a su solicitud ?
1 2 3 4 5
21. iObtuvo financiamiento del gobierno para el desarrollo de sus proyectos?
SI  En cudntos_____
No  <j,Por quO?________________________
Si la respuesta es positiva y  mds de 1, solicitar que seleccione el proyecto mds 
importante en base a su experiencia personal para continuar con el cuestionario.
Si la respuesta es negativa y  hay mds de un proyecto, solicitar que seleccione el mds 
importante en base a su experiencia personal para continuar con el cuestionario.
22. De los siguientes conceptos, que tipo de proyecto fue el de su empresa:
a) Innovation
b) Mejora
c) Adaptation de tecnologla extranjera
d) Adaptation de tecnologla nacional
e) Otros___________________________________________




24. El proyecto es :_____Precompetitivo
 Escalamiento industrial
25. Es un proyecto de riesgo tecnolOgico :
Bajo Medio Alto
26. ^QuiOn fue llder del proyecto ?
a) Propietario(s)
b) Director General
c) Responsable del Orea involucrada
d) Persona contratada especialmente
e) Asesor extemo
f) Otros_______________________________________
27. iUtilizaron servicios de alguna institution de investigation y desarrollo?
SI  CuOles_______________________________
No_____
Si su respuesta es negativa, pasar a la pregunta 29.
28. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo 1 lo peor y 5 lo mejor, ^cOrno califica el servicio 
proporcionado por la institution de investigation y desarrollo?
1 2 3 4 5






30. ^CuOndo iniciO el proyecto ? ______________________________________
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31. <j,EI proyecto inicid en el tiempo planeado ?
Si_____
No  £Por qud?______________________________________
Si el proyecto no ha concluido pasar a la pregunta 35.
32. ^El proyecto concluy6 en el tiempo planeado ?
Si_____
No  ^Por qu6?______________________________________
33. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menos exitoso y 5 lo mds exitoso, ^cdmo 
califica los resultados teenicos ?
1 2 3 4 5
34. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menos exitoso y 5 lo mds exitoso, <?,qud c6mo 
califica los resultados comerciales ?
1 2 3 4 5
35. El proyecto <j,se relaciona directamente con el giro de la empresa ?
SI  No_____
36. ^Tiene planes para continuar con otros proyectos ? 
Si  No_____
37. ^Ha recibido asesoria y apoyo de las asociaciones empresariales a las que pertenece 
para desarrollar el proyecto ?
SI  No_____
38. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menos y 5 lo mds, qud tanto las asociaciones
empresariales defienden los intereses de sus asociados respecto a la tecnologia ?
1 2 3 4 5
39. Recomendarfa a otras empresas desarrollar proyectos tecnoldgicos ?
Si_____
No  <j,Por qud?__________________________________________
40. ^Solicitd apoyo a instituciones financieras ?
Si_____
No  £Por qud?_____________________________________________
41. ^Cudl fue la respuesta ? Positiva  Negativa_____
42. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 negativo y 5 positivo, ^cdmo califica la actitud de 
las instituciones financieras hacia los proyectos tecnoldgicos?
1 2 3 4 5
43. De los siguientes conceptos, <j,en qud porcentaje fue financiado el proyecto ?
a) Recursos del gobierno_____
b) Crdditos de instituciones financieras_____
c) Recursos propios_____
d) Crdditos del extranjero_____
e) Otros_________________________________________________
44. ^Cucinto tiempo le llevd reunir los fondos necesarios ?
 Menos de 3 meses ____ De3a6meses  De6a12meses
 De 1 a 2 afios  Mds de 2 afios
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45. ^Obtuvo apoyo de mbs de 1 programa de financiamiento del gobierno para desarrollar 
su proyecto? SI  No____
46. <j,De cubles de los siguientes programas obtuvo apoyo?
 Fonei
 Desarrollo Tecnolbgico de Nafin
 Proyectos Tecnol6gicos de Conacyt
 Riesgo Compartido de Conacyt
 Fidetec de Conacyt
Otros____________________________________
47. En caso de haber tenido distintos apoyos del gobierno para el mismo proyecto, 
contestar las siguientes preguntas para cada uno de los programas en que participo.
48. ^Cbmo recibi6 los recursos ?
a) Directamente de la 
Institucibn
b) Por medio de Banco
c) De Uni6n de Crbdito
d) Otros
a) Directamente de la 
Institucibn
b) Por medio de Banco
c) De Unibn de Crbdito
d) Otros
a) Directamente de la 
Institucidn
b) Por medio de Banco
c) De Unidn de Crddito
d) Otros
49. ^C6mo se enterb de los programas del gobierno a los cue solicitd apoyo ?
a) Publicidad
b) Recomendacibn










c) Acudid a solicitar 
informacion
d) Otros
50. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menos y 5 lo rods, ^qub tan clara fue la 
informacibn que le otorgaron ?
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
51. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo el 1 lo menos y 5 lo mbs, i,c6mo califica el servicio 
que recibi6 ?
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
52. ^Cubnto tiempo le tomb obtener el resultado de su aplicacibn ?
a) Menos de 3 meses
b) De 3a 6 meses
c) De 6 a 12 meses
d) De 1 a 2 anos
e) Mas de 2 anos
a) Menos de 3 meses
b) De 3a 6 meses
c) De 6 a 12 meses
d) De 1 a 2 afios
e) Mbs de 2 anos
a) Menos de 3 meses
b) De 3a 6 meses
c) De6 a 12 meses
d) De 1 a 2 afios
e) Mdsde2arios
53. Cubles cree que fueron los factores que influenciaron la decisibn ?
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54. Fue visitada su empresa por evaluadores?
SI No SI No CO z o
55. /,1-lubo evaluaciones de seguimiento durante el proceso de desarrollo ?
SI No SI No SI No
56. ^Alguna vez le solicitaron retroalimentacibn sobre su experiencia o le pidieron
sugerencias para mejorar el programa ?
SI No SI No SI No
57. Su proyecto inicib durante un periodo presidencial y continud en otro ?
SI No SI No SI No
58. ^Afect6 este cambio a su proyecto ?
SI No SI No SI No
59. ^De qu6 manera ?
60. £Hubo cambios del personal responsable del programa durante el desarrollo de su
proyecto?
SI No SI No CO z o
61. <iDe qu6 nivel?
a) Direccidn General del 
Organismo, Cudntas 
veces
b) Director del Programa, 
Cu&ntas veces
c) Subdirectores, Cudntas 
veces
d) Personal T6cnico, 
Cucintas veces
a) Direccidn General del 
Organismo, Cu£ntas 
veces
b) Director del Programa, 
Cu&ntas veces
c) Subdirectores, Cu£ntas 
veces
d) Personal T6cnico, 
Cuantas veces
a) Direccidn General del 
Organismo, Cu£ntas 
veces
b) Director del Programa, 
Cuantas veces
c) Subdirectores, Cuantas 
veces
d) Personal T6cnico, Cuantas 
veces
62.^Afectaron estos cambios a su proyecto ?
SI No SI No SI No
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63. ^De qub manera ?
64. Si no hubiera tenido ayuda del gobierno, <j,habrla llevado al cabo el proyecto de 
cualquier manera ? SI  No_____
65. ^Considera necesario que el gobierno participe en estas actividades que finalmente 
son para el beneficio de empresas particulares ?
SI  No_____
66. iH a  recibido asesorla para proteger su desarrollo ? SI  No_____
67. <j,De quibn ? _____________________________________________________
68. i Ha iniciado tramites de proteccibn ? SI  No_____
69. En una escala del 1 al 5, siendo uno lo menos y 5 lo mejor, c6mo califica los 
procedimientos para obtener la proteccibn de su desarrollo?
1 2 3 4 5
70. ^Recomendarla a otras empresas solicitar apoyos gubernamentales ?
SI  No_____
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DATOS DE LA EMPRESA 
NOMBRE:_____________
DOMICILIO:____________________________________________________________
CIUDAD :________________________ ESTADO :_______________
TELEFONO_______________
DATOS DEL ENTREVISTADO NOMBRE Y PUESTO:
TAMANO DE EMPRESA:
a) Micro
b) Pequefias y medianas
c) Grandes




ASOCIACIONES A LAS QUE PERTENECE:
Sr.-------------Su informacibn nos ha sido de gran utilidad. Muchas gracias por el tiempo





SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
SURVEY: ENTREPRENEURS’ OPINION OF MEXICO’S TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT 
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEY:
Hello. My name is  . We are conducting a research project at the University of London
about technology development in different countries. This is a national survey amongst 
firms that have shown interest in developing technology projects. The purpose of the study 
is the evaluation of the conditions in which projects are developed. The questionnaire is 
simple and takes approximately fifteen minutes to be answered. The information given will 
help in the identification of those factors that impact the generation of a technology market 
in Mexico. Could we have your opinion?
1. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how important is 
technology for the country’s development?
1 2 3 4 5
2. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how important is 
technology for the growth of your firm?
1 2 3 4 5
3. Can Mexican enterprises develop technology?
Yes  No_____
4. Which of the following categories of firms are able to develop technology?
a) Micro-sized firms
b) Small and medium-sized firms
c) Large firms
d) Transnationals
5. Which of the following methods of investment in technology are the two most important 
for enabling your firm to grow?
a) Adaptation
b) Innovation
c) Purchase of national technology
d) Imports of technology
6. Does your firm have an innovation capacity? Yes  No_____









8. What have been the effects of trade liberalisation for your firm?
9. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how creative are 
Mexican entrepreneurs?
1 2 3 4 5
10. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how responsible are 
businessmen for the process of promotion and development of the country’s 
technology (do they consider it their duty)?
1 2 3 4 5
11. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how responsible are 
business associations for the process of promotion and development of the country’s 
technology (do they consider it their duty)?
1 2 3 4 5
12. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how responsible are 
education institutions for the process of promotion and development of the country’s 
technology (do they consider it their duty)?
1 2 3 4 5
13. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how responsible are 
research centres in the process of promotion and development of the country’s 
technology (do they consider it their duty)?
1 2 3 4 5
14. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how responsible is the 
federal government for the process of promotion and development of the country’s 
technology (does it consider it as its duty)?
1 2 3 4 5
15. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how responsible are 
state-level governments for the process of promotion and development of the 
country’s technology (do they consider it their duty)?
1 2 3 4 5
16. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how responsible are 
international organisations in the process of promotion and development of the 
country’s technology (do they consider it their duty)?
1 2 3 4 5
17. Has your firm developed any technology projects?
Yes  How many? No_____
If the answer is negative, ask :
Why?
Go to the end of the questionnaire and request the general information for this firm.
18. Did you request or apply for any governmental support to develop the project?
Yes  No Why?___________________________
If the answer is negative go to question 22.
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19. What type of support did you request?
 Financial
Advice and information 
Other__________________________
20. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how was the service 
you received from the government?
1 2 3 4 5
21. Did you receive government funding to develop your projects?
Yes  For how many?_____
No  Why?________________________
If the answer is Yes and for more than one project: ask the respondent to select the 
project he/she considers the most important to continue the questionnaire.
If the answer is No and the respondent mentions the existence of more than one 
project: ask the respondent to select the project he/she considers the most important 
to continue the questionnaire.
22. Which type of project did your firm develop?
a) Innovation
b) Improvement
c) Adaptation of foreign technology
d) Adaptation of domestic technology
e) Other__________________________________________




24. The stage of the project is :_____Pre-competitive
 Industrial Scaling
25. The risk involved in the project is:
Low Medium High
26. Who is the leader of the project?
a) Owner(s)
b) Director-General
c) A person responsible for the specific area
d) Someone hired specifically for the project
e) External consultant
f) Other_______________________________________
27. Did you use the services of research and development institutions?
Yes  Which ones?_______________________________
No_____
If the answer is No, go to question 29.
28. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how do you rate the 
services provided by the research and development institution(s)?
1 2 3 4 5
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30. When did the project start?______________________________________
31. Did the project start as planned?
Yes_____
No  Why?______________________________________
If the project has not concluded go to question 35.
32. Did the project end as planned?
Yes_____
No  Why?______________________________________
33. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how successful are 
the technical results?
1 2 3 4 5
34. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how successful are 
the commercial results?
1 2 3 4 5
35. Does the project relate directly to the firm’s main activities?
Yes  No_____
36. Are there plans to continue with more projects?
Yes  No_____
37. Have you received advice and/or support for your project from the business chambers 
and associations that your firm belongs to?
Yes  No_____
38. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how much do 
business chambers defend the interests of their members in relation to technology 
issues?
1 2 3 4 5
39. Do you recommend other firms to develop technology projects?
Yes
No Why?__________________________________________
40. Did you apply for funding from financial institutions?
Yes_____
No  Why?_____________________________________________
41. How was their response? Positive  Negative_____
42. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being negative and 5 positive, how do you rate the attitude of 
private financial institutions towards technology projects?
1 2 3 4 5
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43. How was the project financed (percentages)?
a) Government funding_____




44. How long did it take to get the necessary funding?
 Less than 3 months _____3 to 6 months  6 to 12 months
 1 to 2 years  More than 2 years
45. Did you receive funds from more than one government programme or institution? 
Yes  No____
46. From which programmes did you receive funds? 
 Fonei
 Desarrollo Tecnoldgico (Nafin)
 Proyectos Tecnolbgicos (Conacyt)
 Riesgo Compartido (Conacyt)
 Fidetec (Conacyt)
Other__________________________________
47. If there was funding from different programmes or institutions the following 15
questions should be answered for each of them, using one column per programme or 
institution.
48. How did you receive the funds?
a) Directly from the 
institution
b) Via a commercial bank
c) Via a credit union
d) Other
a) Directly from the 
institution
b) Via a commercial bank
c) Via a credit union
d) Other
a) Directly from the 
institution
b) Via a commercial bank
c) Via a credit union
d) Other
49. How did you know about the government programmes for which you applied?
a) Advertisement
b) Recommendation








c) Visited the institution
d) Other
50. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how clear was the 
information you received?
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
51. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how do you rate the 
service provided?
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
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52. How long did it take to receive a response to your application?
a) Less than 3 months
b) 3 to 6 months
c) 6 to 12 months
d) 1 to 2 years
e) More than 2 years
a) Less than 3 months
b) 3 to 6 months
c) 6 to 12 months
d) 1 to 2 years
e) More than 2 years
a) Less than 3 months
b) 3 to 6 months
c) 6 to 12 months
d) 1 to 2 years
e) More than 2 years
53. Which do you think were the factors that influenced the decision?
54. Was the firm visited by evaluators?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
55. Were there follow-up evaluations during the process of the project being developed?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
56. Were you ever asked for feedback regarding your experience with the programme or 
were you asked for suggestions for how to improve the service?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
57. Did the project start during one presidential term and end or continue during a different 
one?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
58. Did this affect your project?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
59. In what way?
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60. Were there changes in the personnel responsible for the programme during the 
development of your project?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
61. At which levels?
a) Director-General of the 
Institution.
Freauencv
b) Programme Director. 
Freauencv
c) Mid-level personnel. 
Freauencv
d) Technical personnel. 
Freauencv
a) Director-General of the 
Institution.
Freauencv
b) Programme Director. 
Freauencv
c) Mid-level personnel. 
Freauencv
d) Technical personnel. 
Freauencv
a) Director-General of the 
Institution.
Freauencv
b) Programme Director. 
Freauencv
c) Mid-level personnel. 
Freauencv
d) Technical personnel. 
Frequencv
62. Did the changes affect your project?
Yes No Yes No Yesf No
63. In what way?
64. If you had not have support from the government, would have developed the project?
Yes  No_____
65. Do you consider it necessary for the government to participate in the support of 
technology activities even if they are for the benefit of individual firms?
Yes  No_____




68. Have you started the process to protect the rights of your project?
Yes  No_____
69. On a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the lowest and 5 the highest rating, how do you rate the 
procedures and laws to protect the rights of your project?
1 2 3 4 5
70. Do you recommend other firms to apply for government support?
Yes  No_____
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NAME AND POSITION OF THE RESPONDENT:
SIZE OF THE FIRM:
a) Micro
b) Small or medium-sized
c) Large
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